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ABSTRACT
Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize time between computer systems
communicating over unreliable, variable-latency, and untrusted network paths. Time
is critical for many applications; in particular it is heavily utilized by cryptographic
protocols. Despite its importance, the community still lacks visibility into the robust-
ness of the NTP ecosystem itself, the integrity of the timing information transmitted
by NTP, and the impact that any error in NTP might have upon the security of other
protocols that rely on timing information. In this thesis, we seek to accomplish the
following broad goals:
1. Demonstrate that the current design presents a security risk, by showing that
network attackers can exploit NTP and then use it to attack other core Internet
protocols that rely on time.
2. Improve NTP to make it more robust, and rigorously analyze the security of
the improved protocol.
3. Establish formal and precise security requirements that should be satisfied by
a network time-synchronization protocol, and prove that these are sufficient for
the security of other protocols that rely on time.
vi
We take the following approach to achieve our goals incrementally.
1. We begin by (a) scrutinizing NTP’s core protocol (RFC 5905) and (b) stati-
cally analyzing code of its reference implementation to identify vulnerabilities
in protocol design, ambiguities in specifications, and flaws in reference imple-
mentations. We then leverage these observations to show several off- and on-
path denial-of-service and time-shifting attacks on NTP clients. We then show
cache-flushing and cache-sticking attacks on DNSSEC that leverage NTP. We
quantify the attack surface using Internet measurements, and suggest simple
countermeasures that can improve the security of NTP and DNS(SEC).
2. Next we move beyond identifying attacks and leverage ideas from Universal
Composability (UC) security framework to develop a cryptographic model for
attacks on NTP’s datagram protocol. We use this model to prove the security
of a new backwards-compatible protocol that correctly synchronizes time in the
face of both off- and on-path network attackers.
3. Next, we propose general security notions for network time-synchronization pro-
tocols within the UC framework and formulate ideal functionalities that capture
a number of prevalent forms of time measurement within existing systems. We
show how they can be realized by real-world protocols (including but not limited
to NTP), and how they can be used to assert security of time-reliant applica-
tions — specifically, cryptographic certificates with revocation and expiration
times. Our security framework allows for a clear and modular treatment of the
use of time in security-sensitive systems.
Our work makes the core NTP protocol and its implementations more robust and
secure, thus improving the security of applications and protocols that rely on time.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Time Synchronization & Network Time Protocol (NTP)
The need for time in computer network systems does not arise from the desire to
provide synchronous communication, quality of service, or other “sophisticated” net-
working primitives. Rather, the need for correct time is often coupled with the safe
use of applications especially for cryptography to thwart attacks against the network.
It may appear that measuring real time is a relatively easy task; indeed, most
computing platforms today, even low end ones, are equipped with a built-in clock.
Still, synchronizing and adjusting these clocks, and in particular reaching agreement
on time in an asynchronous network like the Internet turns out to be non-trivial. In
particular, Network Time Protocol (NTP), one of the oldest protocols in the Inter-
net and the current Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard to synchronize
time between computer systems communicating over unreliable variable-latency net-
work paths, is rather complex. In its most typical client-server mode of operation,
NTP assumes a hierarchical system of “time servers”, where lower-stratum servers
are assumed to have a more accurate notion of time, and higher-stratum servers de-
termine time by querying several lower-stratum ones and performing some complex
aggregation of the responses. The protocol has mechanisms for protecting from er-
rors introduced by network delays, but is built on complete trust in the queried time
servers, as well as in the authenticity of the communication.
The goal of this thesis is to make the core NTP protocol and its implementations
1
2more robust and secure.
1.2 Motivation to Secure NTP
Time matters! Time is a fundamental building block for multiple applications;
in particular it is heavily utilized by cryptographic protocols. For instance, crypto-
graphic protocols use timestamps to prevent replay attacks and limit the use of stale
or compromised cryptographic material, e.g., TLS (Rescorla, 2018), HSTS (Hodges
et al., 2012), DNSSEC (Arends et al., 2005a), RPKI (Lepinski and Kent, 2012), au-
thentication protocols, etc. while accurate time synchronization is a basic requirement
for various distributed systems like email, bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008), etc.
Why do we care about NTP? NTP is the most dominant protocol in the In-
ternet to update system time (Minar, 1999), (Murta et al., 2006), (Czyz et al.,
2014a) (Mauch, 2015). When NTP fails on the system, multiple applications on
the system can fail, all at the same time. Such benign (non-malicious) failures have
happened. On November 19, 2012 (Bicknell, 2012), for example, two important NTP
(stratum 1) servers, tick.usno.navy.mil and tock.usno.navy.mil, went back in
time by about 12 years, causing outages at a variety of devices including Active Di-
rectory (AD) authentication servers, PBXs and routers (Morowczynski, 2012). Other
than these benign failures, exploits of individual NTP clients can also serve as a
building block for malicious attacks on other protocols and applications. For ex-
ample, several authors (Mills, 2011, pg 33, pg 183) (Klein, 2013), (Selvi, 2015)
have observed that NTP could be used to undermine the security of TLS certifi-
cates. Others like (Corbixgwelt, 2011) suggest how an NTP attacker can trick a
victim into rejecting a legitimate block on bitcoin blockchain, or waste computa-
tional power on a stale block. (Klein, 2013) also discusses the implications of shifting
time on logging and authentication services. (Selvi, 2014), (Selvi, 2015) was the first
3Table 1.1: Attacking various applications with NTP.
To attack... change time by ... To attack... change time by ...
TLS Certificates years or months Routing (RPKI) days
HSTS a year Bitcoin hours
DNSSEC months API authentication minutes
Kerberos minutes DNS Caches days
to practically demonstrate Man-in-The-middle timeshifting attacks on Simple NTP
(SNTP) (Mills, 2006) to attack another application HTTP Strict Transport Security
(HSTS). HSTS is used by a webserver to tell its client that all future connections
should use HTTPS. The HSTS request, however, comes with an expiry time (one
year is recommended (OWASP, 2015)) after which point the client need no longer
use an encrypted connection; thus, an NTP attacker that sends the client a year into
the future can effectively disable HSTS, allowing for downgrade attacks (e.g., ‘SSL
Stripping’ (Marlinspike, 2009)) to non-encrypted connections.
We summarize (in Table 1.1) various applications that can be subverted by lever-
aging vulnerabilities in NTP. This further motivates the need for securing NTP.
1.3 Our Novel Research Approach Towards Network Proto-
col Security
In this thesis we use a novel research approach towards network protocol security
comprising of techniques ranging from theoretical to applied. While we focus on
securing NTP, our research approach is general and can be applied to other network
protocols.
Overview of network protocols ecosystem (See Figure 1·1) Network proto-
cols like NTP are specified in the documents called RFCs published by IETF, the
standards body for Internet protocols. These are important documents that are ref-
erenced by different developers for various implementations. A single protocol may
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Figure 1·1: Overview of network protocols ecosystem.
have several implementations. Further each implementation may have several differ-
ent configurations1 when they are deployed in the real world. Although these imple-
mentations when shipped with operating systems have certain default configuration,
they may be customized by the end users.
Following is the exposition of our approach towards network protocols security:
Scrutinizing RFCs. In order to do any meaningful research on network protocols,
the first obvious step is to take a deep dive into RFCs. This helps us recognize
underspecifications in the protocol and ambiguities in the written language that may
lead to vulnerabilities.
Analyzing implementation code. The next step is to analyze the code of different
implementations of the protocol to see how these underspecifications and ambiguities
are interpreted by the developers and baked into the software2.
This two-step process exposes potential security vulnerabilities due to flaws in
protocol design or gaps in implementation and specifications.
Simulating attacks and network measurements. The next step is to demon-
strate network attacks on the protocol for different implementations that leverage
1Implementations come with configuration files used to configure the parameters and initial set-
tings for some computer programs.
2RFCs do not necessarily mandate everything. Some things are left to the interpretation or choice
of developers.
5vulnerabilities identified in the above process. Finally we perform measurements in
the Internet to determine the attack surface i.e., the number of IPs that are vulnerable
to our attacks.
Security & Cryptography. Having demonstrate the fragility/subvertibilty of the
protocol, the next step is to make it more robust and secure. Our approach towards
this depends on the underlying issue. Sometimes these vulnerabilities are due to gaps
between the specifications and implementations. This usually requires modifications
in RFCs and code changes in the existing software. Other times the identified security
issue is due to flaw(s) in the design of the core protocol itself, which requires a change
in the protocol design and use of cryptographic tools to prove its security.
1.4 NTP Security: History & Current-State-of-Art
NTP’s design rationale. At the time of its inception back in 1985 (Mills, 1985,
Sec. 2) there were two main design goals for the service provided by NTP.
1. Robustness To mitigate errors due to equipment or network propagation failures,
NTP was designed as a service where a client can gather timing samples from
multiple peers over multiple communication paths and then combine them to
get more accurate measurement.
2. Load distribution Top-level NTP servers that are directly attached to high pre-
cision time-keeping devices like atomic clocks, GPS, etc have more accurate
time. While ideally every NTP client would like to connect to these devices,
that would wreck havoc for these relatively fewer NTP servers and the net-
work. So to reduce protocol load on the network, NTP service was designed in
a hierarchical manner.
RFC 958 (Mills, 1985, Sec. 3) also states the following non-goals of the protocol:
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1. Peer authentication The protocol does not provide any guarantee on the identity
of the entity that the NTP client thinks that it is connected to.
2. Data integrity The protocol provides no guarantee on the correctness of the
data delivered. Integrity check was deferred to the lower layers of the protocol
stack such as IP and UDP layer checksums.
It is clear from above that security against malicious entities was a “non-goal” for the
protocol at the time of its design. We attribute this to the following two reasons:
1. Like many other protocols in common use on the Internet today, NTP was de-
signed at a time when Internet was not as vast and full of untrusted entities
as it is today. e.g., until late 1980’s, before the commercialization of the Inter-
net with the arrival of ISPs and World Wide Web (WWW), the Internet was
basically an internetwork of few mutually-trusted nodes (Leiner et al., 1999).
2. Time, unlike today, was not crucially used by other security critical applications.
See, for example, Figure 1·2 for a rough timeline of the development of security
protocols, that depend on time to provide functionality and security guarantees,
that developed after NTP.
7Current state-of-art of NTP security. Since the need for securing NTP was re-
alized after the development of protocols that relied on time, there were proposals for
cryptographically-authenticating NTP3. While NTP supports both symmetric (Mills
et al., 2010) as well as asymmetric authentication (Haberman and Mills, 2010) mech-
anisms, we found that they are rarely used in practice because of limitations of both.
Symmetric cryptographic authentication appends an MD5 hash keyed with symmetric
key k of the NTP packet contents m as MD5(k||m) (Mills, 2011, pg 264) to the
NTP packet. MD5(k||m) is intended to be a cryptographic message authentication
code (MAC). There are at least two major problems with this approach. First, the
use of MD5 in this manner is not a provably secure MAC and is also vulnerable to
length-extension attacks (Bellare et al., 1996); HMAC should be used instead (Bellare
et al., 1996). Moreover, MD5 is not collision-resistant (Wang and Yu, 2005) and has
been deprecated in favor of more secure hash functions like SHA-256 (Turner and
Chen, 2011). Second, the symmetric key k must be pre-configured manually, which
makes this solution quite cumbersome for public servers that must accept queries
from arbitrary clients. (Indeed, NIST operates important public stratum 1 servers
and distributes symmetric keys only to users that register, once per year, via US
mail or facsimile (NIST, 2010); the US Naval Office does something similar (USNO,
2015).)
Asymmetric cryptographic authentication is provided by the Autokey protocol, first
described in RFC 5906 (Haberman and Mills, 2010). RFC 5906 is not a standards-
track document (it is classified as ‘Informational’), NTP clients do not request Au-
tokey associations by default (Autokey, 2012), and many public NTP servers do
not support Autokey (e.g., the NIST timeservers (NIST, 2010), many servers in
3The payload of NTP packets consists basically of timestamps, which are not considered se-
cret (Mizrahi, 2012b). Therefore, encryption of the time synchronization protocol packet’s payload
is usually of low importance.
8pool.ntp.org). The most critical problem, however, is that the protocol has non-
standard authentication mechanisms and is badly broken. Any network attacker can
trivially retrieve the secret key shared between the client and the server (Ro¨ttger,
2012). In fact, a lead developer of the ntpd client wrote in 2015 (Stenn, 2015a): “No-
body should be using autokey. Or from the other direction, if you are using autokey
you should stop using it.”
These limitations inhibit the adoption of cryptographically-authenticated NTP,
thus exposing it to network attacks.
1.5 Our Goals
We observe that despite the critical role played by NTP, the community lacks visibility
into the robustness of the NTP ecosystem itself, the integrity of the timing information
transmitted by NTP, and the impact that any error in NTP might have upon the
security of other protocols that rely on timing information. In this thesis, we seek to
accomplish the following broad goals:
1. Demonstrate that the current design presents a security risk, by showing that
network attackers can exploit NTP and then use it to attack other core Internet
protocols that rely on time.
2. Improve NTP to make it more robust, and rigorously analyze the security of
the improved protocol.
3. Establish formal and precise security requirements that should be satisfied by
a network time-synchronization protocol, and prove that these are sufficient for
the security of other protocols that rely on time.
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1.6 Our Contributions
The following chapters in this thesis are self-contained with their own introduction,
motivation, results and conclusion sections. This section gives an overview of the
results in these chapters, and discuss how they contribute incrementally to achieve
the goals of this thesis.
1.6.1 Attacking and fixing different modes of NTP (unauthenticated and
authenticated) Chapters 2, 3, 5
Threat Models. We consider the following categories of network attacks on NTP
(See Figure 1·3).
1. Off-path attacks. An off-path attacker cannot eavesdrop on the NTP traffic
of its targets, but can spoof IP packets i.e., send packets with a bogus source IP
address. This threat model captures ‘remote attacks’ launched by arbitrary IPs
that do not occupy a privileged position on the communication path between
the NTP client and server. Off-path attacks are essentially the weakest (and
therefore the scariest) threat model that one could consider for a networking
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protocol.
2. On-path attacks. An on-path attacker occupies a privileged position on the
communication path between NTP client and one of its servers, or hijacks (with
e.g., DNS (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013) or BGP (Goldberg,
2014), (d’Itri, 2015; Peterson, 2013)) traffic to the server. An on-path attacker
can eavesdrop, inject, spoof, and replay packets, but cannot drop, delay, or
tamper with legitimate traffic. An on-path attacker eavesdrops on a copy of the
target’s traffic, so it need not disrupt live network traffic, or even operate at line
rate. For this reason, on-path attacks are commonly seen in the wild, disrupting
TCP (Weaver et al., 2009), DNS (Duan et al., 2012), BitTorrent (Weaver et al.,
2009), or censoring web content (Clayton et al., 2006).
3. In-path/MiTM attacks. An in-path attacker or more traditionally a Man-
in-The-Middle (MiTM) can eavesdrop, inject, spoof, replay and can additionally
delay, drop, or tamper with the legitimate traffic.
Our Attacks. We demonstrate several attacks on NTP client. Each of these attacks
(a) exploits distinct flaws in the protocol or its implementation, (b) requires different
resources in terms of number of spoofed packets, time to accomplish the attack, and
position of the attacker on network path (off-, on- or in-path), (c) requires different
fixes to the protocol design or implementation.
Impact. Overall our attacks and Internet measurements expose the fragility of NTP
ecosystem. We show that the attacks are possible due to the following:
1. flaws in NTP protocol design and underspecified RFCs.
2. despite conflicting security-requirements, RFC 5905 suggests that implementa-
tions process different NTP modes4 in the same codepath. Also, this lack of
4Other than the typical client-server mode, NTP has several other modes of operation, e.g.,
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modularity in code-design makes it challenging to modify code without inad-
vertently (re)introducing more vulnerabilities.5
3. lack of secure protocol for cryptographically-authenticating NTP.
We make several recommendations to fix NTP’s existing reference implementation
that were incorporated in the ntpd software thus making it more robust and secure6.
Most importantly, however, our work motivates the community to work towards bet-
ter protocol design (Schiff et al., 2018), (roughtime, 2015), efforts to make existing
implementations more robust and secure ( (Stenn, 2015b), (NTPsec, 2017)), and
proposals for cryptographically-authenticating NTP (Dowling et al., 2016), (Mkacher
et al., 2018) and (Franke et al., 2018), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2019).
Following is a brief overview of some of our attacks on NTP (more details in
respective chapters).
Time-shifting attacks.7 In time-shifting attacks, a network attacker can mali-
ciously alter time on client systems.
1. Time steps by on-path and off-path attackers. Our on-path attacks on NTP’s
client-server mode exploit client’s behavior upon initialization, and the fact that an
on-path attacker can easily determine exactly when an ntpd client is initializing.
We show “small-step-big-step” attack that stealthily shifts client clocks when clients
are unlikely to notice. One might suppose that preconfiguring an NTP client with
multiple servers could prevent this attack. However, we show that an attacker need
only intercept traffic to one server queried by a client. We then show how an off-path
broadcast mode, where a set of clients are pre-configured to listen to a server that broadcasts timing
information, and symmetric mode where peers exchange time information typically on the same
level. There is also an interleaved mode that enables NTP servers to provide their clients and peers
with more accurate timestamps that are available only after transmitting NTP packets.
5e.g., our “Zero-0rigin timestamp” attack was fixed in ntpv4.2.8p6. However, subsequent times-
tamp validation checks introduced a regression in the handling of some Zero origin timestamp checks.
6We secured several Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE, 2019) in the process.
7Some attacks were discovered by members of Cisco security team ASIG (specifically Matt Van
Gundy, Jonathan Gardner) while the author was a visiting research fellow at Cisco, Knoxville.
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attacker, that uses spoofed rate-limiting Kiss-o’-Death (KoD) packets, forces clients
to synchronize to malfunctioning servers that provide incorrect time.
2. Leaky-origin timestamp attack. In this attack we leverage our observation that
NTP’s control query interface is not specified in the latest RFC 5905 and can be
exploited remotely as a side-channel to leak information about NTP client’s internal
timing state variables. We show that an off-path attacker can maliciously shift time
on a target client by querying for client’s secret state variables and thus bypassing
the non-cryptographic authentication checks.
3. Interleaved pivot attack. In this attack we exploit the fact that in NTP’s reference
implementation, client-server mode shares the same codepath as NTP’s interleaved
mode. First, the attacker spoofs a single packet, for an NTP client operating in
client-server mode, that tricks the target into thinking that he is in interleaved mode.
There is no codepath that allows the client to exit interleaved mode. The target then
rejects all subsequent legitimate client-server mode packets. This is a DoS attack. We
further leverage NTP’s leaky control queries to convert this DoS attack to an on-path
timeshifting attack.
4. Zero-0rigin timestamp attack. This is among the strongest timeshifting attacks
on NTP’s client-server mode and follows directly from RFC 5905 specification. In
this attack we exploit the fact that NTP’s client-server mode shares the same code-
path as NTP’s symmetric mode. The off-path attacker bypasses non-cryptographic
authentication check by spoofing server response packets (with malicious timing infor-
mation) for the client with their nonce set to a predictable value “zero” (a legitimate
requirement for symmetric mode).
5. Fragmentation attack. We show how NTP’s interaction with lower layer protocols
(UDP, ICMP, IP) can be exploited in an off-path IPv4 fragmentation attack that can
dramatically shift time on a victim client. We explain why NTP’s clock discipline
13
algorithms force our attack to craft a stream of self-consistent packets (rather than
just one packet, as in the attacks of e.g., (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman,
2013)), and demonstrate that this can be done with a proof-of-concept implementa-
tion.
6. Replay attack. This attack exploits the weakness in NTP’s broadcast mode that
the check for replay protection does not actually prevent replay in general; it only
prevents replay for the most recent packet. We show that an on-path attacker can
indefinitely stick a cryptographically-authenticated broadcast client to a specific time.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In DoS attacks, a network attacker prevents
the victim client system from ever updating its clock.
1. DoS attack-1. RFC 5905 requires that the server sends a client a KoD packet
asking the client to reduce its polling interval if the client queries it too many times
within a specified time interval. RFC 5905 also requires that the client MUST imme-
diately reduce its polling interval to that sent by the server and continue to reduce
it each time it receives this packet. But RFC 5905 does not explicitly require the
client to check for authentication for KoD packet. We show how an off-path attacker
can essentially disable NTP for any victim. Our attacker need only spoof a single
KoD packet with large polling interval from each of the client’s preconfigured servers,
and send this packet once every 36 hours. The client stops querying its servers and
no longer updates its local clock. An off-path attacker that uses standard network-
ing scanning tools (e.g., zmap (Durumeric et al., 2013)) to spoof KoD packets can
launch this attack on most NTP clients in the Internet within a few hours, essentially
disabling NTP in the Internet.
2. DoS attack-2. This attack exploits a flaw in NTP’s broadcast mode8 of operation
that an off-path attacker can easily cause an error by sending a packet with bad cryp-
8In broadcast mode a set of NTP clients are pre-configured to listen to a server that broadcasts
timing information.
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tographic authentication (e.g., wrong or mismatched key, incorrect message digest,
etc.). We show a DoS attack where an off-path attacker sends one such error-causing
packet per query interval, so that a cryptographically-authenticated broadcast client
immediately tears down its association with the server. This way, the client never
collects enough good NTP responses to allow its clock discipline algorithms to update
its local clock. This attack also applies to all other NTP modes that are ‘ephemeral’9
or ‘preemptable’ (including manycast, pool, etc). This attack implies that even if
cryptographic-authentication is used, an off-path attacker can still spoof packets that
will deny NTP service to a broadcast client.
1.6.2 Leveraging NTP to attack DNS (Chapter 4)
Progressing towards the goal of analyzing the impact of security vulnerabilities in
network timing protocols (including but not limited to NTP) on other protocols, we
demonstrate this on Domain Name System (DNS) and the DNS Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) protocol.
How does DNS rely on time? DNS relies on caching to provide enhanced perfor-
mance and improved reliability in the face of network failures. DNS caches rely on an
absolute notion of time (e.g., “August 8, 2019 at 11:00am”) to determine how long
DNS records can be cached (i.e., their Time To Live (TTL)) and to determine the
validity interval of DNSSEC signatures. Following our two-step approach described
above in subsection 1.6.1, we find that while TTL is a relative time value (e.g., “2
hours from the time the DNS query was sent”), the RFCs do not clearly specify how
the cache should determine that the TTL has elapsed. We then checked popular
caching resolver implementations (Unbound, 2018), (Bind, 2018), (Powerdns, 2018),
(Dnsmasq, 2018), (knot, 2018) (before v1.5.1) to see how their caches were imple-
menting time. We found that these implementations all mark the end of validity of
9An ephemeral association is mobilized upon arrival of a packet and exists until error or timeout.
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the cached object by translating the relative time values in the TTL into absolute
time values by adding an offset equal to the TTL to the current system time. DNS
resolver implementations, however, do not come with a predefined mechanism for
getting absolute time. So the best that they can do is to rely on system time (which
represents some form of absolute time) from the underlying OS to get these absolute
time values.
Previous work on DNS attacks. Several works study DNS spoofing and cache
poisoning attacks and propose potential solutions (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and
Shulman, 2012a), (Klein et al., 2017), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2012b), (Schomp
et al., 2014), (Yuan et al., 2006). These attacks focus on how the DNS protocol can
be exploited to poison DNS resolver caches. By contrast our attacks show how to
pivot from vulnerabilities in absolute time (e.g., in NTP), to attacks that flush/stick
the DNS cache.
Impact. Our attacks indicate that DNS caches should lessen their reliance on abso-
lute time. In fact, we observe that setting TTL as relative time value is a feature of
the DNS protocol. So there is no fundamental change required to the DNS protocol
to deal with our attacks. We therefore recommend that DNS caching resolvers use
relative time rather than absolute time. Specifically, we suggest using the OS’s raw
time, which is monotonically increasing and not subject to adjustment by external
sources (and thus immune to the network attacks on time.) We have implemented
our recommendations as part of the popular open source validating, recursive, and
caching DNS resolver product from NLnet Labs.
Our Attacks. We leverage the above mentioned observations to investigate a largely
overlooked and important threat in DNS: the impact of security vulnerabilities intro-
duced because resolver’s caches are dependent on absolute time, which is obtained
from the system time, which is often obtained via network timing protocols (e.g.,
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NTP), which are vulnerable to attacks. We show how to pivot from network attacks
on absolute time (NTP) to attacks on DNS caching. Specifically, we present and
discuss the implications of following attacks:
1. Cache-expiration attacks. When time is shifted forwards, the DNS cached re-
sponses expire sooner than expected, effectively flushing the cache.
2. Cache-sticking attacks. When time is shifted backwards, the cached responses
stick in the cache for longer than intended.
We show how these attacks can be used to harm DNS performance (introducing
latency into DNS responses) and DNS availability (increasing the risk of denial-of-
service). We also discuss how they can be used to aid for fast-fluxing (Holz et al.,
2008), (Honeynet, 2018), cache poisoning and other well-known threats to the DNS.
We use network measurements to identify a significant attack surface for these DNS
cache attacks in the Internet.
1.6.3 New provably-secure NTP (Chapter 5)
Having demonstrated the fragility of NTP and its impact on other protocols, our next
goal is to go beyond attacks and patches and propose a more robust protocol and prove
the security of new protocol. In Chapter 5 we propose a new backwards-compatible
protocol for client-server mode that preserves the semantics of the timestamps in
NTP packets. We then leverage ideas from the universal composability framework
(UC) (Canetti, 2001) to develop a cryptographic model for network attacks on NTP’s
datagram protocol.
Impact. Our network protocol analysis introduces new ways of reasoning about
network attacks on time synchronization protocols. In this work, our focus is in
securing the core datagram protocol used by NTP. To the best of our knowledge,
the security of the core NTP datagram protocol has never previously been analyzed.
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We also prove the security of authenticated NTP where we assume authenticated
communication channels. As such, our design and analysis of secure client-server
protocols complements recent proposals of protocols for establishing authenticated
communication channels i.e., protocols for distributing keys and performing the MAC
(Haberman and Mills, 2010), (Dowling et al., 2016), (Franke et al., 2018), (Itkin and
Wool, 2016).
Threat model. Our model is inspired by prior cryptographic work that designs syn-
chronous protocols with guaranteed packet delivery (Katz et al., 2013a),(Achenbach
et al., 2015). However, we consciously omit to model the more powerful MiTM who
can drop, modify, or delay packets.
Why is MiTM too strong a threat model for NTP? We do not consider in-path
attacks. This is because an MiTM can always prevent time synchronization by drop-
ping packets. Moreover, an MiTM can also bias time synchronization by delaying
packets (Mizrahi, 2012a; Mizrahi, 2012b). This follows because time synchronization
protocols use information about the delay on the network path in order to accurately
synchronize clocks (Section 5.2). A client cannot distinguish the delay on the forward
path (from client to server) from the delay on the reverse path (from server to client).
As such, the client simply takes the total round trip time δ (forward path + reverse
path), and assumes that delays on each path are symmetric. The MiTM can exploit
this by making delays asymmetric (e.g., causing the delay on the forward path to be
much longer than delay on the reverse path), thus biasing time synchronization.
We assume instead that the network delivers all packets sent between the honest
parties. We also assume that the network does not validate the source IP in the
packets it transits, so that the attacker can spoof packets. Honest parties experience a
delay before their packets are delivered, but the attacker can win every race condition.
We require that honest parties have sufficient time to process every packet received;
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put another way, attacks that flood an honest party with packets in order to deny
service are out of scope.
Security guarantees. We use this model to prove that our proposed protocol
correctly synchronizes time in the face of both (1) off-path attackers when NTP is
unauthenticated, and (2) on-path attackers when NTP packets are authenticated with
a cryptographically secure MAC (Refer to the corresponding Theorems in Chapter 5.)
We also use our model to prove similar results about a different protocol that is
used by chronyd (chronyd, 2015) and openNTPD (openNTPD, 2012) (two alternate
implementations of NTP). The chronyd/openNTPD protocol is secure, but unlike our
protocol, does not preserve the semantics of packet timestamps.
1.6.4 A Universally-Composable Treatment of Network Time (Chapter 6)
Up until now, our work has specifically focused on the design and analysis of the
most dominant protocol for time synchronization in the Internet NTP. We observe
that meanwhile we have many candidates for secure network time synchronization
protocols like (Haberman and Mills, 2010), (Sibold et al., 2015), (Dowling et al.,
2016), (Itkin and Wool, 2016), (Franke et al., 2018). We also have several frameworks
(Mizrahi, 2012b), (Dowling et al., 2016), (Itkin and Wool, 2016), (Malhotra et al.,
2017) that aim to define and analyze the security requirements of time synchronization
protocols. Additionally there exist many works that propose ways to model time
(either real, global, or relative) within network protocols, and even within security
protocols (Kalai et al., 2005), (Katz et al., 2013b), (Canetti, 2013), (Backes et al.,
2014) and (Vajda, 2016) to analyze their security.
However none of these works rigorously capture the security guarantees from a
network time synchronization protocol that provably suffice for security-sensitive ap-
plications that require time— for instance for guaranteeing the validity of crypto-
graphic certificates in a way that, in turn, will guarantee authenticated and secure
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communication.
So the next goal of this thesis is to establish formal and precise security require-
ments that should be satisfied by a network time synchronization protocol, and prove
that these are sufficient for the security of other time-reliant applications – specifically,
cryptographic certificates with revocation and expiration times.
Our Contributions. We choose the Universally Composable (UC) security frame-
work as a basis for our formalism because of its two specific properties that are im-
portant for our modeling:
1. Secure composition: UC framework provides a general mechanism for specifying
security properties of cryptographic protocols in a way that facilitates compos-
ing protocols together, and in particular guarantees that composition of secure
components results in overall security of the composed protocol. This allows for
relatively clear and modular treatment of the use of time in security-sensitive
systems.
2. Seamless integration of real time within existing cryptographic tools and prim-
itives: UC framework is geared towards analyzing the security of cryptographic
protocols, which facilitates incorporating the results in this work with existing
analytical results for cryptographic protocols.
Both of these properties are crucial towards our goal of realizing time-sensitive
cryptographic primitives like the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Specifically, we
propose formal abstractions of secure network time, and show that:
• Our abstractions of network-time suffice for securely incorporating expiration
times in certificates, as well as freshness guarantees for public certificate lists,
in a way that guarantees PKI-based secure communication even in face of an
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adversary who tries to subvert the measurement of time and at the same time
corrupts revoked and expired certificates.
• Our abstractions are realizable by simple protocols that mimic the behavior of
authenticated NTP.
Specifically, we build upon an existing analytical work by Canetti et al. that asserts,
within the UC framework, the security of authentication and key exchange protocols
that are based on global PKI (Canetti et al., 2016). We incorporate our analysis of
timing consensus achieved via network time into the UC analysis of a global PKI.
The combined analysis extends the security guarantees provided by (Canetti et al.,
2016) to the case of revocable and expirable certificates.
Impact. Our methodology of incorporating network time into existing UC protocols
and functionalities is quite generic. Hence, our work paves the way toward instanti-
ating time consensus and reaping its security benefits within other UC formalisms in
a seamless fashion. An important lesson learned from this modeling is that real-life
certificate revocation lists and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) requests must
continue to answer requests about revoked or expired certificates during the interval
[t∗, t∗+ Σ] because clients may not be able to adjudicate them correctly on their own
before this time. Here, Σ denotes the maximum shift from real time expected by The-
orems 4 and 5 for all clients on the Internet. After this interval, the adversary cannot
convince any clients of the validity of a revoked or expired certificate via network
manipulation, so the CA may forget about its existence.
Chapter 2
Attacking the Network Time Protocol
2.1 Introduction
NTP (Mills et al., 2010) is one of the Internet’s oldest protocols, designed to syn-
chronize time between computer systems communicating over unreliable variable-
latency network paths. NTP has recently received some attention from security
researchers due to software-implementation flaws (National Vulnerability Database,
2014), (Ro¨ttger, 2015), and its potential to act as an amplifier for distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks (Czyz et al., 2014a), (Stenn, 2015d). However, the commu-
nity still lacks visibility into the robustness of the NTP ecosystem itself, as well as the
integrity of the timing information transmitted by NTP. These issues are particularly
important because time is a fundamental building block for computing applications,
and is heavily utilized by many cryptographic protocols.
NTP most commonly operates in an hierarchical client-server fashion. Clients
send queries to solicit timing information from a set of preconfigured servers that
usually remain static over time. At infrequent intervals, a client adaptively select
a single server to which it synchronizes its local clock; selection decisions are made
by a series of complex clock discipline algorithms that are (sometimes incompletely)
specified in RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010), and have evolved in small but important
ways across different versions of ntpd, the NTP reference implementation. While NTP
supports both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic authentication (Haberman
and Mills, 2010), in practice, these modes of operation are rarely used (Section 2.3).
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Our goal is therefore to explore attacks on unauthenticated NTP that are pos-
sible within the NTP protocol specification (Mills et al., 2010). We consider both
(1) on-path attacks, where the attacker occupies a privileged position on the path
between NTP client and one of its servers, or hijacks (with e.g., DNS (Kaminsky,
2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013) or BGP (Goldberg, 2014), (d’Itri, 2015), (Pe-
terson, 2013)) traffic to the server, and (2) off-path attacks, where the attacker can
be anywhere on the network and does not observe the traffic between client and any
of its servers. This chapter considers the following.
Implications (Section 2.2). We consider a few implications of attacks on NTP, high-
lighting protocols and applications whose correctness and security relies on accurate
time.
On-path time-shifting attacks (Section 2.4). We discuss how an on-path attacker can
shift time on victim clients by hours or even years. Our attacks exploit NTP’s behavior
upon initialization, and the fact than an on-path attacker can trivially determine
when an ntpd client is initializing. We also present a “small-step-big-step” attack
(CVE-2015-5300) that stealthily shifts clocks when clients are unlikely to notice.
Off-path DoS attacks (Section 2.5.3). We show how an off-path attacker can disable
NTP at a victim client by exploiting NTP’s rate-limiting mechanism, the Kiss-o’-
Death (KoD) packet.
1. DoS by Spoofed Kiss-o’-Death (CVE-2015-7704). We show how a single attacking
machine can disable NTP on most of clients in the Internet. We find that ntpd
versions earlier than 4.2.8p4 allow an off-path attacker to trivially spoof a KoD packet
for each of the client’s preconfigured servers; upon receipt of the spoofed KoD, the
client stops querying its servers and stops updating its clock. Because the attacker
only sends a few KoD packets per client, standard network scanning tools (nmap,
zmap (Durumeric et al., 2013)) can be used to quickly launch this attack, in bulk,
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on all ntpd clients in the Internet. This vulnerability was patched in ntpd v4.2.8p4
following our work.
2. DoS by Priming the Pump (CVE-2015-7705). Even if KoD packets can no longer
be trivially spoofed, an off-path attacker can still disable NTP at a victim client;
this attack, however, requires the attacker to expend more resources (i.e., send more
packets). Our off-path attacker sends the servers a high volume of queries that are
spoofed to look like they come from the client. The servers then respond to any
subsequent queries from the client with a valid KoD, and once again, the client stops
querying its servers, and stops updating its local clock. Our recommended mitigations
are in Section 2.5.7.
Off-path time-shifting attacks. Next, we consider off-path attackers that step time
on victim NTP clients:
1. Pinning to bad timekeepers (Section 2.5.4). We first consider an off-path attacker
that uses spoofed KoD packets to force clients to synchronize to malfunctioning servers
that provide incorrect time; we find that NTP is pretty good at preventing this type
of attack, although it succeeds in certain situations.
2. Fragmentation attack (Section 2.6). Then we show how NTP’s interaction with
lower layer protocols (ICMP, IPv4) can be exploited in a new off-path IPv4 fragmenta-
tion attack that shifts time on a victim client. We explain why NTP’s clock discipline
algorithms require our attack to craft a stream of self-consistent packets (rather than
just one packet, as in (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013)), and demon-
strate its feasibility with a proof-of-concept implementation. This attack, which has
a small but non-negligible attack surface, exploits certain IPv4 fragmentation policies
used by the server and client operating systems (Section 2.6.5), rather than specific
issues with NTP.
Network measurements (Sections 2.3.2, 2.5.6, 2.6.7, 2.6.8). The last measurement
24
studies of the NTP ecosystem were conducted in 1999 (Minar, 1999) and 2006 (Murta
et al., 2006), while a more recent study (Czyz et al., 2014a) focused on NTP DoS
amplification attacks. We study the integrity of the NTP ecosystem using data from
the openNTPproject (Mauch, 2015), and new network-wide scans (Section 2.3.2).
We identify bad timekeepers that could be exploited by off-path attacker (Section 2.5.6),
and servers that are vulnerable to our fragmentation attack (Sections 2.6.7-2.6.8).
Recommendations and disclosure. We began disclosing these results on August
20, 2015. The Network Time Foundation, NTPsec, Redhat’s security team, and
Cisco quickly patched their NTP implementations to prevent trivial spoofing of the
KoD packet (CVE-2015-7704). We also worked with the openNTPproject to pro-
vide a resource that operators can use to measure their servers’ vulnerability to
our fragmentation attacks.1 Our recommendations for hardening NTP are in Sec-
tions 2.4.3, 2.5.7, 2.6.9 and summarized in Section 2.8.
2.2 Why time matters: Implications of attacks on NTP
NTP lurks in the background of many systems; when NTP fails on the system, mul-
tiple applications on the system can fail, all at the same time. Such failures have
happened. On November 19, 2012 (Bicknell, 2012), for example, two important NTP
(stratum 1) servers, tick.usno.navy.mil and tock.usno.navy.mil, went back in
time by about 12 years, causing outages at a variety of devices including Active
Directory (AD) authentication servers, PBXs and routers (Morowczynski, 2012). Ex-
ploits of individual NTP clients also serve as a building block for other attacks, as
summarized in Table 2.1. Consider the following:
TLS Certificates. Several authors (Mills, 2011, pg 33, pg 183) (Klein, 2013; Selvi,
2015) have observed that NTP could be used to undermine the security of TLS cer-
1http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/NTPattack.html
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tificates, which are used to establish secure encrypted and authenticated connection.
An NTP attacker that sends a client back in time could cause the host to accept
certificates that the attacker fraudulently issued (that allow the attacker to decrypt
the connection), and have since been revoked2. (For example, the client can be rolled
back to March 2011, when a compromise at Comodo (Comodo, 2011) allowed hackers
to issue fraudulent certificates for domains including *.google.com, or back to mid-
2014, when > 100K certificates were revoked due to heartbleed (Zhang et al., 2014).)
Alternatively, an attacker can send the client back to a time when a certificate for
a cryptographically-weak key was still valid. (For example, to 2012 when (Heninger
et al., 2012) exploited entropy problems in key generation to obtain private keys for
0.50% of the Internet’s TLS hosts, or to 2008, when a bug in Debian OpenSSL caused
thousands of certificates to be issued for keys with only 15-17 bits of entropy (Ecker-
sley and Burns, 2010).) Moreover, most browsers today accept (non-root) certificates
for 1024-bit RSA keys, even though sources speculate that they can be cracked by well-
funded adversaries (Barker and Roginsky, 2011); thus, even a domain that revokes
its old 1024-bit RSA certificates (or lets them expire) is vulnerable to cryptanalytic
attacks when its clients are rolled back to a time when these certificates were valid.
Some of these attacks were demonstrated by Selvi (Selvi, 2015).
HSTS. Selvi (Selvi, 2014) suggests using NTP to attack HTTP Strict Transport Secu-
rity (HSTS). HSTS is used by a webserver to tell its client that all future connections
should use HTTPS. The HSTS request, however, comes with an expiry time (one
year is recommended (OWASP, 2015)) after which point the client need no longer
2The attacker must also circumvent certificate revocation mechanisms, but several authors (Mut-
ton, 2014), (Kiyawat, 2014), (Langley, 2014) point out that this is relatively easy to do in various
settings. For instance, several major browsers rely on OCSP (Santesson et al., 2013) to check if a
certificate was revoked, and default to “soft-fail”, i.e., accepting the certificate as valid, when they
cannot connect to the OCSP server. NTP-based cache-flushing could also be useful for this purpose,
by causing the client to ‘forget’ any old certificate revocation lists (CRLs) that it may have seen in
the past; see also our discussion of routing attacks.
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Table 2.1: Attacking various applications with NTP.
To attack... change time by ... To attack... change time by ...
TLS Certificates years Routing (RPKI) days
HSTS a year Bitcoin hours
DNSSEC months API authentication minutes
Kerberos minutes DNS Caches days
use an encrypted connection; thus, an NTP attacker that sends the client a year into
the future can effectively disable HSTS, allowing for downgrade attacks (e.g., ‘SSL
Stripping’ (Marlinspike, 2009)) to non-encrypted connections.
DNSSEC. DNSSEC (Arends et al., 2005a) provides cryptographic authentication of
the Domain Name System (DNS) data. NTP can be used to attack a DNS resolver
that performs ‘strict’ DNSSEC validation, i.e., fails to return responses to queries
that fail cryptographic DNSSEC validation. An NTP attack that sends a resolver
forward in time will cause all timestamps on DNSSEC cryptographic keys and sig-
natures to expire (the recommended lifetime for zone-signing keys in DNSSEC is 1
month (Kolkman et al., 2012)); the resolver and all its clients thus lose connectivity
to any domain secured with DNSSEC. Alternatively, an NTP attack that sends a
resolver back in time allows for DNSSEC replay attacks; the attacker, for example,
roll to a time in which a certain DNSSEC record for a domain name did not exist,
causing the resolver to lose connectivity to that domain. Since the recommended
lifetime for DNSSEC signatures is no more than 30 days (Kolkman et al., 2012), this
attack would need to send the resolver back in time by a month (or more, if the time
in which the DNSSEC record did not exist was further in the past). Going back
in time also allows an attacker to forge DNSSEC responses using an old DNSSEC
key that is compromised or cryptographically weak. Indeed, DNSSEC resolvers still
accept 1024-bit RSA signatures (Kolkman et al., 2012), so even if zone decides to
protect itself by upgrading to a stronger key, an NTP attack could still roll back its
clients to a time when the old 1024-bit key was still valid. (Indeed, 1024-bit RSA
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was the most popular DNSSEC key in 2014, although we hope it won’t be in the
future (Herzberg et al., 2014).)
Cache-flushing attacks. NTP can be used to flush caches. The DNS, or example,
uses caching to minimize the number of DNS queries a resolver makes to a public
nameserver, thus limiting network traffic. DNS cache entries typically live for around
24 hours, so rolling a resolver forward in time by a day would cause most of its cache
entries to expire (Mills, 2011), (Klein, 2013). A widespread NTP failure (like the one
in November 2012) could cause multiple resolvers to flush their caches all at once,
simultaneously flooding the network with DNS queries.
Interdomain routing. NTP can be used to exploit the Resource Public Key Infras-
tructure (RPKI) (Lepinski and Kent, 2012), a new infrastructure for securing routing
with BGP. The RPKI uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to cryptographically
authenticate the allocation of IP address blocks to networks. ROAs prevent hijackers
from announcing routes to IP addresses that are not allocated to their networks. If
a valid ROA is missing, a ‘relying party’ (that relies on the RPKI to make routing
decisions) can lose connectivity to the IPs in the missing ROA.3 As such, relying
parties must always download a complete set of valid ROAs; to do this, they verify
that they have downloaded all the files listed in cryptographically-signed ‘manifest’
files. To prevent the relying party from rolling back to a stale manifest that might
be missing a ROA, manifests have monotonically-increasing ‘manifest-numbers’, and
typically expire within a day (Heilman et al., 2014). NTP attacks, however, can first
roll the relying party forward in time, flushing its cache and causing it to ‘forget’
its current manifest-number, and then roll the relying party back in time, so that it
accepts a stale manifest as valid.
Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a digital currency that allows a decentralized network of nodes
3See (Cooper et al., 2013, Side Effect 6): the relying party loses connectivity if it uses ‘drop
invalid’ routing policy (Cooper et al., 2013, Sec. 5), and the missing ROA has ‘covering ROA’.
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to arrive at a consensus on a distributed public ledger of transactions, aka “the
blockchain”. The blockchain consists of timestamped “blocks”; bitcoin nodes use
computational proofs-of-work to add blocks to the blockchain. Because blocks should
be added to the blockchain according to their validity interval (about 2 hours), an
NTP attacker can trick a victim into rejecting a legitimate block, or into wasting
computational power on a stale block (Corbixgwelt, 2011).
Authentication. Various services (e.g., (Amazon, 2015), (DropBox, 2015)) expose
APIs that require authentication each time an application queries them. To prevent
replay attacks, queries require a timestamp that is within some short window of
the server’s local time, see e.g., (Hammer-Lahav, 2010, Sec 3.3); Amazon S3, for
example, uses a 15-minute window. An NTP attacker can also launch replay attacks
on Kerberos, which requires clients to present tickets which have been timestamped
within minutes (Kohl and Neuman, 1993).
2.3 The NTP Ecosystem
We start with background on the NTP protocol, and use a measurement study to
discuss its structure and topology. NTP has evolved in more fluid fashion than other
core Internet protocols like DNS or BGP. While NTP is described in RFC 5905 (Mills
et al., 2010), practically speaking, the protocol is determined by the NTP reference
implementation ntpd, which has changed frequently over the last decades (Stenn,
2015d). (For example, root distance Λ (equation (2.4)) is a fundamental NTP param-
eter, but is defined differently in RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010, Appendix A.5.5.2),
ntpd v4.2.6 (the second most popular version of ntpd we found in the wild) and ntpd
v4.2.8 (the latest version).)
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2.3.1 Background: The NTP Protocol.
NTP most commonly operates in an hierarchical client-server fashion.4 Clients send
queries to solicit timing information from a set of servers. This set of servers is
manually configured before the client initializes and remains static over time. In
general, the ntpd client can be configured with up to 10 servers.5 Online resources
suggest configuring anywhere from three to five servers (Knowles, 2004), and certain
OSes (e.g., MAC OS X 10.9.5) default to installing ntpd with exactly one server (i.e.,
time.apple.com). At the root of the NTP hierarchy are stratum 1 NTP servers, that
provide timing information to stratum 2 client systems. Stratum 2 systems provide
time to stratum 3 systems, and so on, until stratum 15. Stratums 0 and 16 indicate
that a system is unsynchronized. NTP servers with low stratum often provide time to
the Internet at large (e.g., pool.ntp.org, tick.usno.navy.mil); our organization,
for example, has stratum 2 servers that provide time to internal stratum 3 machines,
and take time from public stratum 1 servers.
Client/server communications. An NTP client and server periodically exchange a
pair of messages; the client sends the server a mode 3 NTP query and the server
responds with a mode 4 NTP response. This two-message exchange uses the IPv4
packet shown in Figure 2·1, and induces the following four important timestamps on
the mode 4 response:
T1 Origin timestamp. Client’s system time when client sent mode 3 query.
T2 Receive timestamp. Server’s system time when server received mode 3 query.
T3 Transmit timestamp. Server’s system time when server sent mode 4 response.
4NTP also supports several less popular modes including broadcast, where a set of clients listen
to a server that broadcasts timing information, and symmetric peering, where servers (typically at
the same stratum) exchange time information. We only consider client-server mode.
5For example, when installing NTP in 14.04.1-Ubuntu in July 2015, the OS defaulted to installing
ntpd v4.2.6 with a five preconfigured servers.
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T4 Destination timestamp. Client’s system time when client received mode 4 re-
sponse. (Not in packet.)
The round-trip delay δ during the exchange is therefore:
δ = (T4 − T1)− (T3 − T2) (2.1)
Offset θ quantifies the time shift between a client’s clock and a server’s clock. Assume
that delays on the forward (client→server) and reverse (server→client) network paths
are symmetric and equal to δ
2
. Then, the gap between the server and client clock is
T2 − (T1 + δ2) for the mode 3 query, and T3 − (T4 − δ2) for the mode 4 response.
Averaging these two quantities gives the offset:
θ = 1
2
((T2 − T1) + (T3 − T4)) (2.2)
An NTP client adaptively and infrequently selects a single server (from its set of
pre-configured servers) from which it will take time. The IPv4 address of the selected
server is recorded in the reference ID field of every NTP packet a system sends, and
the reference timestamp field records the last time it synchronized to its reference ID.
Notice that this means that any client querying a server S2 can identify exactly which
IPv4 NTP server S1 the server S2 has used for synchronization.
6
Infrequent clock updates. NTP infrequently updates a client’s clock because (1) a
client and server must exchange between eight to hundreds of messages before the
client’s clock discipline algorithms synchronizes it to the server (Mills et al., 2010, Sec.
10-12) (see also Section 2.5.5), and (2) messages are exchanged at infrequent polling
intervals (on the order of minutes) that are adaptively chosen by a randomized poll
process (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 13).
6128-bit IPv6 addresses are first hashed and then truncated to before recorded in the 32-bit
reference ID field (Mills et al., 2010, pg 22). Thus, one would need a dictionary attack to identify
an IPv6 server.
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Figure 2·1: Mode 4 NTP Packet, highlighting nonces and checksums.
Authentication. How does the client know that she is talking to its real NTP server
and not to an attacker? While NTPv4 supports both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic authentication, this is rarely used in practice. Symmetric cryptographic
authentication appends an MD5 hash keyed with symmetric key k of the NTP packet
contents m as MD5(k||m) (Mills, 2011, pg 264) to the NTP packet in Figure 2·1.7
The symmetric key must be pre-configured manually, which makes this solution quite
cumbersome for public servers that must accept queries from arbitrary clients. (NIST
operates important public stratum 1 servers and distributes symmetric keys only to
users that register, once per year, via US mail or facsimile (NIST, 2010); the US
Naval Office does something similar (USNO, 2015).) Asymmetric cryptographic au-
7MD5(k||m) is intended to provide be a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC), but
the use of MD5 in this manner is not a provably secure MAC and is also vulnerable to length-
extension attacks; HMAC should be used instead (Bellare et al., 1996). Moreover, MD5 has been
depreciated in favor of more secure hash functions like SHA-256 (Turner and Chen, 2011).
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thentication is provided by the Autokey protocol, described in RFC 5906 (Haberman
and Mills, 2010). RFC 5906 is not a standards-track document (it is classified as ‘In-
formational’), NTP clients do not request Autokey associations by default (Autokey,
2012), and many public NTP servers do not support Autokey (e.g., the NIST time-
servers (NIST, 2010), many servers in pool.ntp.org). In fact, a lead developer of
the ntpd client wrote in 2015 (Stenn, 2015a): “Nobody should be using autokey. Or
from the other direction, if you are using autokey you should stop using it.” For the
remainder of this chapter, we shall assume that NTP messages are unauthenticated.
2.3.2 Measuring the NTP ecosystem.
We briefly discuss the status of today’s NTP ecosystem. Our measurement study
starts by discovering IP addresses of NTP servers in the wild. We ran a zmap (Du-
rumeric et al., 2013) scan of the IPv4 address space using mode 3 NTP queries on
April 12-22, 2015, obtaining mode 4 responses from 10,110,131 IPs.8 We augmented
our data with openNTPproject (Mauch, 2015) data from January-May 2015, which
runs weekly scans to determine which IPs respond to NTP control queries. (These
scans are designed to identify potential DDoS amplifiers that send large packets in
response to short control queries (Czyz et al., 2014a).) The openNTPproject logs
responses to NTP read variable (rv) control queries. rv responses provide a trove of
useful information including: the server’s OS (also useful for OS fingerprinting!), its
ntpd version, its reference ID (32-bit field that identifies the source of time for the
data packet), the offset θ between its time and that of its reference ID, and more.
Merging our zmap data with the openNTPproject rv data gave a total of 11,728,656
IPs that potentially run NTP servers.
OSes and clients in the wild. We use openNTPproject’s rv data to get a sense of the
8NTP control query scans run in 2014 as part of (Czyz et al., 2014a)’s research found several
‘mega-amplifiers’: NTP servers that response to a single query with millions of responses. Our mode
3 scan also found a handful of these.
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Table 2.2: Top ntpd versions in rv data from May 2015.
ntpd version 4.1.1 4.2.6 4.1.0 4.2.4 4.2.0 4.2.7 4.2.8 4.2.5 4.4.2
# servers 1,984,571 702,049 216,431 132,164 100,689 38,879 35,647 20,745 15,901
Table 2.3: Top OSes in rv data from May 2015.
OS Unix Cisco Linux BSD Junos Sun Darwin Vmkernal Windows
# servers 1,820,957 1,602,993 835,779 38,188 12,779 6,021 3625 1994 1929
OSes and ntpd clients that are present in the wild. Importantly, the rv data is incom-
plete; rv queries may be dropped by firewalls and other middleboxes, NTP clients
can be configured to refuse these queries, and some rv responses omit information.
(This is why we had only 4M IPs in the rv data, while 10M IPs responded to our
mode 3 zmap scan.) Nevertheless, we get some sense of what systems are out there
by looking at the set of rv responses from May 2015. In terms of operating systems,
Table 2.3 shows many servers running Unix, Cisco or Linux. Table 2.4 indicates that
Linux kernels are commonly v2 (rather the more recent v3); in fact, Linux v3.0.8
was only the 13th most popular Linux kernel. Meanwhile, Table 2.2 shows that ntpd
v4.1.1 (released 2001) and v4.2.6 (released 2008) are most popular; the current release
v4.2.8 (released 2014) is ranked only 8th amongst the systems we see. The bottom
line is that there are plenty of legacy NTP systems in the wild. As such, our lab
experiments and attacks study the behavior of two NTP reference implementations:
ntpd v4.2.6p5 (the second most popular version in our dataset) and ntpd v4.2.8p2
(the latest release as of May 2015).
Bad timekeepers. Next, we used our mode 3 zmap data to determine how many
bad timekeepers–servers that are unfit to provide time—are seen in the wild. To
do this, we compute the offset θ (equation (6.2)) for each IP that responded to our
mode 3 queries, taking T1 from the Ethernet frame time of the mode 3 query, T4
from the Ethernet frame time of the mode 4 query, and T2 and T3 from the mode 4
NTP payload. We found many bad timekeepers — 1.7M had θ ≥ 10 sec, 3.2M had
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Table 2.4: Top Linux kernels in rv data from May 2015.
kernel 2.6.18 2.4.23 2.6.32 2.4.20 2.6.19 2.4.18 2.6.27 2.6.36 2.2.13
# servers 123,780 108,828 97,168 90,025 71,581 68,583 61,301 45,055 29550
Table 2.5: Stratum distribution in our dataset.
stratum 0,16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7-10 11-15
# servers3,176,142115,3571,947,7765,354,9221,277,942615,633162,162218,370187,348
stratum 0 or 16, and the union of both gives us a total of 3.7M bad timekeepers. Under
normal conditions, NTP is great at discarding information from bad timekeepers, so
it’s unlikely that most of these servers are harming anyone other than themselves; we
look into this in Sections 2.5.4-2.5.6.
Topology. Since a system’s reference ID reveals the server from which it takes
time, our scans allowed us to start building a subset of the NTP’s hierarchical client-
server topology. However, a reference ID only provides information about one of a
client’s preconfigured servers. In an effort to learn more, on June 28-30, 2015 we
used nmap to send an additional mode 3 NTP query to every IP that had only one
parent server in our topology; merging this with our existing data gave us a total of
13,076,290 IPs that potentially run NTP servers. We also wanted to learn more about
the clients that synchronize to bad timekeepers. Thus, on July 1, 2015, we used the
openNTPproject’s scanning infrastructure to send a monlist query to each of the 1.7M
servers with θ > 10 sec. While monlist responses are now deactivated by many servers,
because they have been used in DDoS amplification attacks (Czyz et al., 2014a), we
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Figure 2·2: Client-degree distribution of NTP servers in our dataset;
we omit servers with no clients.
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did obtain responses from 22,230 of these bad timekeepers. Monlist responses are a
trove of information, listing all IPs that had recently sent NTP packets (of any mode)
to the server. Extracting only the mode 3 and 4 data from each monlist response,
and combining it with our existing data, gave us a total of 13,099,361 potential NTP
servers.
Stratum. Table 2.5 shows the distribution of stratums in our entire dataset. Note
that there is not a one-to-one mapping between an NTP client and its stratum; be-
cause an NTP client can be configured with servers of various stratum, the client’s
stratum can change depending on the server it selects for synchronization. Thus,
Table 2.5 presents the ‘best’ (i.e., lowest) stratum for each IP in our dataset. Un-
surprisingly, stratum 3 is most common, and, like (Czyz et al., 2014a) we find many
unsynchronized (stratum 0 or 16) servers.
Degree distribution. Figure 2·2 shows the client (i.e., child) degree distribution
of the servers in our topology. We note that our topology is highly incomplete; it
excludes information about clients behind a NAT or firewall, as well as servers that
a client is configured for but not synchronized to.9 The degree distribution is highly
skewed. Of 13.1M IPs in our dataset, about 3.7M (27.8%) had clients below them
in the NTP hierarchy. Of these 3.7M servers with clients, 99.4% of them have fewer
than 10 clients, while only 0.2% of them have more than 100 clients. However, servers
with more than 100 clients tend to have many clients, averaging above 1.5K clients
per server, with the top 50 servers having at least 24.5K clients each. Compromising
these important servers (or hijacking their traffic) can impact large swaths of the
NTP ecosystem.
9Earlier studies (Murta et al., 2006), (Minar, 1999) used monlist responses, which are now com-
monly deactivated, to obtain topologies. We present a new technique that exposes a client’s servers
in Section 2.5.3, but as it is also a denial-of-service attack on the client, we have not used it to
augment our measurements.
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2.4 How to step time with NTP
Unauthenticated NTP traffic is vulnerable to on-path attacks, as was pointed out by
various authors (Mizrahi, 2012b), (Haberman and Mills, 2010), (Klein, 2013), (Selvi,
2014), (Selvi, 2015). While on-path attacks are sometimes dismissed because the
attacker requires a privileged position on the network, it is important to remember
that an attacker can use various hijacking techniques to place herself on the path to
an NTP server. For instance, ntpd configuration files allow clients to name servers by
either their IP or their hostname (e.g., MAC OS X 10.9.5 comes with an NTP client
that is preconfigured to take time from the host time.apple.com, while many systems
rely on the pool of servers that share the hostname pool.ntp.org). By hijacking the
DNS entries for these hostnames (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013),
an attacker can quietly manipulate the NTP traffic they send. Moreover, NTP relies
on the correctness of IP addresses; thus ARP-spoofing in a local-area network or
even global attacks on BGP (Goldberg, 2014) (like those seen in the wild (d’Itri,
2015), (Peterson, 2013)) can divert NTP traffic to an attacker.
In Section 2.2 and Table 2.1 we saw that dramatic shifts in time (years, months)
are required when NTP attacks are used inside larger, more nefarious attacks. Can
an on-path attacker really cause NTP clients to accept such dramatic shifts in time?
2.4.1 Time skimming
At first glance, the answer should be no. NTP defines a value called the panic
threshold which is 1000 sec (about 16 minutes) by default; if NTP attempts to tell
the client to alter its local clock by a value that exceeds the panic threshold, then
the NTP client “SHOULD exit with a diagnostic message to the system log” (Mills
et al., 2010). Our experiments confirm that ntpd v4.2.6 and v4.2.8 quit when they
are initially synchronized to a server that then starts to offer time that exceeds the
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panic threshold.
One way to circumvent this is through an adaption of (Selvi, 2014)’s “time-
skimming” technique,10 so that the man-in-the-middle slowly steps the client’s local
clock back/forward in steps smaller than the panic threshold. However, this comes
with a caveat: it can take minutes or hours for ntpd to update a client’s local clock.
To understand why, observe that in addition to the panic threshold, NTP also defines
a step threshold of 125 ms (Mills et al., 2010). A client will accept a time step larger
than step threshold but smaller than the panic threshold as long as at least “stepout”
seconds have elapsed since its last clock update; the stepout value is 900 seconds (15
minutes) in ntpd v4.2.6 and RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010), and was reduced to 300
seconds (5 minutes) in ntpd v4.2.8. Thus, shifting by one year using steps of size
16 minute each requires 1×365×24×60
16
= 33K total steps; with a 5-minute stepout, this
takes at least 114 days.
2.4.2 Exploiting reboot.
There are other ways to quickly shift a client’s time. ntpd has a configuration op-
tion called -g, which allows an NTP client that first initializes (i.e., before it has
synchronized to any time source) to accept any time shift, even one exceeding the
panic threshold. (We have confirmed that both ntpd v4.2.6p5 and ntpd v4.2.8p2 on
Ubuntu13.16.0-24-generic accept a single step 10 years back in time, and forward in
time, upon reboot.) The -g configuration is quite natural for clocks that drift sig-
nificantly when systems are powered down, and many OSes, including Linux, do run
10Selvi’s (Selvi, 2014) time-skimming attack allows for fast timesteps on clients that update their
clocks at predictable intervals—for instance, Fedora Linux sends a query every minute and updates
its clock immediately upon receipt of the response. The full ntpd implementation has more complex
clock update mechanisms that thwart this attack. These mechanisms include (1) sending mode 3
queries at randomized and adaptively-selected intervals determined by the poll process (Mills et al.,
2010, Sec 13), (2) only updating the clock upon receipt of an adaptively-chosen number of self-
consistent mode 4 responses (see e.g., the discussion of TEST11 in Section 2.5.5), (3) using the
stepout value to delay clock update events, etc..
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ntpd with -g by default.
Reboot. An on-path attacker can exploit -g by waiting until the client restarts as a
result of power cycling, software updates, or other ‘natural events’. Importantly, the
attacker knows exactly when the client restarts, because the client puts ‘INIT’ in the
reference ID of its packets (Figure 2·1), including the mode 3 queries the client sends
the server. Moreover, a determined attacker can deliberately cause ntpd to restart
using e.g., a packet-of-death like Teardrop (BUGTRAQ mailing list, 1997).
Feel free to panic. Suppose, on the other hand, that an NTP attacker shifts a client’s
time beyond the panic threshold, causing the client to quit. If the operating system
is configured to reboot the NTP client, the rebooted NTP client will initialize and
accept whatever (bogus) time it obtains from its NTP servers. Indeed, this seems to
have happened with some OSes during the November 2012 NTP incident (Menscher,
2012).11
Small-step-big-step. Users might notice strange shifts in time if they occur immedi-
ately upon reboot. However, we have found that ntpd allows an on-path attacker to
shift time when clients are less likely to notice. To understand how, we need to look
into ntpd’s implementation of the -g configuration.
Small-step-big-step with ntpd v4.2.6. One might expect -g to allow for timesteps
that exceed the panic threshold only upon initialization—when the client updates
its clock for the very first time upon starting. To implement this, ntpd allows steps
exceeding the panic threshold only when a variable called allow panic is TRUE. ntpd
v4.2.6p5 sets allow panic to TRUE only upon initialization with the -g configuration
(otherwise, it is initialized to FALSE), and set to FALSE if the client (1) is just about
to update its local clock by a value less than the step threshold (125ms), and (2) is
already in a state called SYNC, which means it recently updated its clock by a value
less than the step threshold. Normally, a client initializes and (1) and (2) occur after
11Panic might be recorded in system log, but users may ignore it.
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two clock updates. However, if an attacker is able to prevent the client from making
ever two contiguous clock updates (one after the other) of less than 125 ms each, then
allow panic remains TRUE.
The following small-step-big-step attack on ntpd v4.2.6 exploits the above obser-
vation. First, the client reboots and begins initializing; it signals this to the server by
putting ‘INIT’ in the reference ID of its mode 3 queries (Mills et al., 2010, Fig. 13)).
Next, the client synchronizes to the server; it signals this with the server’s IP address
in the reference ID of its mode 3 queries (Mills et al., 2010, Fig. 13)). When the
server sees that the client has synchronized once, the server sends the client a ‘small
step’ greater than the STEP threshold (125 ms) and less than the panic threshold
(≈ 16 min); the client signals that it has accepted this timestep by putting ‘STEP’
in its reference ID (Mills et al., 2010, Fig. 13)). When the server sees that the client
is in ‘STEP’ mode, the server immediately sends the client a ‘big step’ that exceeds
the panic threshold. At this point, the client does not panic, because it never set
allow panic to FALSE. Indeed, one might even interpret this as expected behavior
per RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010):
STEP means the offset is less than the panic threshold, but greater than
the step threshold STEPT (125 ms). In this case, the clock is stepped to
the correct offset, but ... all associations MUST be reset and the client
begins as at initial start.
Notice that this gives the server some ‘slack time’ before it sends the client the bogus
big time step. We confirmed this for ntpd v4.2.6p5 with a small step of 10 minutes
and a big step of 1 year. Upon initialization, our client exchanges 3 packets with the
server before it first synchronizes, then 21 packets before accepting the small step and
entering STEP mode, and 25 packets before accepting the big step.
Small-step-big-step with ntpd v4.2.8. Meanwhile, ntpd v4.2.8p2 sets allow panic
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to FALSE under conditions (1) and (2), OR if (1) holds and (3) the client is in
FSET state, which is the state the client enters upon initialization. Normally, a
client initializes and (1) and (3) occur after one clock update. Thus, small-step-
big-step succeeds iff every clock update the client receives exceeds the step threshold
(125ms). We confirmed this for an ntpd v4.2.8p2 client with a small step of 10 minutes
and two big steps of 1 year. The very first mode 4 response received by the client,
upon initialization, was the small step of 10 minutes back in time, and the client
immediately went into ‘STEP’ mode. The next mode 4 response was a big step of 1
year back in time, which the client accepted after sending 11 queries to the server.
The next mode 4 response was a another big step of 1 year, which the client accepted
after sending 10 queries to the server.
Stealthy time shift. As an application of the small-step-big-step attack, an on-path
attacker can preform a bogus big step and then to quickly bring the client’s clock
back to normal, so that the client never notices; this might be useful for stealthily
flushing a client’s cache, or expiring certain cryptographic objects (see Section 2.2).
To do this, the attacker waits for ntpd to reboot (or deliberately causes a reboot),
and ensures that every clock update made by the client makes is larger than 125 ms,
sending the client into STEP mode. To keep things stealthy, the attacker can e.g.,
first shift the client forward by 150 ms, then back by 150 ms, then forward by 150
ms, etc.. Then, when the attacker is ready, it can send a big step that exceeds the
panic threshold, perform nefarious deeds, and finally send another big step that sets
the client’s clock back to normal.
2.4.3 Recommendation: Careful with -g
The security of ntpd should not rely on 100% OS uptime, so users should be careful
with the -g option. One solution is to not use the -g option. Alternatively, one can
detect feel-free-to-panic attacks by monitoring the system log for panic events and
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being careful when automatically restarting ntpd after it quits. Monitoring should
also be used to detect suspicious reboots of the OS (that might indicate the presence
of a small-step-big-step or other reboot-based on-path attacks). Implementors can
prevent small-step-big-step attacks by patching ntpd to ensure that the allow panic
variable is set to FALSE after the very first clock update upon initialization; this issue
has been captured in CVE-2015-5300. Moreover, implementors can prevent ntpd
clients from putting ‘INIT’ in the reference ID of their NTP packets upon initializing;
this would make it more difficult for on-path attackers to know when initialization is
taking place, raising the bar for attacks that exploit reboot.
2.5 Kiss-o’-Death: Off-path Denial-of-Service Attacks
We show how NTP security can be stymied by another aspect of the NTP protocol:
the ‘Kiss-o-death’ (KoD) packet. KoD packets are designed to reduce load at an NTP
server by rate-limiting clients that query the server too frequently; upon receipt of
a KoD from its server, the client refrains from querying that server for some period
of time (Mills et al., 2010, Sec 7.4). We now show how KoD packets can be used
to launch off-path denial-of-service attacks on NTP clients. We also consider using
KoDs to pin a client to a bad timekeeper.
2.5.1 Why are off-path attacks hard?
We first need to understand why it is usually difficult to spoof NTP mode 4 packets
(Figure 2·1) from off-path.
TEST2: The origin timestamp. Like many other protocols, NTP requires clients to
check that a nonce in the client’s query matches a nonce in the server’s response; that
way, an off-path attacker, that cannot observe client-server communications, does
not know the nonce and thus has difficulty spoofing the packet. (This is analogous to
source port randomization in TCP/UDP, sequence number randomization in TCP,
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and transaction ID randomization in DNS.) NTP uses the origin timestamp as a
nonce: the client checks that (a) the origin timestamp on the mode 4 response sent
from server to client (Figure 2·1), matches (b) the client’s local time when he sent
the corresponding mode 3 query, which is sent in the transmit timestamp field of the
mode 3 query sent from client to server. This is called TEST2 in the ntpd code. (Note
that ntpd does not randomize the UDP source port to create an additional nonce;
instead, all NTP packets have UDP source port 123.)
How much entropy is in NTP’s nonce? The origin timestamp is a 64 bit value,
where the first 32 bits represent seconds elapsed since January 1, 1900, and the last
32 bits represent fractional seconds. A client whose system clock has e.g., ρ = −12
bit precision (2−12 = 244µs) puts a 32 − 12 = 20-bit random value in the least
significant bit of the timestamp. Thus, for precision ρ, the origin timestamp has at
least 32 + ρ bits of entropy. However, because polling intervals are no shorter than
16 seconds (Mills et al., 2010), an off-path attacker is unlikely to know exactly when
the client sent its mode 3 query. We therefore suppose that the origin timestamp has
about 32 bits of entropy. This is a lot of entropy, so one might conclude that NTP
is robust to off-path attacks. However, in this section and Section 2.6, we will show
that this is not the case.
2.5.2 Exploiting the Kiss-O’-Death Packet.
A server sends a client a Kiss-O’-Death (KoD) if a client queries it too many times
within a specified time interval; the parameters for sending KoD are server dependent.
The KoD is an NTP packet (Figure 2·1) with mode 4, leap indicator 3, stratum 0
and an ASCII ‘kiss code’ string in the reference ID field. A sample KoD packet is
shown in Figure 2·3. According to RFC5905 (Mills et al., 2010):
For kiss code RATE, the client MUST immediately reduce its polling
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v4 IHL=20 TOS  Total length = 76 
IPID x DF MF Frag Offset 
TTL Protocol = 17 IP Header Checksum 
Source IP 
Destination IP 
Source Port = 123 Destination Port = 123 
Length = 56 UDP Checksum 
L=3 v4 Mode =4 Stratum=0 Poll =17 Precision 
Root Delay 
Root Dispersion 
Reference ID = RATE 
Reference Timestamp = Jan 1, 1970 0:00:00 UTC 
Origin Timestamp = July 29, 2015 01:23:45 UTC 
Receive Timestamp  = July 29, 2015 01:23:45 UTC 
Transmit Timestamp = July 29, 2015 01:23:45 UTC 
IP header 
UDP header 
NTP data 
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36 
44 
52 
60 
68 
76 
 0   
Figure 2·3: Kiss-o’-Death (KoD) packet, telling the client to keep
quiet for at least 217 seconds (36 hours).
interval to that server and continue to reduce it each time it receives a
RATE kiss code.
In ntpd v4.2.6 and v4.2.8, this is implemented by having the client stop querying
the server for a period that is at least as long as the poll value field in the received
KoD packet.12 Our experiments confirm that if the KoD packet has polling interval
τkod = 17 then the ntpd v4.2.8 client will stop querying the server for at least 2
τkod sec
(36 hours).13 The poll field in the NTP packet is an 8-bit value (i.e., ranging from 0
to 255), but RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010, pg 10) defines the maximum allowable poll
12Interestingly, RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 7.4) defines an even more dangerous type of
KoD packet: “ For kiss codes DENY and RSTR, the client MUST demobilize any associations to
that server and stop sending packets to that server”. Thus, spoofing a single DENY or RSTR KoD
packet can completely disconnect a client from its server! Fortunately, however, neither ntpd v4.2.6
or v4.2.8 honor this functionality.
13Due to complex interactions between τkod, the poll value in the KoD packet, and NTP’s polling
algorithm, the period of time that the client stops querying the server will usually exceed 2τkod .
More precisely, the client’s polling algorithm resets the minpoll value τmin for the server sending
the KoD to τmin = max(τmin, τkod) and then the client stops querying the server for a period of
about 2max(τmin+1,max(min(τmax,τkod))). By default, minpoll is initialized to τmin = 6, and maxpoll to
τmax = 10.
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value to be 17. The most recent ntpd implementation, however, will accept KoDs
with poll values even larger than 17; setting τkod = 25, for example, should cause the
client to stop querying its server for at least 225 seconds, i.e., ≈ 1 year.
Spoofing a KoD from off-path. How does the client know that the KoD packet came
from the legitimate server, and not from an attacker? With regular mode 4 responses,
the client uses the origin timestamp as a nonce. While it seems reasonable to expect
this check to be performed on the KoD packet as well, RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010,
Sec. 7.4) does not seem to explicitly require this. Moreover, lab experiments with
ntpd v4.2.6p5 and v4.2.8p3 show that the client accepts a KoD even if its origin
timestamp is bogus. This means that an offpath attacker can trivially send the client
a KoD that is spoofed to look like it came from its server; the only information the
attacker needs is the IP addresses of the relevant client and server. Moreover, by
setting the poll value in the spoofed KoD to be an unreasonably high value (e.g.,
τkod = 25), the spoofed KoD will prevent the client from querying its server for an
extended period of time. This vulnerability, captured in CVE-2015-7704, was patched
in ntpd v4.2.8p4 after the disclosure of our work.
Eliciting a KoD from off-path: Priming the pump. Even if the client does validate
the origin timestamp on the KoD packet, an off-path attacker could still elicit a valid
KoD packet for the client from the server. To do this, the off-path attacker ‘primes-
the-pump’ at the server, by sending multiple mode 3 queries spoofed to look like they
come from the victim client; the server then ‘gets angry’ at the client, and responds
to the client’s legitimate mode 3 queries with a KoD. The client will accept this
KoD because it has a valid origin timestamp (matching that in the client’s legitimate
query). The attacker just needs to measure the number of times q in a given period of
time t0 that a client must query the server in order to elicit a KoD; this is easily done
by attempting to get the server to send KoD packets to the attacker’s own machine.
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Then, the attacker sends the server q−1 queries with source IP spoofed to that of the
victim client, and hopes that the client sends its own query to server before time t0
elapses. This issue has been captured in CVE-2015-7705. Interestingly, recent NTP
security bulletins (as of 09/2015) have increased this attack surface by recommending
that servers send KoDs (Axel K, 2015).14
Attack efficiency. A single spoofed KoD packet with high poll (e.g., τkod ≥ 25) can
essentially prevent the client from ever taking time from its server, and thus gives
rise to a very low-rate off-path denial-of-service attack (CVE-2015-7704). Meanwhile,
eliciting a KoD by priming-the-pump (CVE-2015-7705) requires more packets, be-
cause:
1) The attacker must send several packets to the server to elicit the KoD, and
2) The elicited KoD packet is likely to have poll value no larger than 10. (This
follows because when ntpd servers send KoDs, the KoD’s poll value τkod is at least
as large as that in the query triggering the KoD. Meanwhile, the query triggering
the KoD was a legitimate query from the client, and default maximum value of the
poll in the client’s query is 10.) The attacker can thus elicit a KoD that quiets the
client for ≈ 210 seconds (15 minutes), then elicit another KoD 15 minutes later, and
continue this indefinitely.
Thus, patching clients to validate the KoD origin timestamp (CVE-2015-7704) does
weaken, but does not eliminate, KoD-related attacks.
2.5.3 Low-rate off-path denial-of-service attack on NTP clients.
It’s tempting to argue that NTP clients are commonly pre-configured with many, and
so KoD-related attacks on one server can be mitigated by the presence of the other
servers. However, this is not the case. We now present a denial-of-service attack that
14As of August 2015, (Axel K, 2015) recommends the configuration restrict default limited
kod nomodify notrap nopeer. Note that turning on limited means that a server will not serve
time to a client that queries it too frequently; kod additionally configures the server to send KoDs.
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allows an off-path attacker to “turn off” NTP at a client by preventing the client
from synchronizing to any of its preconfigured servers.
What are the implications of this attack? For the most part, the client will just sit
there and rely on its own local clock for the time. If the client has accurate local time-
keeping abilities, then this attack is unlikely to cause much damage. On the other
hand, the client machine could be incapable of keeping time for itself, e.g., because
it is in a virtual machine (VMware, 2011), or running CPU-intensive operations that
induce clock drift. In this case, the client’s clock will drift along, uncorrected by NTP,
for the duration of attack.
The denial of service attack. The attack proceeds as follows:
1) The attacker sends a mode 3 NTP query to the victim client, and the client
replies with a mode 4 NTP response. The attacker uses the reference ID in the mode
4 response to learn the IP of the server to which the client is synchronized.
2) The attacker spoofs/elicits a KoD packet with τkod from the server to which the
client is synchronized. The client stops querying this server for at least 2τkod sec.
3) There are now two cases. Case 1: the client declines to take time from any its
of other preconfigured servers; thus, the attacker has succeeded in deactivating NTP
at the client. Case 2: The client will synchronize to one of its other preconfigured
servers, and the attacker returns to step 1. To determine whether the client is in the
Case 1 or Case 2, the attacker periodically sends mode 3 queries to the client, and
checks if the reference ID in the mode 4 response has changed.
Thus, the attacker learns the IP addresses of all the preconfigured servers from which
the client is willing to take time, and periodically (e.g., once every 2τkod seconds),
spoofs/elicits KoD packets from each of them. The client will not synchronize to any
of its servers, and NTP is deactivated.
Attack surface. For this attack to work, the client must (1) react to KoD packets by
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refraining from querying the KoD-sending server, (2) respond to NTP mode 3 queries
with NTP mode 4 responses, and (3) be synchronized to an IPv4 NTP server. This
creates a large attack surface: condition (1) holds for ntpd v4.2.6 and v4.2.8p3, the
most recent reference implementation of NTP, and our scans (Section 2.3.2) suggest
that over 13M IPs satisfy condition (2).
Sample experiment. We ran this attack on an ntpd v4.2.8p2 client in our lab
configured with the IP addresses of three NTP servers in the wild. We elicited a
KoD for each server in turn, waiting for the client that resynchronize to a new server
before eliciting a new KoD from that server. To elicit a KoD, a (separate) attack
machine in our lab ran a scapy script that sent the server 90 mode 3 queries in rapid
succession, each of which was spoofed with the source IP of our victim client and
origin timestamp equal to the current time on the attacker’s machine. (Notice that
the origin timestamp is bogus from the perspective of the victim client.) Because
our spoofed mode 3 queries had poll value τ = 17, the elicited KoDs had poll value
τ = 17. Our client received its third KoD within 1.5 hours, and stopped querying its
servers for the requested 217 seconds (36 hours); in fact, the client had been quiet for
50 hours when we stopped the experiment.
2.5.4 Pinning to a bad timekeeper. (Part 1: The attack)
Consider a client that is preconfigured with several servers, one of which is a bad
timekeeper. Can KoDs force the client to synchronize to the bad timekeeper? Indeed,
since ntpd clients and configurations are rarely updated (see Table 2.2, that shows
that 1.9M servers use a version of ntpd that was released in 2001), a bad timekeeper
might be lurking in rarely-updated lists of preconfigured servers.
The attack. The attacker uses the KoD denial-of-service attack (Section 2.5.3) to
learn the client’s preconfigured servers; each time the attacker learns a new server,
the attacker sends a mode 3 query to the server to check if it is a good timekeeper,
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continuing to spoof KoDs until it identifies a server that is a bad timekeeper. At this
point, the client is taking time from a bad timekeeper, and the attack succeeds. To
ensure that the client remains pinned to the bad timekeeper, the attacker periodically
sends the client fresh KoDs from the good timekeepers.
But does this attack actually work? NTP’s clock discipline algorithms are designed
to guard against attacks of this type. We have launched this attack against different
clients (in our lab) configured to servers (in the wild), and observed differing results;
sometimes, that client does take time from the bad timekeeper, and sometimes it does
not. Unfortunately, however, we have not yet understood exactly what conditions are
required for this attack to succeed. One thing we do know, however, are conditions
that would definitely cause this attack to fail. We explain these conditions by tak-
ing detour into some aspects of NTP’s clock discipline algorithm, that will also be
important for the attacks in Section 2.6.
2.5.5 Detour: NTP’s clock discipline algorithms.
An NTP client only updates its local clock from its chosen server at infrequent inter-
vals. Each valid mode 4 response that the client obtains from its server is a sample
of the timing information at that server. A client needs to obtain enough “good”
samples from a server before it even considers taking time from that server.
There are mechanisms that “age”, but do not necessarily delete, old samples from
servers that have not been heard from in a long time (because e.g., they have an
excessively long polling interval, or have been KoD’d). Empty samples are recorded
under various failure conditions; we discussed one such failure condition, TEST2 (origin
timestamp validity) in Section 2.5.1. TEST7 is another important failure condition:
TEST7. Read the root delay ∆ and root dispersion E from the server’s mode 4
packet (Figure 2·1) and check that ∆/2 +E does not exceed MAXDISP, a parameter
whose default is 16 sec (Mills et al., 2010). (Roughly, ∆/2 + E measures how far off
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the server’s clock is, relative to the stratum 1 server that is at the ‘root’ of the NTP
hierarchy from which the server is taking time.)
For each non-empty sample, the client records the offset θ per equation (6.2) and
delay δ per equation (6.1). The client keeps up to eight samples from each server,
and selects the offset θ∗ corresponding to the non-empty sample of lowest delay δ∗.
It then computes the jitter ψ, which is the root-mean-square distance of the sample
offsets from θ∗, i.e.,
ψ =
√
1
i−1
∑
i
(θi − θ∗)2 (2.3)
Next, the server must pass another crucial check:
TEST11. Check that the root distance Λ does not exceed MAXDIST, a parameter
that defaults to 1.5 sec. While RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010, Appendix A.5.5.2), ntpd
v4.2.6 and ntpd v4.2.8 each use a slightly different definition of Λ, what matters is
Λ ∝ ψ + (δ∗ + ∆)/2 + E + 2ρ (2.4)
where ∆ is the root delay, E is the root dispersion, and ρ is the precision, all which are
read off the server’s mode 4 packet per Figure 2·1. (Precision ρ reveals the resolution
of the server’s local clock; e.g., ρ = −12 means the server’s local clock is precise to
within 2−12 sec or 244 µs. Root delay ∆ is the cumulative delay from the server to
the ‘root’ (i.e., stratum 1 server) in the NTP client-server hierarchy from which the
server is taking time; a stratum 1 server typically has ∆ = 0. Root dispersion E is an
implementation-dependent quantity related to the Λ value computed by the server.)
If the client has several servers that pass TEST11 (and other tests we omit here), the
client must select a single server to synchronize its clock. This is done with a variant
of Marzullo’s Algorithm (Marzullo, 1984), which clusters servers according to offset
θ∗ (equation (6.2)) and other metrics. Servers who differ too much from the majority
are ignored, while the remaining servers are added to a ‘survivor list’. (This is why,
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under normal conditions, NTP clients do not synchronize to bad timekeepers.) If all
servers on the survivor list are different from the server the client used for its most
recent clock update, the client must decide whether or not to “clock hop” to a new
server. The clock hop decision is made by various other algorithms that are different
in ntpd v4.2.6 and v4.2.8. If no clock hop occurs, the client does not update its clock.
2.5.6 Pinning to a bad timekeeper. (Part 2: Attack surface)
Thus, for a client to synchronize to a bad timekeeper, we know that the bad time-
keeper must be able to pass TEST11. In practice, we found that this means that
bad timekeeper must send mode 4 packets (Figure 2·1) with root delay ∆ and root
dispersion E and precision ρ such that ∆/2 +E+ 2ρ < 1 sec. In addition to this, the
bad timekeeper must (1) “defeat” the good timekeepers in Marzullo’s algorithm, and
then (2) convince the client to clock hop.
Example: A successful attack. We synchronized an ntpd v4.2.6 client in our lab to
three stratum 2 servers in the wild. Two of these servers were good timekeepers, and
the bad timekeeper had an offset of -224 sec relative to our client with E ≈ 10 msec
and ∆ ≈ 0. We let the client synchronize to one of the good timekeepers, and then
an (separate) attack machine in our lab elicited KoDs with poll interval τ = 17 (36
hours) from the two good timekeepers (by sending 90 NTP mode 3 packets spoofed
with the source IP of our client in rapid succession to each). At this point, the client
stopped querying the good timekeepers, still keeping the old samples from these
servers in its logs, and continuously getting fresh samples from the bad timekeeper.
At this time, the client indicated that Marzullo’s Algorithm was eliminating the bad
timekeeper from consideration. Then, 94 minutes after the KoDs were first sent,
the client cleared its logs of samples and sent one query to each of its three servers.
Because the good timekeepers had poll interval of τ = 17, the client stopped querying
them after this one query. Meanwhile, the client continued to get fresh samples from
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the bad timekeeper. Once the client had four fresh samples from the bad timekeeper,
it was accepted for synchronization.
This experiment is quite curious; we are not sure what caused the client to clear
its log of samples after 94 minutes and requery all its servers. Once this happened, the
larger number of fresh samples logged from the bad timekeeper allowed it to become
the chosen server for synchronization. Indeed, we ran the exact same experiment
(using the same servers) with a ntpd v4.2.8 client, and after six hours the client never
cleared its log of samples, and thus never accepted time from the bad timekeeper. We
tried the same experiment with the same ntpd v4.2.6 client and good timekeepers,
but this time using a ‘worse’ timekeeper with offset -582s and E ≈ 10 msec and
∆ ≈ 0; five hours later, the client still had not cleared its logs or taken time from the
bad timekeeper.
KoD + reboot. There is one way around all of the issues discussed so far. If
ntpd reboots,15 then the attacker has a short window during which the client is not
synchronized to any of its preconfigured servers; our experiments confirm that in ntpd
v4.2.6 this window is at least 4 polling intervals (i.e., the minimum polling interval
is 24 sec, so this translates to at least 1 min), while ntpd v4.2.8 shortens this to after
the client receives its first mode 4 responses from its servers. Thus, the attacker can
exploit this short window of time to spoof a KoD packet from each of the clients’ good-
timekeeper servers, but not from the bad timekeeper. As long as the bad timekeeper
passes TEST11, the attacker no longer has to worry about Marzullo’s algorithm, clock-
hopping, or exceeding the panic threshold, and the attack will succeed.
Bad timekeepers in the wild. To quantify the attack surface resulting from pinning
to a bad timekeeper, we checked which bad timekeepers (with offset θ > 10 sec) are
15A reboot can be elicited by sending a packet-of-death that restarts the OS (e.g., Teardrop (BUG-
TRAQ mailing list, 1997)) or the ntpd client (e.g., CVE-2014-9295 (National Vulnerability Database,
2014)). Alternatively, the attacker can wait until the client reboots due to a power cycling, software
updates, or other ‘natural’ events.
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Figure 2·4: Cumulative distribution of the size of the subtrees rooted at bad time-
keepers (with offset θ > 10 sec) that can pass TEST11 (because ∆/2 + E + 2ρ < 1
sec), broken out by the bad timekeeper’s stratum. We omit bad timekeepers with no
children.
“good enough” to have (a) ∆/2 + E + 2ρ < 1 sec and (b) stratum that is not 0
or 16. Of the 3.7M bad timekeepers in our dataset (Section 2.3.2), about 368K (or
10%) are “good enough” to pass the necessary tests. Meanwhile, we found only 2190
bad timekeepers that had clients below them in the NTP hierarchy, and of these, 743
were “good enough”. While our topology is necessarily incomplete (Section 2.3.2), this
suggests that there are only a limited number of servers in the wild that can be used for
these attacks. Figure 2·4 is a cumulative distribution of the size of the subtrees rooted
at bad timekeepers that are “good enough” to pass the necessary tests, broken out
by the bad timekeeper’s stratum. (Point (x, y) in the figure corresponds to y “good-
enough” bad timekeepers have a subtree of size at least x.) Notice, however, that the
distributions are highly skewed, so some of the “good enough” bad timekeepers had
large subtrees below them in the NTP hierarchy. For example, one stratum 1 server
(in Central Europe) had an offset of 22 minutes and almost 20K clients in its subtree.
2.5.7 Recommendation: Kiss-o’-Death considered harmful.
Following the disclosure of our work, many NTP implementations (including ntpd
v4.2.8p4) have been patched to ensure that clients validate the origin timestamp
on KoD packets (CVE-2015-7704), thus preventing our extremely low-rate off-path
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denial-of-service attack that uses spoofed KoD. However, our less severe priming-the-
pump attack that allows the attacker to elicit a valid KoD (CVE-2015-7705) has not
yet been addressed. Preventing this attack requires some rethinking of NTP’s KoD
and rate-limiting functionality.
One solution is to simply eliminate NTP’s KoD and other rate-limiting function-
ality; this, however, eliminates a server’s ability to deal with heavy volumes of NTP
traffic.
Alternatively, if clients are required to cryptographically authenticate their queries
to the server, then it is no longer possible for an off-path attacker to prime the pump
at the server by spoofing mode 3 queries from the client. Interestingly, however, a new
proposal for securing NTP (Sibold et al., 2015, Sec.4) only suggests authenticating
mode 4 responses from the server to client, but not mode 3 queries from client to
server.
In the absence of authentication, another solution is to apply techniques devel-
oped for rate-limiting other protocols, e.g., Response Rate Limiting (RRL) in the
DNS (Vixie, 2014). With RRL, nameservers do not respond to queries from clients
that query them too frequently.16 Like NTP, DNS is sent over unauthenticated UDP,
and therefore is at risk for the same priming-the-pump attacks we discussed here.
RRL addresses this by requiring a server to randomly respond to some fraction of the
client’s queries, even if that client is rate limited (Vixie and Schryver, 2012, Sec. 2.2.7);
thus, even a client that is subject to a priming-the-pump attack can still get some
good information from the server. To apply this to NTP, a server that is rate-limiting
a client with KoDs would send legitimate mode 4 responses (instead of a KoD) to the
client’s queries with some probability. For this to be effective, NTP clients should
also limit the period for which they are willing to keep quiet upon receipt of a KoD;
16ntpd also offers this type of rate limiting, as an alternative to the KoD, via the limited config-
uration option.
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not querying the server for days (τkod = 17 ) or even years (τkod = 25) upon receipt
of a single KoD packet is excessive and invites abuse.
2.6 Off-Path NTP Fragmentation Attack
We now show how an off-path attacker can hijack an unauthenticated NTP connec-
tion from a client to its server. The key ingredient in our attack is overlapping IPv4
packet fragments ; therefore this attack succeeds a on small but non-negligible set of
clients and servers that use the IPv4 fragmentation policies described in Section 2.6.5.
We will assume the client is preconfigured with only one server. (Some OSes (e.g.,
MAC OS X v10.9.5) actually do use this configuration, and in Section 2.5.6 we show
how to combine our KoD and reboot techniques to simulate this scenario for clients
preconfigured with multiple servers.) We first explain why off-path attacks are chal-
lenging and give background on IPv4 packet fragmentation (Postel, 1981a), (Novak,
2005), (Shankar and Paxson, 2003), (Ptacek and Newsham, 1998). Next, we present
the attack itself, explain when it works, and conclude with a measurement study that
sheds light on the number of clients and servers in the wild that are vulnerable to
this attack.
2.6.1 Why are off-path attacks hard?
The goal of our attacker is to spoof a series of mode 4 response packets (Figure 2·1)
from the server to the client. The spoofed response should contain bogus server
timestamps (i.e., T3 transmit timestamp, T2 receive timestamp) in order to convince
the client to accept bogus time from the server. This creates several hurdles for an
off-path attacker who cannot see the communication between client and server:
First, there is the issue of nonces. Per Section 2.5.1, the attacker must spoof
packets with the correct origin timestamp, which has about 32 bits of entropy. Our
off-path attacker will not even try to learn the origin timestamp; instead, we use the
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origin timestamp from the honest mode 4 response from server to client, and use IPv4
packet fragmentation to overwrite other relevant fields of the NTP packet.
Second, since our attacker does not know NTP’s origin timestamp, it cannot
compute the UDP checksum. However, the UDP specification for IPv4 allows a host
to accept any packet with UDP checksum of zero (which means: don’t bother checking
the checksum) (Postel, 1980, pg 2). As such, our attacker uses IPv4 fragmentation
to set the UDP checksum to zero.
Third, in order to convince the client’s clock discipline algorithms (Section 2.5.5)
to accept the attacker’s bogus time, our attacker must spoof a stream of several
(at least eight, but usually more) packets that are acceptable to the clock discipline
algorithm. This is significantly more challenging than just spoofing a single packet
as in e.g., (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013). Moreover, this stream
of spoofed packets must be sufficiently self-consistent to pass TEST11 (Section 2.5.5).
To do this, our attacker uses IPv4 fragmentation to set several fields in the packet to
tiny values (e.g., ρ = −29, ∆ = 0.002, E = 0.003 sec and stratum = 1). His main
challenge, however, is to ensure that jitter ψ is small enough to pass TEST11. We
show how this can be done in Section 2.6.4.
2.6.2 IPv4 packet fragmentation.
Fragmentation is one of IP’s original functionalities (Postel, 1981a); chopping a large
packet into fragments that can be sent through networks that can only handle small
packets. The length of the largest packet that a network element can accommodate is
its ‘maximum transmission unit (MTU)’. In practice, almost every network element
today supports an MTU of at least 1492 bytes (the maximum payload size for Ethernet
v2 (Mamakos et al., 1999, Sec. 7)). Back in 1981, however, RFC791 (Postel, 1981a)
required that “all hosts must be prepared to accept” IPv4 packets of length 576
bytes, while “every internet module must be able to forward” IPv4 packets of length
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Figure 2·5: ICMP Fragmentation Needed packet from attacker 6.6.6.6 telling server
42.42.42.42 to fragment NTP packets for client 43.43.43.43 to MTU of 68 bytes.
68 bytes. The minimum IPv4 MTU for the Internet is therefore 68 bytes, but many
OSes refuse to fragment packets to MTUs smaller than 576 bytes. Our attack only
succeeds against servers that fragment to a 68 byte MTU; the attacker can therefore
convince a server to chop an NTP packet into the two fragments of Figure 2·7. Our
measurements (Section 2.6.7) confirm that there are ten of thousands of NTP servers
in the wild that do this.
ICMP Fragmentation Needed. How does a host learn that it needs to fragment
packets to a specific MTU? Any network element on the path from sender to receiver
can send a single ICMP fragmentation needed packet to the sender containing the
desired MTU; this information is then cached for some OS-dependent period of time
(e.g., 10 minutes by default on Linux 3.13.0 and MAC OS X 10.9.5). Figure 2·5 shows
an ICMP fragmentation needed packet that signals to host 42.42.42.42 to fragment
all NTP packets (UDP port 123) it sends to destination IP 43.43.43.43 to an MTU of
68 bytes. Since the host is not expected to know the IP addresses of all the network
elements on its path, this packet can be sent from any source IP; in Figure 2·5
this source IP is 6.6.6.6. The payload of this ICMP packet contains an IP header
and first eight bytes of a packet that has already been sent by host and exceeded the
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MTU (Postel, 1981b); for NTP, these eight bytes correspond to the UDP header. The
sender uses this to determine which destination IP (i.e., 43.43.43.43) and protocol
(i.e., UDP port 123) requires fragmentation. Our attacker (at IP 6.6.6.6) can easily
send an ICMP fragmentation needed from off-path. Its only challenge is (1) choosing
UDP checksum (which it sets to zero) and (2) matching the IPID in the ICMP
payload with that in an NTP packet previously sent to the client (which it can do,
see Section 2.6.4, and moreover some OSes don’t bother checking this (e.g., Linux
3.13.0)).
IPv4 Fragmentation. How do we know that an IPv4 packet is a fragment? Three
IPv4 fields are relevant (see Figure 2·1). Fragment offset specifies the offset of a
particular fragment relative to the beginning of the original unfragmented IP packet;
the first fragment has an offset of zero. The more fragment (MF) flag is set for
every fragment except the last fragment. IPID indicates that a set of fragments all
belong to the same original IP packet. Our attacker infers IPID (Section 2.6.4), and
then sends the client spoofed IPv4 fragments with the same IPID as the legitimate
fragments sent from the server, as in Figure 2·6. The spoofed and legitimate fragments
are reassembled by the client into a single crafted NTP packet.
Fragment reassembly. How does a host reassemble a fragmented IPv4 packet?
In the common case, the fragments are non-overlapping, so that the offset of one
fragment begins immediately after the previous fragment ends. In this case, the
host checks its fragment buffer for fragments with the same IPID, and pastes their
payloads together according to their fragment offset, checking that the last fragment
has a MF=0 (Postel, 1981a). Fragment buffer implementations differ in different
OSes (Knockel and Crandall, 2014; Herzberg and Shulman, 2013). Meanwhile, the
RFCs are mostly silent about reassembly of overlapping fragments, like the ones
in Figure 2·6 and 2·7.17 Several authors (Ptacek and Newsham, 1998), (Shankar
17RFC 3128 (Miller, 2001) does have some specific recommendations for overlapping IPv4 frag-
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Figure 2·6: IPv4 fragments for our attack: 1st and 2nd spoofed fragments.
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Second Honest Fragment  
Figure 2·7: IPv4 fragments for our attack: 1st and 2nd legitimate fragments.
and Paxson, 2003), (Novak, 2005), (Baggett, 2012) have observed that reassembly
policies differ for different operating systems, and have undertaken to determine these
policies using clever network measurement tricks. (Hilariously, Wireshark has an
overlapping fragment reassembly policy that is independent of its host OS (Baggett,
2012) and is therefore useless for this purpose.) Our attacks also rely on overlapping
fragments. Overlapping fragment reassembly policies are surprisingly complex, poorly
documented, and have changed over time. Thus, instead of generically describing
them, we just consider reassembly for the specific fragments used in our attack.
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BSD reassembly = 
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Linux reassembly = 
 our attack fails due to checksum 
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Figure 2·8: Different ways our fragments may be reassembled. From left to right:
Outcome A, Outcome B, Outcome C.
2.6.3 Exploiting overlapping IPv4 fragments.
Our attack proceeds as follows. The attacker sends the server a spoofed ICMP frag-
mentation needed packet (Figure 2·5) requesting fragmentation to a 68-byte MTU for
all NTP packets sent to the client. If the server is willing to fragment to a 68-byte
MTU, the server sends all of its mode 4 NTP responses as the two fragments in Fig-
ure 2·7. Meanwhile, our attacker plants the two spoofed fragments in Figure 2·6 in the
client’s fragment buffer. The spoofed fragments sit in the fragment buffer and wait for
the server’s legitimate fragments to arrive. The first spoofed fragment sets the UDP
checksum to zero, and sets ρ = −29, ∆ = 0.002, E = 0.003 to tiny values so that the
reassembled packet is more likely to pass TEST11. The second spoofed fragment sets
the NTP receive timestamp (T2) and transmit timestamps (T3) to bogus time values.
Both spoofed fragments must have the same IPID as the two legitimate fragments;
we explain how to do this in Section 2.6.4. This process of planting spoofed fragments
continues for every mode 4 NTP response that the server sends the client. Once the
client has accepted the bogus time, the attacker spoofs KoDs (Section 2.5.3) so the
client stops updating its clock. (The attacker can check that the client accepted the
bogus time by sending it a mode 3 query and checking the timestamps in the client’s
mode 4 response.)
ments in the case of TCP; NTP, however, is sent over UDP. Also, overlapping fragments are forbidden
for IPv6.
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The victim client receives the four overlapping fragments in Figure 2·6 and 2·7,
in the order shown, with the first fragment in 2·6 arriving earliest. How are they
reassembled? One potential outcome is for the client to reject the fragments altogether
because they are overlapping or too short. Otherwise, the first honest fragment arrives
in the client’s fragment buffer and is reassembled with one or both of the spoofed
fragments, according to one of the reassembly outcomes shown in Figure 2·8. (Note:
the second honest fragment will not reassemble with anything, because by the time it
arrives in the buffer the earlier fragments have already reassembled.) In Outcome A
the client prefers fragments that arrive earliest, pasting the first legitimate fragment
underneath the two spoofed fragments that were waiting in the cache (i.e., the ‘First’
policy in the Paxson/Shankar overlapping-packet reassembly model (Shankar and
Paxson, 2003), and the ‘First’, ‘Windows’ and ‘Solaris’ policies of Novak (Novak,
2005)). In Outcome B, the client prefers an earlier fragment with an offset that is
less than or equal to a subsequent fragment (i.e., the ‘BSD’ policy of (Shankar and
Paxson, 2003), (Novak, 2005)). In Outcome C the client prefers fragments that arrive
later over those that arrive earlier (i.e., the ‘Last’ and ‘Linux’ policies of (Shankar
and Paxson, 2003), (Novak, 2005)).
In which outcome does our attack succeed? In Outcome C, the packet is dropped
due to its incorrect UDP checksum, and our attack fails. In Outcomes A and B, our
off-path attacker successfully injects packets with the correct origin timestamp and
UDP checksum. However, in Outcome B, the attacker controls only the transmit
timestamp T3 in the reassembled packet. Because passing TEST11 (equation (2.4))
constrains delay δ to be < 1 sec (equation (6.1)) it follows that the spoofed T3 must
be within 1 sec of the legitimate receive timestamp T2, making our attack much
less interesting. Our attack therefore works best in Outcome A, where the attacker
controls both the T3 and T2; by setting T2 ≈ T3, the delay δ is small enough to pass
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TEST11, even if the spoofed T2 and T3 are very far from the legitimate time.
2.6.4 Planting spoofed fragments in the fragment buffer.
Because a client will only take time from a server that provides several self-consistent
time samples (Section 2.6.1), our attacker must craft a stream of NTP mode 4 re-
sponses. In achieving this, our attacker must surmount two key hurdles:
Hurdle 1: Jitter. The reassembled stream of packets must be sufficiently self-
consistent to pass TEST11, so that root distance Λ < 1.5 sec (equation (2.4)). If the
client reassembles packets as in Outcome A, the attacker can set tiny values for the
precision ρ, root delay ∆ and root dispersion E (in the first spoofed fragment on the
left of Figure 2·6) and delay δ (by setting T2 ≈ T3 in the second spoofed fragment).
What remains is ensuring that jitter ψ is sufficiently small (equation (5.3)); this means
that the offset values θ in the reassembled stream of packets must be consistent to
within about 1 sec.
Why is this difficult? The key problem is that the offset θ is determined by the
timestamps T2 and T3 set in the attacker’s second spoofed fragment (Figure 2·6), as
well as the origin and destination timestamps T1, T4. T1 corresponds to the moment
when the legitimate client sends its query, and is unknown to our off-path attacker.
Moreover, T1 roughly determines T4, which roughly corresponds to the moment when
the first legitimate fragment reassembles with the spoofed fragments in the client’s
fragment buffer. Now suppose the fragment buffer caches for 30 sec. This means
that timestamps T2 and T3 (from attacker’s second spoofed fragment) can sit in
the fragment buffer for anywhere from 0 to 30 sec before reassembly at time T4
(Figure 2·6). Thus, the offset θ in the reassembled packet can vary from 0 to 30 sec,
so that jitter ψ ≈ 30 sec and the attack fails TEST11.
Hurdle 2: IPID. Our attacker must ensure that the IPID of the spoofed fragments
planted in the fragment buffer (the two fragments in Figure 2·6) match the IPID of
62
the legitimate fragments sent by the server (the two fragments in Figure 2·7); this
way, the spoofed fragments will properly reassemble with the legitimate fragments.
Surmounting these hurdles. To surmount the first hurdle, our attacker ensures
that the client’s fragment buffer always contains fresh copies of the second spoofed
fragment that are no more than 1 sec old. Suppose that the client’s fragment
cache is a FIFO queue that holds a maximum of n fragments. (Windows XP has
n = 100 (Knockel and Crandall, 2014), and the Linux kernel in (Herzberg and Shul-
man, 2013) has n = 64). Then, every second, the attacker sends the client n/2 copies
of its first spoofed fragment (each with different IPIDs), and n/2 copies of the sec-
ond spoofed fragment, per Figure 2·6. Each second spoofed fragment has (1) IPID
corresponding to one of the first spoofed fragments, and (2) timestamps T2 and T3
corresponding to the (legitimate) time that the fragment was sent plus some constant
value (e.g., x = +10 mins, where x represents how far the attacker wants to shift the
client forward/backward in time). Thus, every second, a fresh batch of n fragments
evicts the old batch of n fragments. The reassembled packets have offset within ≈ 1
sec, so that jitter ψ ≈ 1 sec, and the attacker passes TEST11.
To surmount the second hurdle, our attack exploits the fact that IPIDs are
often predictable. Several policies for setting IPID exist in the wild, including:
globally-incrementing, i.e., the OS increments IPID by one for every sent packet,
per-destination-incrementing, i.e., the OS increments IPID by one every packet sent
to a particular destination IP, and random, i.e., the IPID is selected at random for ev-
ery packet (Gilad and Herzberg, 2013). Random IPIDs thwart our attacks. However,
when the server uses an incrementing IPID policy, the following techniques allow our
attacker to plant several copies of the spoofed fragments with plausible IPIDs (cf.,
(Herzberg and Shulman, 2013), (Gilad and Herzberg, 2013), (Knockel and Crandall,
2014)):
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Globally incrementing IPIDs: Before sending the client the n/2 copies of the spoofed
fragments, our attacker pings the server to learn its IPID i, and sets IPID of its spoofed
packets accordingly (i.e., to i+ 1, i+ 2, ..., i+ n/2).
Per-destination incrementing IPIDs: Gilad and Herzberg (Gilad and Herzberg,
2013)(Knockel and Crandall, 2014) show how per-destination incrementing IPIDs
can be inferred by a puppet (adversarial applet/script that runs in a sandbox) on
the client or server’s machine, while (Knockel and Crandall, 2014) show how to do
this without puppets. Thus, at the start of our attack, our attacker can use (Gilad
and Herzberg, 2013), (Knockel and Crandall, 2014)’s techniques to learn the initial
IPID i, then uses i to set IPIDs on the n/2 copies of its pairs of spoofed fragments.
The choice of IPIDs depends on the polling interval, i.e., the frequency at which the
client queries the server. NTP default poll values range from τ = 6 (26 = 64 sec) to
τ = 10 (1024 seconds) (Mills et al., 2010). If the attacker knew that the client was
polling every 64 seconds, it could send n/2 copies of the spoofed fragments with IPID
i+ 1,....,i+ n/2, and then increment i every 64 seconds.
More commonly, however, the polling interval is unknown. To deal with this,
the attacker can predict the IPID under the assumption that the client and server
consistently used the minimum (resp., maximum) polling interval, and ensures that
all possible IPIDs in between are planted in the buffer. As an example, suppose that
2048 seconds (30 mins) have elapsed since the attacker learned that the IPID is i. At
one extreme, the client and server could have consistently used the minimum default
polling interval of 2τ = 64 sec; thus, imax = i + 2048/64 = i + 32. At the other
extreme, the client and server could have consistently used the maximum default
polling interval of 2τ = 1024 sec; then imin = i + 2048/1024 = i + 2. Then, the
attacker must send pairs of spoofed fragments with IPIDs ranging from imin = i + 2
to imax = i+32. This works as long as the fragment buffer can hold imax−imin > 30 ·2
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fragments (as in e.g., Linux (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013) and Windows XP (Knockel
and Crandall, 2014)). When 2(imin − imax) exceeds the size of the fragment buffer
n, the attacker repeats (Gilad and Herzberg, 2013), (Knockel and Crandall, 2014)’s
techniques to learn IPID again.
Moreover, to avoid having to plant so many IPIDs in the fragment buffer, the
attacker can try making the polling interval more predictable. Our experiments show
that if a server becomes “unreachable” (i.e., stops responding to queries) for a short
period, and starts to respond with packets with poll field τp = 6, the ntpd v4.2.6 client
will speed up its polling interval to ≈ 64 sec. To simulate “unreachable” behavior
from off-path, the attacker can plant fragments with incorrect UDP checksum (e.g.,
planting just the second spoofed fragment, but not the first, per Figure 2·6). Then,
after some time, the attack begins with poll set to τp = 6 in the first spoofed fragment.
2.6.5 Conditions required for our attack.
In summary, our attack succeeds for a given victim NTP server and victim NTP client
if the following hold:
1) the server accepts and acts on ICMP fragmentation needed packets for a 68-byte
MTU, and
2) the server uses globally-incrementing or per-destination-incrementing IPID, and
3) the client reassembles overlapping IPv4 fragments as in Outcome A of Figure 2·8.
If the client reassembles packets as in Outcome B, then a weaker form of our
attack could be possible, where the attacker can alter the client’s time in steps of
at most 1 sec. Alternatively, if the first two conditions hold and server sends NTP
packets with a UDP checksum of zero, then the weak form of our attack could also
be possible if the client reassembles overlapping IPv4 fragments as in Outcomes C.
65
2.6.6 Proof-of-concept implementation of our attack.
We implemented a proof of concept of our attack on three lab machines. Our server
had per-destination incrementing IPID. We perform the small-step-big-step attack
(Section 2.4.2) from off path against an ntpd v4.2.6p5 client, with a ‘small step’ of
10 minutes, and a ‘big step’ of 1 day.
Server. Our victim server ran ntpd v4.2.8p2 on Linux 3.13.0-24-generic kernel
which uses a per-destination incrementing IPID. This Linux kernel has configuration
parameter min pmtu that determines the minimum MTU to which the OS is willing to
fragment packets upon receipt of an ICMP fragmentation needed packet; we manually
set min pmtu to 68, so that the server would satisfy the first condition of our attack.18
Client. Choosing the right client was a challenge. It is extremely difficult to find
documentation on overlapping fragment reassembly policies for popular OSes. These
policies also change over time (e.g., in 2005 (Novak, 2005) found that MAC OS
reassembles as in Outcome A, but our July 2015 experiments indicated that MAC
OS X v10.9.5 reassembles as in Outcome B). After testing various OSes, we tried
using the Snort IDS to emulate a network topology where a middlebox reassembles
fragmented packets before passing them to endhosts. We set up Snort in inline mode
on a VM in front of another VM with the ntpd v4.2.6 client. Unfortunately, Snort’s
frag3 engine, which reassembles overlapping IPv4 fragments according to various
policies, exhibited buggy behavior with UDP (even though it worked fine with the
ICMP fragments used in (Novak, 2005)). Finally, we gave up and wrote our own
fragment buffer in python and scapy, running it on a Linux 3.16.0-23-generic OS with
ntpd v4.2.6p5.
18The default value for min pmtu in Linux exceeds 500 bytes (Schramm, 2012), so that the vast
majority of NTP servers running on Linux should not be vulnerable to our attack. (Linux 2.2.13 is
one notable exception; see Section 2.6.7.) However, our measurements in Section 2.6.7 indicate that
servers in the wild do fragment to a 68-byte MTU; we just use Linux 3.13.0 as a proof-of-concept in
our lab.
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Our fragment buffer code had two parts. The first part uses scapy’s sniff func-
tion to detect IPv4 fragments, and then sends them to our fragment buffer, which
reassembles them and passes them back to the OS. The second part uses nfqueue to
drop packets that were reassembled by the OS and pass packets reassembled by our
fragment buffer. The fragment buffer itself is a FIFO queue with capacity n = 28 frag-
ments and timeout t = 30 sec. Fragments older than t are evicted from the queue.
When the queue is full, a newly-arrived fragment evicts the oldest fragment. The
buffer reassembles packets according to the ‘First’ policy19 in (Shankar and Paxson,
2003) (i.e., Outcome A in Figure 2·8).
Attacker. Our attacker machine ran code written in scapy. Before the attack starts, we
let the NTP client synchronize to the server. After that, our attacker machine should
infer the IPID the server uses to send mode 4 packets to the client; rather than reim-
plementing the IPID-inference techniques of (Gilad and Herzberg, 2013), (Knockel
and Crandall, 2014), we just have the client machine send the initial IPID i directly
to the attack machine. At this point, the client no longer reveals any more infor-
mation to the attacker, and the attack starts. The attacker first sends the server a
spoofed ICMP fragmentation needed packet requesting fragmentation to a 68-byte
MTU for the client; the server caches the request for 10 minutes, and starts sending
the two fragments in Figure 2·7. To keep the server fragmenting, the attacker sends
a fresh ICMP fragmentation needed every 10 minutes.
Per Section 2.6.4, each second our attacker needs to send the client a fresh
batch of n/2 pairs of the two fragments in Figure 2·6. Each pair had IPID in
{(i+1), ..., (i+n/2−1)}, with i incremented every 70 seconds.20 Our attack machine
19The ‘First’ policy of (Shankar and Paxson, 2003) requires reassembly to prefer the fragment
that was received earliest by fragment buffer.
20NTP uses a randomized algorithm to set the polling interval. Our client had not been running for
long, so its polling interval was τ = 6 (64 sec), which translates to intervals randomly chosen from the
discrete set {64, 65, 66, 67} sec. We therefore increment i every 70 seconds.However, per Section 2.6.4,
(1) an off-path attacker can push the polling interval down to τ = 6 by using fragmentation to make
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Figure 2·9: Absolute value of offset θ (above) and jitter ψ (below) computed by the
client during a proof-of-concept implementation of our attack.
was a relatively less efficient eight-year old Fujitsu x86 64 with 1.8GB of memory
running Linux 3.16.0-24-generic, and thus could only manage to send thirteen pairs
of the required fragments within 1 second. We therefore set the size of the FIFO
queue on our client machine to n = 28. Our attacker uses the fragmentation attack
to launch a “small-step-big-step” attack : First, it sets receive and transmit times-
tamps T2 and T3 in its second spoofed fragment to shift the client 10 minutes back
in time. Once the client enters ‘STEP’ mode, it sets T2 and T3 to shift the client
one day back in time. (Note that an off-path attacker can check that the client is in
‘STEP’ mode by querying the client and checking for ‘STEP’ in the reference ID of
the response (Mills et al., 2010, Fig. 13).)
Results (Figure 2·9). We plot the results of one run of our attack, obtained from
the client’s ntpq program. We plot offset θ (equation (6.2)) computed by the client
for each mode 4 packet the client (thinks it) received from the server. The horizontal
lines on the offset plot represent NTP’s default panic threshold (1000 sec) and ‘STEP’
threshold (125 ms). We also plot jitter ψ (equation (5.3)) computed by the client from
its eight most recent offset samples. Recall that the client will only synchronize to the
the server to look like it has become ‘unreachable’, and (2) if the fragment buffer has large n,
our attack can accommodate larger variation in the polling interval (e.g., MAC OS X has n =
1024 (Knockel and Crandall, 2014)).
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server if ψ < 1 sec (Section 2.5.5, 2.6.4). Before the attack begins, the client and server
are synchronized and offset is small. Once the attack begins, offset jumps to about
600 seconds (10 minutes). Figure 2·9 also shows some spikes where the offset jumps
back down to a few msec. These spikes occur during cache misses, when our attacker
fails to plant fragments with the right IPID in the fragment buffer; this allows the
two legitimate fragments to reassemble so that the client gets sample of the correct
time. The attacker pays a price each time a cache miss causes an inconsistency in
the offset values; for example, at time 25 mins, the attacker crafts enough packets to
force the jitter to about 10 sec, but two samples later it suffers a cache miss, causing
jitter to jump up again. Eventually, the attacker crafts enough packets to keep jitter
below 1 sec for some period of time, and the client accepts the time, enters ‘STEP’
mode, and clears its state. Once in ‘STEP’ mode, the attacker manages to craft nine
consecutive packets, causing jitter to drop below 1 sec and sending the client back in
time for another 24 hours.
2.6.7 Measuring the attack surface: Servers.
How often are the conditions required for our attack (Section 2.6.5) satisfied in the
wild? We answer this question by scanning our dataset of 13M NTP servers (Sec-
tion 2.3.2) to find servers satisfying the two conditions for our attack per Section 2.6.5:
(1) fragmenting to a 68-byte MTU, and (2) using incrementing IPID. To avoid harm-
ing live NTP servers with this scan, we send only ICMP packets or mode 3 NTP
queries (which do not set time on the server).
Fragmenting to 68-byte MTU. We send each server in our list (1) an NTP mode 3
query and capture the corresponding NTP mode 4 response, and then (2) send an
ICMP fragmentation needed packet requesting fragmentation to a 68-bytes for NTP
packets sent to our measurement machine (as per the packet in Figure 2·5, where
UDP checksum is zero and IPID inside the ICMP payload is that in the captured
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Table 2.6: IPID behavior of non-bad-timekeepers satisfying conditions (1), (2) of
Section 2.6.5.
IPID Per-Dest Globally incrementing
behavior Γ = 1 Γ = 10 Γ = 25 Γ = 50 Γ = 100 Γ = 250 Γ = 500
# servers 2,782 5,179 2,691 533 427 135 55
mode 4 NTP response), and finally (3) send another NTP mode 3 query. If the
server fragments the final mode 4 NTP response it sends us, we conclude it satisfies
condition (1) for our attack.
Server IPID behavior. Next, we check the IPID behavior of each server that was
willing to fragment to a 68-byte MTU. To do this, we send each IP five different
NTP mode 3 queries, interleaving queries so that at about 30 sec elapse between each
query to an IP. We then check the IPIDs for the mode 4 responses sent by each IP.
If IPID incremented by one with each query, we conclude the server is vulnerable
because it uses a per-destination-incrementing IPID. Otherwise, we determine the
gap between subsequent IPIDs; if all gaps were less than a threshold Γ (for Γ =
{10, 25, 100, 250, 500}), we conclude that the server uses a globally-incrementing IPID.
Results of server scan. Out of the 13M servers we scanned, about 24K servers were
willing to fragment to a 68-byte MTU. 10K of these servers have bigger problems
than just being vulnerable to our attacks: they were either unsynchronized (i.e.,
either stratum 0 or stratum 16) or bad timekeepers (i.e., with offset θ > 10 sec).
However, we did find 13,081 ‘functional’ servers that fragment to a 68-byte MTU. As
shown in Table 2.6, the vast majority (11,802 servers) of these are vulnerable to our
attack because they use an incrementing IPIDs that grow slowly within a 30-second
window. In fact, most use a globally-incrementing IPID, which is easier to attack
than a per-destination IPID (see Section 2.6.4).
Who are these vulnerable servers? The majority 87% (10,292 servers) are at
stratum 3, but we do see 14 vulnerable stratum 1 servers and 660 vulnerable servers
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with stratum 2. Indexing these with our (very incomplete) topology data, we find
that 11 servers are at the root of subtrees with over 1000 clients, and 23 servers have
over 100 clients each. One vulnerable stratum 2 server, for example, is in South Korea
and serves over 19K clients, another with over 10K clients is in a national provider in
the UK, one with over 2K clients serves a research institute in Southern Europe, and
two with over 7K clients are inside a Tier 1 ISP. Cross-referencing these servers to our
May 2015 rv data, we find that the vast majority (9,571 out of the 11,803 vulnerable
servers) are running Linux 2.2.13; the other significant group is 1,295 servers running
“SunOS”. We note that not every Linux 2.2.13 server in our rv dataset fragmented to
a 68 byte MTU; 688 of the servers running on Linux 2.2.13 in our rv data responded
to our final NTP query with an unfragmented NTP response, even though they had
been sent a valid ICMP fragmentation needed packet, possibly because of middleboxes
that drop ICMP packets.
2.6.8 Measuring the attack surface: Clients.
Determining how many clients in the wild satisfy the third condition of our attack
(Section 2.6.5) was significantly more complex. To measure how an NTP client re-
assembles overlapping IPv4 fragments, we can use (Shankar and Paxson, 2003), (No-
vak, 2005)’s technique of sending fragmented pings. To check for reassembly per
Outcome A in Figure 2·8, we send four ping fragments with offsets corresponding
exactly to those in Figures 2·6 and 2·7. If the client reassembles them as in Outcome
A, the reassembled ping will have a correct ICMP checksum and elicit a ping response
from the client; otherwise, the client will ignore them. Figure 2·10 shows the four
ping fragments and how they would be reassembled per Outcome A. We repeat this
with four other ping fragments to check for Outcome B.
Before we could deploy this technique in the wild, we hit an important complica-
tion: Teardrop (BUGTRAQ mailing list, 1997), an ancient implementation bug (from
71
1997) with devastating consequences. In a teardrop attack, the attacker sends two
overlapping IPv4 fragments to an OS, and the OS crashes. Most OSes were patched
for this over fifteen years ago, but some firewalls and middleboxes still alarm or drop
packets when they see overlapping IPv4 fragments. Worse yet, legacy operating sys-
tems may not be patched, and new IP stacks might have reintroduced the bug. This
is a big problem for us: this measurement technique inherently requires overlapping
IPv4 fragments, and thus inherently contains a teardrop attack. We therefore cannot
run this measurement on all 13M NTP clients we found in the wild, since we don’t
know what OSes they might be running. Instead, we deal with this in two ways.
First, we have developed a website for users to measure the vulnerability of their
NTP clients, i.e., whether they reassemble packets as in Outcome A. (http://www.cs
.bu.edu/~goldbe/NTPattack.html) To prevent the site from becoming a teardrop
attack vector, we require users running the measurement to be on the same IP prefix
as the measured NTP client.
Second, we can send our measurements to NTP clients that we know are patched
for Teardrop. Teardrop affects version of Linux previous to 2.0.32 and 2.1.63 (BUG-
TRAQ mailing list, 1997); thus, we can use the rv data from the openNTPproject to
determine which clients are running on patched Linux versions, and send our mea-
surements to those clients only. We did this for 384 clients that responded to rv
queries with “Linux/3.8.13”, a kernel released in May 2013, well after Teardrop was
patched. Five clients responded with pings reconstructed as in Outcome A, 51 clients
with pings reconstructed as in Outcome B.
This is interesting for two reasons. Most obviously, this gives evidence for the
presence of reassembly per Outcome A in the wild, which means that there are NTP
clients that are vulnerable to our attack. But it also suggests that this fragmentation
reassembly is not always done by the endhost itself; if it had, all 384 servers would
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Figure 2·10: Ping packets for measuring fragmentation reassembly policies.
have responded in the same way. (Also, (Novak, 2005), (Shankar and Paxson, 2003)’s
measurement indicate that Linux uses a policy that results in reconstruction per
Outcome C, rather than Outcomes A or B.) Thus, we speculate that these five
clients responded to our ping because they were sitting behind a middlebox that
performs fragment reassembly for them
2.6.9 Recommendations: Fragmentation still considered harmful.
Our measurements suggest that the attack surface for our NTP fragmentation attack
is small but non-negligible. Thousands of NTP servers satisfy the conditions required
by our attack (Section 2.6.5). However, our attack only succeeds if the victim client
is synchronized to a vulnerable server, and reassembles fragmented packets according
to the third condition required for our attack (Section 2.6.5). Unfortunately, we could
not safely measure which NTP clients reassemble packets in this way, although we do
find evidence of vulnerable clients.
Perhaps the simplest way to protect the NTP ecosystem is to ensure that any OS
running an NTP server does not fragment packets to a 68 byte MTU; indeed, many
OSes already do this (e.g., Linux (Schramm, 2012), Windows (Microsoft, 2010)). On
the client side, the OS should drop overlapping NTP fragments, as should middleboxes
that reassemble IPv4 fragments like (Checkpoint, 2018).
Source port randomization? One might wonder whether our attack is thwarted by
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UDP source-port randomization. (That is, what if the client chose a random 16-bit
value for the UDP source port (Larsen and Gont, 2011), instead of always setting
it to 123?) Unfortunately, the answer is no. Suppose conditions (1), and (2) of
Section 2.6.5 hold, and modify our attack as follows: replace the first spoofed fragment
on the left of Figure 2·6 with an identical fragment that has its UDP source port and
destination port fields sliced off. (The replacement fragment has fragment offset of
24 bytes.) Then, if the client reassembles the packet according to the ‘First’ policy of
(Shankar and Paxson, 2003), then the packet will look just like the one reassembled
per Outcome A in Figure 2·8, except with the legitimate UDP source/dest ports, and
the attack will succeed. Thus, while UDP source-port randomization raises the bar
for our attack, we do not consider it to be a sufficient defense.
2.7 Related work
NTP security. While NTP-based DDoS amplification attacks have generated widespread
interest (see e.g., (Czyz et al., 2014a)), there is less research (Mizrahi, 2012b; Selvi,
2014; Klein, 2013; Mills, 2011; Corbixgwelt, 2011) on the implications of shifting time
via NTP attacks. A few researchers (Mizrahi, 2012b; Selvi, 2014; Mills, 2011; Selvi,
2015) have considered the implications of attacks on NTP traffic, and (Selvi, 2014;
Selvi, 2015) demonstrated on-path attacks on timing clients that update their clocks
at predictable intervals. We consider on-path attacks on the full NTP implementation
(ntpd), which does not perform clock updates in a predictable fashion, and present
new off-path attacks. Complementary to our work are efforts to identify software
bugs in ntpd (National Vulnerability Database, 2014), (Ro¨ttger, 2015), including sev-
eral that were made public at the same time as our work (Chiu, 2015); because ntpd
typically operates as root on the host machine, we expect that interest in this area
will only continue to increase. Our work is also related to older NTP measurement
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studies (Minar, 1999), (Murta et al., 2006), as well as the recent work of (Czyz et al.,
2014a); (Czyz et al., 2014a) studies NTP’s use for DDoS amplification, but we focus
on the integrity of timing information. Finally, concurrent to our work is a study that
measures network latency using NTP (Durairajan et al., 2015).
IPv4 Fragmentation. Our work is also related to research on exploiting IPv4 packet
fragmentation for e.g., off-path attacks on operating systems (BUGTRAQ mailing
list, 1997), DNS resolvers (Herzberg and Shulman, 2013), TCP connections (Gilad
and Herzberg, 2013; Gont, 2010), and to evade intrusion detection systems (Ptacek
and Newsham, 1998), (Shankar and Paxson, 2003), (Novak, 2005), (Baggett, 2012)
and exploit side channels (Knockel and Crandall, 2014). Unlike most prior work,
however, we had to use fragmentation to craft a stream of self-consistent packets,
rather than a single packet. Our attack also exploits problems with overlapping IPv4
fragments (Novak, 2005), (Shankar and Paxson, 2003), (Baggett, 2012) and tiny IPv4
fragments, and should provide some extra motivation for OSes/middleboxes to drop
tiny/overlapping fragments, rather than reassemble them.
2.8 Conclusion
Our results suggest four ways to harden NTP:
1) In Section 2.4 we discuss why freshly-restarted ntpd clients running with the
-g configuration (which is the default installation for many OSes) are vulnerable to
quick time shifts of months or years. We also present a ‘small-step-big-step’ attack,
captured in CVE-2015-5300, that allows an on-path attacker to stealthily shift time
on a freshly-restarted ntpd client. Different versions of the small-step-big-step attack
succeed on ntpd v4.2.6 and ntpd v4.2.8. To protect against these attacks, users can
either stop using the -g configuration, or monitor their systems for suspicious reboots
of the OS or of ntpd. Section 2.4.3 also has recommendations for implementors who
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wish to patch against our small-step-big-step attack.
2) We showed how NTP’s rate-limiting mechanism, the Kiss-o-Death packet (KoD),
can be exploited for off-path denial-of-service attacks on NTP clients (Section 2.5.3).
We find that ntpd versions earlier than v4.2.8p3 allow for trivial spoofing of KoD
packets, and that this can be exploited to disable NTP on clients in the Internet
using only a single attacking machine. The KoD-spoofing vulnerability (CVE-2015-
7704) has been patched in ntpd 4.2.8p4, following the disclosure of our work. This
patch, however, does not prevent off-path attackers from eliciting valid KoDs from the
server via a priming-the-pump technique (CVE-2015-7705); the priming-the-pump
technique, however, does require the attacker to expend more resources (i.e., send
more packets). Therefore, we argue in Section 2.5.7 that NTP should either (1)
eliminate its KoD functionality, (2) require NTP clients to cryptographically authen-
ticate their queries to NTP servers, or (3) adopt more robust rate limiting techniques,
like (Vixie, 2014).
3) In Section 2.6 we showed how an off-path attacker can use IPv4 fragmentation
to hijack an NTP connection from client to server. Because our attack requires server
and client to run on operating systems that use less-common IPv4 fragmentation
policies, we have used a measurement study to quantify its attack surface, and found
it to be small but non-negligible. As we argue in Section 2.6.9, NTP servers should
run on OSes that use a default minimum MTU of ≈ 500 bytes, as in recent versions
of Linux and Windows (Schramm, 2012), (Microsoft, 2010). OSes and middleboxes
should also drop overlapping IPv4 fragments. We have also set up a website where
operators can test their NTP clients for vulnerability to our fragmentation attacks.21
4) Each of our attacks has leveraged information leaked by the reference ID field
in the NTP packet (Figure 2·1). (In Section 2.4, we use the reference ID to learn that
the client was in the ‘INIT’ or ‘STEP’ state. In Section 2.5.3 our off-path attacker
21http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/NTPattack.html
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used the reference ID to learn the IPs of client’s servers.) Moreover, since the purpose
of the reference ID is to prevent timing loops (where A takes time from B who takes
time from A (Stenn, 2015c)) any extra information leaked in the reference ID should
be limited.
In fact, RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010, pg 22) already requires IPv6 addresses to be
hashed and truncated to 32 bits before being recorded as a reference ID. Of course,
this approach is vulnerable to trivial dictionary attacks (with a small dictionary, i.e.,
the IPv4 address space), but there are other ways to obfuscate the reference ID. One
idea is to use a salted hash, in an approach analogous to password hashing. Upon
sending a packet, client A chooses a a fresh random number as the ‘salt’, includes the
salt in the NTP packet (perhaps as the lower-order bits of the reference timestamp
(Figure 2·1)), and sets the reference ID in the packet to Hash(IP, salt), where IP is
the IP address of the server B from which A takes time. B can check for a timing loop
by extracting the salt from the packet, taking B’s own IP, and checking that Hash(IP,
salt) matches the value in the packet’s reference ID; if yes, there is a timing loop,
if no, there is not. This approach requires no state at A or B, and de-obfuscating
the IP requires an attacker to recompute the dictionary for each fresh salt. This
approach, however, comes with the caveat that an committed attacker could still
launch dictionary attacks on the salted hash.
5) Our attacks also exploited the fact that, by default, ntpd sends mode 4 responses
in response to any mode 3 query sent by any IP in the Internet. Thus, it makes sense
to limit the set of IPs that can communicate with an NTP client, especially for clients
that are not designed to serve time to the Internet at large. (My laptop, for example,
should not be responding to NTP queries from anyone.) An organization can also
run its entire NTP infrastructure (including stratum 1 servers) behind a firewall, to
avoid attacks from the public Internet.
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Our work also motivates taking another look at cryptographic authentication for
NTP (Haberman and Mills, 2010), (Mizrahi, 2012b), (Ro¨ttger, 2012), (Franke et al.,
2018).
Chapter 3
Attacking NTP’s Authenticated
Broadcast Mode
3.1 Introduction
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) (Mills et al., 2010), one of the Internet’s old-
est protocols, is used to set time on Internet clocks. Time places a crucial and
often-ignored role in the security and correctness of computing applications, and es-
pecially in cryptographic protocols. As we discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2),
an attacker that manipulates time using NTP can seriously undermine the secu-
rity of key Internet protocols and applications, including TLS certificates (Selvi,
2015), (Mills, 2011), (Klein, 2013), DNSSEC, routing security with the RPKI, au-
thentication with Kerberos, caching, and bitcoin (Corbixgwelt, 2011). NTP operates
in several modes including (1) client/server, (2) symmetric active/passive, and (3)
broadcast/multicast. Our earlier work (Chapter 2) considered attacks on NTP’s
client/server mode. In this companion Chapter, we consider the security of NTP’s
broadcast mode.
We use network measurements to find that NTP’s broadcast mode, which is in-
tended for an environment with a few servers and potentially a large client population,
is used by thousands of NTP clients in the wild (Section 3.5). Next, we show that
while symmetric-key cryptographic authentication of NTP broadcast traffic is recom-
mended by the NTP specification (Mills et al., 2010) and required by the open-source
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NTP reference implementation ntpd, it does not provide sufficient protection against
attacks on broadcast mode. We consider both (1) on-path attacks, where the at-
tacker occupies a privileged position on the path between NTP client and one of its
servers, and (2) off-path attacks, where the attacker can be anywhere on the network
and does not observe the traffic between client and any of its servers. We present
an on-path replay attack on authenticated broadcast mode (CVE-2015-7973) that
causes the NTP client to get stuck at a particular time (Section 3.3), and a new
off-path denial-of-service attack on authenticated broadcast mode (CVE-2015-7979)
that also applies to all of NTP’s “preemptable” and “ephemeral” modes of operation
(Section 3.4). We conclude by discussing the inherent challenges of cryptographically
authenticating NTP’s broadcast mode, and provide several recommendations for the
way forward (Section 3.6).
3.2 NTP’s broadcast mode
NTP clients and servers are not configured to operate in broadcast mode by default
on most operating systems. However, there is a configuration option that allows for
this mode of operation.
Broadcast servers. An NTP broadcast server can be preconfigured to periodically
send ‘persistent ’ broadcast-association server packets (NTP mode 5 packets) to the
clients on the broadcast network. By persistent, we mean the server mobilizes the
broadcast association upon initialization, and never demobilizes the association (Mills
et al., 2010). Figure 3·1 presents a sample NTP mode 5 broadcast packet.
Broadcast clients. An NTP client can be preconfigured to accept NTP mode 5
packets.1 When a broadcast client receives its first NTP mode 5 packet, the client
1The configuration option broadcastclient or multicastclient [address] allows an ntpd client to
receive and process mode 5 broadcast packets. Note that a client configured to accept multicast
messages from a particular address also accepts broadcast messages from ANY address.
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must first calculate the propagation delay by exchanging a volley of client/server
mode packets with the broadcast server—where the client sends the server an NTP
mode 3 query and the server responds with an NTP mode 4 response.2 After this, the
client reverts to broadcast client mode, and creates an ephemeral association with the
server upon receipt of further mode 5 broadcast packets. An ephemeral association
is mobilized upon arrival of a packet and exists until error or timeout (Mills et al.,
2010).
Authenticating an association. How does an NTP client validate incoming pack-
ets before establishing an association with a server? Most NTP traffic (especially
client/server-mode traffic) is not cryptographically authenticated.3 However, even
in the absence of cryptographic authentication, NTP clients running in client/server
mode or symmetric active/passive mode use a nonce to validate a server’s response.
The nonce is a field in the NTP packet, called the origin timestamp; see Figure 3·1.
Upon receipt of an NTP response packet, the client checks if the 64-bit transmit
timestamp field in the most recent query packet it sent the server, matches the 64-bit
origin timestamp field in the incoming response packet. This is called TEST2 in the
NTP specifications. This non-cryptographic authentication is based on the premise
that the nonce has enough entropy such that an off-path attacker, who can not see the
NTP packets in transit, cannot guess the nonce. Indeed, as we argued in Chapter 2,
we can safely assume that this nonce has about 32 bits of entropy, and so it is difficult
2The server and client also run the Autokey security protocol, if they are configured to do so.
Autokey (Haberman and Mills, 2010) is public-key authentication method for NTP, but NTP clients
do not request Autokey associations by default (Autokey, 2012), and many public NTP servers do
not support Autokey (e.g., servers in pool.ntp.org). In fact, a lead developer of the ntpd client
wrote in 2015 (Stenn, 2015a): “Nobody should be using autokey. Or from the other direction, if
you are using autokey you should stop using it.” We therefore do not consider Autokey any further
here.
3As we discussed in Chapter 2, NTP’s symmetric-key cryptography is not commonly because the
symmetric keys must be pre-configured manually ; this can be quite cumbersome for public servers
that must accept queries from arbitrary clients. (NIST, for example, distributes symmetric keys for
its public servers via US mail or facsimile (NIST, 2010).) Moreover, NTP’s public-key cryptography
(Autokey) is not recommended for use in the wild, see footnote 2.
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to forge from off path.
Authenticating broadcast. In contrast to the client/server mode, where the client
actively sends a query to the server to get the response, the broadcast client operates
in listen-only mode. Thus, because the client does not send the server any queries
for broadcast packets, and the origin timestamp field in the broadcast server packet
is always set to null. So now TEST2 that defends NTP’s client-server mode from off-
path attacks does not apply. Moreover, the NTP’s current reference implementation
(ntpd v4.2.8p4) does NOT use UDP source port randomization (Larsen and Gont,
2011), and so an off-path attacker can easily forge an unauthenticated mode 5 packet.
Also, an NTP client preconfigured to run in broadcast client mode will accept
and process packets from ANY server that sends it broadcast packets; it is NOT
configured to listen only to one particular broadcast server. So any off-path attacker
can easily send broadcast messages and the client will accept them. RFC5905 (Mills
et al., 2010, pg 57) says:
Filtering can be employed to limit the access of NTP clients to known
or trusted NTP broadcast servers. Such filtering will prevent malicious
traffic from reaching the NTP clients.
To fill this gap and the lack of nonce check, RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010) strongly
suggests the use of cryptography to authenticate broadcast packets. Indeed, NTP’s
current reference implementation (ntpd v4.2.8p4) requires symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy, by default, for clients that wish to listen to broadcast mode packets. NTP’s
symmetric cryptographic authentication appends an MD5 hash keyed with symmetric
key k of the NTP packet contents m as MD5(k||m) (Mills, 2011, pg 264) to the NTP
packet in Figure 3·1; authenticated NTP packets also have a 32-bit key ID which is
used to identify the symmetric key that was used to authenticate the message.
In this paper, however, we present two attacks that show that NTP’s symmetric
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Figure 3·1: Mode 5 NTP Broadcast Packet.
key cryptography does not provide sufficient protection for broadcast mode.
3.3 Timeshifting Attacks
Should broadcast be robust to replay attacks? According to RFC 5905 (Mills
et al., 2010), NTP’s “on-wire protocol ... resists replay of a server response packet.”
This is supposed to be accomplished through what is called TEST1 in the protocol
specification: Upon receipt of an NTP response packet, the NTP client matches
the transmit timestamp in the current packet to that of the last response packet it
received; if the timestamp matches, it marks the packet as duplicate and drops it.
However, we now show that because broadcast mode does not impose TEST2, then
TEST1 cannot provide sufficient protection against replay attacks, even when NTP
packets are cryptographically authenticated.
a) Deja Vu: Our on-path time-sticking attack (CVE-2015-7973). Consider a man-
in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, where the attacker is positioned between the server
and the victim client, and can intercept and replay a packet and prevent onward
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transmission of the original packet, but does not possess the symmetric key that
authenticates broadcast messages. We show that the protocol does not resist the
following replay attack. The MiTM collects and records a contiguous sequence of
server broadcast packets. (The attacker requires a sufficient number of these packets
for the client to update its clock; this is because NTP requires a client to obtain
between eight to hundreds of messages from a server before the client’s clock discipline
algorithms synchronizes it to the server (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 10-12).) He then
replays this sequence of packets, over and over, to the victim client; the victim accepts
the same time over and over, and thus gets stuck at a particular time. Notice that
these are the authenticated packets from the broadcast server, and so they pass the
authentication check on the client. Moreover, by replaying a sequence of packets,
rather than just one packet, the attacker ensures that the replayed packets pass
TEST1.
b) Our off-path time-shifting attack. If the attacker is one of the clients on the
broadcast network, or on an adjacent network that also gets the broadcast packets
from the same broadcast server, it then shares the same symmetric key with the server
as the victim client. In this case, the attacker possesses the same key as the server
and therefore can simply forge authenticated NTP mode 5 packets and send them
to the victim client. The attacker can then send the victim back/forward in time as
discussed in Chapter 2, or can make him stick to a particular time.
Why do these attacks work? These attacks highlight the following weaknesses in
NTP; a) The protocol specifies and defaults to the use of symmetric key cryptography
for broadcast authentication, where all nodes share the same key and one/some of
them could be malicious or may be compromised, b) an NTP client is unable to
recognize that it is stuck in a particular time for long periods of time, and c) in
the absence of TEST2, TEST1 doesn’t actually prevent replay in general—it just
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prevents replay of the most recent packet. Our replay attack passes TEST1 because
the client only matches the current transmit timestamp with that of the last packet.
Experiments: As a proof-of-concept, we set up an ntpd v4.2.8p3 broadcast client
and server using the configuration options broadcastclient and broadcast IP address range.
Another machine on the same network behaves as MiTM and collects 12 mode 5 pack-
ets and stores them. The MiTM then drops the original mode 5 packets to the victim
and replays his previously collected set of mode 5 packets. The victim accepts the
time after getting sufficient samples required for a server to pass the clock discipline
algorithms, gets into the ‘STEP’ mode4and clears the state variables for this associa-
tion. We continue this experiment for ≈ 4 hours and observe that the victim’s system
clock is stuck at the same time.
Implications of the attack. A MiTM can use a replay attack to make the victim
client get stuck at a particular time value forever. Moreover, a compromised machine
on the same or adjacent subnet can or forge authenticated mode 5 packets and shift
time forward or backward on the victim client. Shift time forward/backward has
severe implications on security guarantees provided by various core Internet proto-
cols, such as DNSSec, BGP, TLS, and authentication services that use Kerberos; see
Chapter 2 for discussion.
3.4 Denial of Service Attacks
We now present an off-path denial-of-service attack that generically succeeds on any
preemptable or ephemeral association that is cryptographically authenticated, includ-
ing authenticated broadcast mode.
Preemptable and empheremal associations. NTP’s broadcast clients use an
4An NTP client enters ‘STEP’ mode whenever it needs to shift its clock by more than 125ms but
less than ≈ 16 min; our replay attack shifts the client back in time by more than 125ms, causing
the client to enter STEP mode.
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ephemeral association to listen to NTP mode 5 from a broadcast server; as discussed
in Section 3.2, this association is automatically demobilized upon error or timeout.
NTP also supports preemptable associations (Mills, 2014), which are similar to
ephemeral associations. Preemptable associations are mobilized if the ntpd client has
the keyword “preempt” to the line in its configuration file that establishes a associa-
tion with a particular server. Alternatively, the ntpd client may be preconfigured with
the manycastclient or pool [pool address ] options; in this case, the client establishes
a preemptable association upon receipt of a server discovery packet. Preemptable
associations are also demobilized upon error or timeout.
Our off-path DoS attack (CVE-2015-7979). An off-path attacker can easily cause
an error by sending mode 5 with bad cryptographic authentication (e.g., wrong key,
mismatched key, incorrect message digest, etc.). The attacker sends one such error-
causing packet for every legitimate response the client receives from the server, so that
the client immediately tears down its association with the server. This way, the client
never collects enough good NTP response to allow its clock discipline algorithms to
update its local clock, resulting in a denial-of-service attack on the client.
Experiment. As a proof-of-concept, we set up ntpd v4.2.8p3 broadcast client and
server using the configuration options broadcastclient and broadcast IP address range
respectively. Once the client is synchronized with the broadcast server, another ma-
chine which behaves as an off-path attacker sends badly-authenticated mode 5 packet
to the client. The client immediately tears down the association with the server and
clears all the state variables. Next, the client receives the legitimate packet from
the broadcast server and again mobilizes the association. The attacker again sends
the bad mode 5 packet and the client again tears down the association. The attacker
keeps repeating this and the client never obtains enough consistent time samples from
the server to allow it to update its system clock.
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Implications a) An off-path attacker can deny NTP service to the broadcast client
even when it uses cryptographic authentication. b) If the client is preconfigured
to a bad timekeeper or one of the servers’ that the client is configured to is con-
trolled/compromised by the attacker, then using this DoS attack, the client can pin
the client to bad server that is controlled by him. The attacker can then send the
client back/forward in time which has implications as mentioned in Section 3.3.
3.5 Measurement Results
We use NTP’s peers command to check for the presence of broadcast and other
ephemeral and preemptable modes in the wild. As shown in Figure 3·2, NTP’s peers
command returns a list of all associations used by an NTP client; associations with
a broadcast server are marked with a b or B, client/server associations are marked
with a u, etc.. ‘*’ is used to indicate the association that the client last took time
from, and ‘+’ indicates an association that is a candidate for synchronization. While
this command provides a variety of useful information for network measurement, it’s
also a great tool for adversarial network reconnaissance and DDoS amplification at-
tacks (Czyz et al., 2014a); for this reason, network operators commonly disable remote
peers queries, or configure firewalls or other middleboxes to drop them. Moreover,
while we conjecture broadcast mode is most common when both the clients and the
broadcast server are behind a NAT, we are unable to scan clients behind a NAT.
Therefore, it’s important to remember that our measurement results can only pro-
vide a lower bound on the number of broadcast/ephemeral/preemptable associations
in the wild.
Our scan. Thus, we scanned the entire IPv4 address space using the peers command
on 10-11 November 2015, and obtained responses from 4,443,118 IPv4 addresses. On
16-21 November 2015 we rescanned only the 4.4M responding IP addresses with NTP’s
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peers command, as well the rv command (which reveals useful information about the
NTP client, including its version, build date, and the operating system it runs on),
and the as command (which has useful information about each association used by
the client). For this second scan we obtained responses from 3,716,362 IPv4 addresses;
we consider only these addresses here.
Results. Of the 3.7M responding IPs, we found that 18,020 (0.4%) IPs have at least
one broadcast association, and 1,767 IPs use multicast associations. (Recall that
clients configured for multicast will also accept broadcast associations.) Moreover,
we see 9,806 IPs that use broadcast associations exclusively, of which 7,556 IPs were
synchronized to a broadcast server, while the remaining 2,250 were unsynchronized
and thus likely malfunctioning.
As an aside, we were also surprised to find many symmetric associations in the
wild; 190,724 (5.1%) of the responding IPs had at least one symmetric association.
Overall, we found 2,848,238 IPs that have at least one client/server associations, 77
IPs use multicast exclusively, 67383 IPs use symmetric associations exclusively, and
9806 use broadcast exclusively. This is a total of 2,925,504 (78.7%) IPs; for the rest
of the IPs, their association status is “-” which may mean they are initializing, or
using a local clock (e.g., via GPS) rather than taking time from the Internet using
NTP. Thus, while broadcast is not an especially popular mode of operation for NTP,
we do find thousands of clients in the wild that rely upon it for time synchronization.
Who are these broadcast clients? Of the 18K IPs that have at least one broad-
cast association, 16,552 of them also responded to NTP’s rv query, and thus reveal
information about their operating systems, ntpd version, and compile date. Most of
these broadcast clients are running on unix (10,671 IPs) or ‘cisco’ devices (5,135 IPs).
Also, out of 16.5K IPs that responded to the rv query, only 326 replied with the
detailed ntpd version and compilation details (the rest merely say “ntpd version 4”).
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Figure 3·2: Sample response to peers query.
Of these, the majority (212 IPs or 65%) of these have been compiled between 2012
and 2015 inclusive. The most popular ntpd version that we found is 4.2.6p5@1.2349
(23%) which was released in December 2011, closely followed by 4.2.8@1.3265 (20%)
which was released in December 2014, while 4.1.1c-rc1@1.836 (released in 2001) and
4.2.4p5-a (released in 2008) are 9% each. The bottom line is that we do find evidence
of recently maintained NTP implementations that use broadcast mode in the wild.
3.6 Recommendations
We have several recommendations to mitigate our attacks.
1) Ephemeral and pre-emptable associations considered harmful. Our denial-of-
service attack from Section 3.4 points to a serious problem with the notion of ephemeral
and preemptable associations; namely, that an off-path attacker can easily forge a
packet that can tear down an association. Even though an ephemeral association can
easily be reestablished, the attacker can quickly tear it down again before the client
has the chance to update its clock. For this reason, we suggest that NTP does NOT
tear down ephemeral associations upon receipt of a malformed packet; instead, the
malformed packet should just be dropped, while the association remains in place.
2) Prevent replay in broadcast mode. As others have pointed out (Mizrahi,
2012b), (Franke et al., 2018), NTP’s broadcast mode should contain a robust mech-
anism for preventing replay attacks. TEST1 is insufficient, since it only checks if
the most recent packet has been replayed. One solution is to require authenticated
mode 5 NTP packets to include an incrementing counter (e.g., in the extension field).
Another idea is to use the transmit timestamp field in the mode 5 response packet
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(Figure 3·1) as an incrementing counter; to do this, the broadcast client would need
to ensure that the transmit time is monotonically increasing. Alternatively, the MAC
computed on the broadcast packet could become a hash chain; that is, the MAC on
packet pi should be computed over the contents of packet pi concatenated with the
MAC on packet pi−1.
3) Monitor to detect time-sticking. In the absence of replay protection, monitoring
could be used as a “band-aid” solution against time-sticking attacks. That is, NTP
clients could monitor their own clocks to see if they are stuck at the same timestamp
for a considerable amount of time; if so, they could log an error or alert to warn an
admin.
4) Only the broadcast server should be able to sign broadcast packets. As others have
pointed out (Mizrahi, 2012b),(Franke et al., 2018), the broadcast servers’ symmetric
key should NOT be distributed to all its client; as we noted in Section 3.3, this allows
clients to trivially forge packets from the server. Instead, the only entity that should
be able to sign broadcast (mode 5) packets is the broadcast server itself.
3.7 Conclusion
Our analysis highlights the difficulty of designing robust cryptographic authentica-
tion for NTP’s broadcast mode. One might be tempted to dismiss broadcast mode
altogether, by arguing that broadcast mode is a legacy from the past that is largely
unused today. Our measurements, however, indicate that this is not the case; while
broadcast mode is not especially popular, we do find thousands of NTP clients in the
wild that have broadcast associations. Thus, we believe that the community should
take another careful look at authentication for NTP’s broadcast mode.
One approach, taken by a new Internet draft for the “Network Time Security pro-
tocol (NTS)”, achieves recommendations (2) and (4) above through a modified version
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of TESLA (Perrig et al., 2005). TESLA uses public-key cryptography to ensure that
a server is the only entity that can authenticate broadcast messages, but that the
authenticators themselves can be computed and validated using fast symmetric cryp-
tography. To do this, however, TESLA requires loose time synchronization between
the broadcast server and its client. Thus, using TESLA in the context of NTP creates
a circular dependency on time. NTS suggests avoiding this circular dependency by
using an authenticated unicast association to achieve the loose synchronization be-
tween the server and each of its clients. This, however, once again requires pairwise
associations between server and each client, and may defeat the purpose of using the
broadcast mode in the first place. Finding a cryptographic solution that can authen-
ticate NTP’s broadcast mode, without a unicast association or a circular dependency
on time, remains an interesting open problem.
Chapter 4
The Impact of Time on DNS Security
4.1 Introduction
Time is a crucial building component of network protocols, providing basic correctness
and functionality as well as claimed security guarantees. Recently, however, it has
become clear that network protocols cannot take the correctness and security of time
for granted. There have been a series of works describing errors, misconfigurations
and malicious attacks that are possible when time is obtained from network timing
protocols such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Simple NTP (SNTP), (Mal-
hotra et al., 2016), (Selvi, 2014), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016), (Malhotra et al.,
2017), (Czyz et al., 2014b). It is known that millions of hosts (Czyz et al., 2014b),
(Malhotra et al., 2016), (Mauch, 2015), (Minar, 1999), (Murta et al., 2006) on the
Internet implement and run network timing protocols. However, there is little work
exploring how a reliance on network timing protocols affects the security of other
network protocols that rely on time. (Thus far, there is only the work of Selvi on
SNTP’s impact on the security of HSTS (Selvi, 2015).) In this work, we explicitly
look into how a reliance on time affects the security of the Domain Name System
(DNS) and DNSSEC. We show how attacks on time and NTP can be used as a pivot
for attacks on DNS and DNSSEC.
DNS relies on caching to provide enhanced performance and improved reliability
in the face of network failures. Our work considers how time can be exploited to
attack the correctness and security of caching, and to expose the DNS to Denial of
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Service (DoS) and cache poisoning attacks. We also consider how the DNS security
extensions (DNSSEC) can be attacked by exploiting time.
Time can be represented as absolute time (e.g., “midnight August 7, 2018”) or
relative time (e.g., “20 minutes from the moment you read this”). While the rela-
tive time is typically obtained from internal sources (e.g., oscillators, CPU timers),
absolute time is typically obtained from an external source (e.g., manual settings,
network timing protocols like NTP). As we have seen from recent work (Selvi, 2014),
(Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016), (Malhotra et al., 2017), this
reliance on external time sources leads to vulnerabilities.
DNS and Time The DNS protocol’s reliance on time comes through its use of Time
To Live (TTL) values for DNS records. Fortunately, the DNS on-the-wire protocol
specification uses only relative time values for the TTL, and thus is not directly
attackable. However, DNS caching implements TTL as an absolute time value, and
is therefore attackable. This issue is not just the result of an implementation flaw; we
point out that the earliest DNS RFCs (RFC 1035) implicitly assume that DNS caches
rely on absolute time (Section 4.2.3). Moreover, the DNSSEC on-the-wire protocol
also relies on absolute time to determine the validity interval for DNSSEC signatures;
thus, we show DNSSEC is also vulnerable to attacks that pivot from time.
Attacks & Implications To support these claims, we show two concrete attacks
that leverage absolute time to attack DNS resolver caches. First, we present a cache
expiration attack : when time is shifted forwards, the DNS cached responses expire
sooner than expected, effectively flushing the cache. Second, we present a cache
sticking attack : when time is shifted backwards, the cached responses stick in the
cache for longer than intended. We show how these attacks can be used to harm
DNS performance (introducing latency into DNS responses) and DNS availability
(increasing the risk of denial of service). We also discuss how they can be used to aid
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for fast-fluxing, cache poisoning and other well-known threats to the DNS. We also
present two similar attacks on DNSSEC signature validation; by shifting the time on
the validating resolver forwards or backwards, we can force a valid signature to be
deemed invalid, causing DNSSEC denial-of-service and several other problems.
Measurements How big is the attack surface? While there are many ways to attack
the absolute time, in this work we specifically focus on NTP as an attack vector.
In Section 4.4, we use DNS and NTP measurements to see how many DNS resolvers
might be vulnerable to our cache expiration and cache sticking attacks via pivots from
NTP. We distinguish between two types of attacks on NTP. (1) In an on-path attack
on NTP, the attacker holds a privileged position on the network between a victim
system and its NTP timeserver. (2) In an off-path attack on NTP, the attacker does
not sit between the victim system and it’s NTP timeserver; the off-path attacker need
only have the ability to spoof NTP packets (which are sent via UDP, the transport
protocol that is used by NTP). Naturally, off-path attacks are “a scarier threat”,
because the attack can be any remote machine on the Internet.
We measure both open resolvers identified by the Open Resolver Project (Mauch,
2018), and private (non-open) resolvers that are accessible via RIPE Atlas Probes
(ripe, 2018). We find a significant attack surface. At least 33% of our measured private
DNS resolvers and 5% of our measured open resolvers are vulnerable to MiTM attacks
on NTP. Meanwhile, 6% of those (33%) private DNS resolvers and 19% of those (5%)
open resolvers are vulnerable to “even scarier” off-path attacks on NTP (Malhotra
et al., 2017), many of which should have been patched years ago. (Indeed, one of the
relevant patches was shipped in ntp-4.2.8p6, released on 19 January 2016.)
Recommendations & Implementation Our attacks and measurements indicate
that DNS should not continue to rely on the correctness of absolute time (which is
often derived from NTP). Instead, we suggest using the raw time or adjusted raw
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time (Section 4.2.1) as operating-system obtained sources of relative time for DNS
caching. Meanwhile, for DNSSEC signature validation, resolvers are doomed to use
the vulnerable absolute time. The only way to secure DNSSEC against timing-related
attacks is to secure the aboslute time (e.g., to secure NTP).
Upon our disclosure and recommendations, we worked with the open-source im-
plementation of the Unbound resolver (Unbound, 2018) to built a prototype imple-
mentation that uses raw time (rather than absolute time) for DNS caching. Unbound
is committed to release this update in the coming version of Unbound. (See section
4.5.1 for details on implementation.) Also, after a preliminary disclosure of our work
at IETF 100, the knot resolver (knot, 2018) co-incidentally also changed how it used
time for DNS caching. These changes were released in knot v1.5.1. In Section 4.5.1
we review their changes and discuss the extent to which they actually harden knot
against our attacks. (As a spoiler, we find that these changes are not sufficient to
completely stop our caching attacks on DNS.)
4.2 Time and the DNS ecosystem
In this section, we give background on why attacks on time can be used to harm the
correctness of DNS. We start with an overview of absolute time and relative time
(Section 4.2.1) and then discuss how the DNS specifications and implementations
treat time (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Absolute time vs Relative time
Protocols and applications can express time in several forms, depending on whether
or not universal agreement is required about that point in time. This section focuses
on the differences between absolute time and relative time.
Absolute Time Absolute time expresses an absolute point in time (e.g., June 13,
2018 at 1:32:09pm).For instance,“Unix Time” is seconds since midnight January 1st,
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1970, while “Universal Coordinated Time” (UTC) is an international time scale that
forms the basis for the coordinated dissemination of standard frequencies and time
signals (BIPM, 2018). Absolute time is often used to express the validity of objects
with a limited lifetime that are shared over the network1. In order to validate absolute
time value, a system needs access to a reasonably close reference time, for instance
one based on the UTC.
How do systems get absolute time and why is it vulnerable? The absolute
time on a system is known as system time. One way to update system time is to
manually enter the date and/or time. One can also set the system time from the
local machine by using the hardware time, which is maintained by a battery-powered
clock that persists upon reboot. Alternatively, one can get the absolute time from the
Internet, using a variety of timing protocols including the Network Time Protocol2
(NTP) (Mills et al., 2010), chronyd (chrony, 2015), sntpd (Mills, 2006), openNTPD
(openNTPD, 2012) and others.
There are several problems with relying on system time. First, manual configura-
tions can be subject to errors and misconfiguration. Also, for some machines, when
moving between time zones, the system time must be corrected manually. Second,
because accessing the hardware time requires an I/O operation which is resource in-
tensive, many systems use hardware time only upon reboot, to initialize the system
time; subsequent updates to the system time are made either manually or through
NTP (Linux, 2018), (gentoo linux, 2018), (time, 2018). However, systems like micro-
controllers that operate within embedded systems (e.g., Raspberry Pi, Arduino, etc.)
often lack internal hardware to keep track of time. When embedded systems require
synchronization with the absolute time, they typically initialize their base time upon
reboot by obtaining the current time from an external source (e.g., a timeserver or
1For instance, PKIX certificates (Cooper et al., 2008) carry two time values expressing their
earliest and latest validity.
2NTP disseminates UTC time.
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an external clock), or by asking the user to manually enter the current time (wiki,
2018). Third, relying on Internet timing protocols opens up the system time to at-
tack. Recent papers show vulnerabilities in NTP (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra
et al., 2017), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016) and SNTP (Selvi, 2014) that allow at-
tackers to maliciously alter system time - pushing system time into the past or even
into the future. Moreover, many of these time-shifting attacks can be performed by
off-path attackers, who do not occupy a privileged position on the network between
the victim system and its time sources on the Internet. Researchers have also demon-
strated off-path denial of service attacks on timing protocols that prevent systems
from synchronizing their clocks. The bottom line is that obtaining system time from
an external sources create dependencies that can be exploited.
Relative Time Relative time measures the time interval that has elapsed from some
reference point (e.g., “20 minutes from the time of your query”). Relative time is
commonly used in network protocols, e.g., to determine when a packet should be
considered “dropped”, or e.g., to set Time To Live (TTL) values that govern the
length of time for which an object is valid or usable. Relative time does not require
access to the UTC time, or any other absolute time metric—only the rate of passage
of this time across different systems is important.
How do systems get relative time? The relative time on an operating system can
either be a raw time or an adjusted raw time. In both cases, relative time is monotonic.
Importantly, the key property of each type of time source is not its current value, but
rather the guarantee that the time source is monotonically increasing and thus useful
for calculating the difference in time between two points (Love, 2013).That said, there
are several caveats to each type of time source.
Raw time At its most fundamental, a system has its own perception of time; its
unmodified, raw time. This time is typically measured by counting cycles of an
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oscillator, but systems can also use process CPU time or thread CPU time (via timers
from the CPU). The quality of the raw time is therefore dependent on the either the
stability of the oscillator or of the CPU timer. Raw time is a purely subjective
time—no general meaning can be attached to any specific value. One can only obtain
the relative time by comparing two values. Because raw time is unaltered by any
external or manual time source, the raw time is continuous and strictly monotonically
increasing; it always increases, never decreases, never makes unexpected jumps, and
never skips. It is not subject to vulnerabilities or dependencies in external time
sources. Importantly, even if highly accurate oscillators are used, raw time passes at
a slightly different rate than system time. This difference is called clock drift. Raw
time is not adjusted for the error introduced by clock drift. Thus, the accuracy of
raw time is dependent on the clock drift, which further depends on factors including
oscillator quality, system load, or ambient temperature, etc..
Adjusted raw time When raw time is compared to an external reference time source
in order to adjust for clock drift, then the result is adjusted raw time. This adjustment
doesn’t happen sporadically but rather, the rate of advance of time is slowed down
or sped up slightly until it approaches that of the external reference time source.
Therefore, adjusted raw time is still monotonic. Like raw time, adjusted raw time is
subjective with no specific meaning attached to its values. But how does one obtain
the adjusted raw time? One way to do this to access an external time source using
one of the networking timing protocols we discussed earlier. The approach, however,
is thus susceptible to some of the security risks that underly these network timing
protocols.
4.2.2 The Domain Name System (DNS)
We briefly review the aspects of DNS, address resolution and caching that are relevant
to the DNS cache attacks that we present in Section 4.3.
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Domain Name System DNS is one of the Internet’s most critical components.
DNS is a distributed database that provides mappings between domain names and
IP addresses and other resources in the form of resource records (RRs). A DNS
name server (NS) stores the DNS RRs for a domain and responds with answers to
queries against its database. An authoritative NS is responsible for mapping domain
names for a specific domain (e.g., example.com) to Internet resources, by serving the
relevant DNS RRs (A, CNAME, PTR, etc.).
Caching To resolve an address (Mockapetris, 1987a), a stub resolver typically sends
DNS query from an end-user system to a recursive resolver. If the requested record is
not found in the recursive resolver’s cache (i.e., the query ‘cannot be resolved locally’)
then the recursive resolver recursively queries the authoritative NSs in order to resolve
the name. The recursive resolver caches the final response, and any additional RRs
it learned as part of the resolution process, and sends the final response to the stub
resolver. The stub resolver may also cache the final response.
4.2.3 Time in DNS
Time is an important component of DNS RRs. Each RR contains a time interval,
known as the Time to Live (TTL), which is assigned by the administrator of the
DNS zone in the zone file (aka., “master file” in (Mockapetris, 1987a)). The DNS
specifications require the TTL to be a relative time. However, as we shall now see,
these TTLs are converted to absolute time when they are used for DNS caching.
Later, in Section 4.3, we show that this conversion to absolute times creates network-
time-related vulnerabilities.
According to RFC 1035 (one of the earliest DNS RFCs), TTL specifies the time
interval (i.e., the relative time) that an RR may be cached before the source of the
information should be consulted again (Mockapetris, 1987b). RFC 1035 recommends
that all caching resolvers obey TTL values for caching, but RFC 2181 (Elz and Bush,
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1997) says that caches can upper-bound the TTL of any RR, and treat any TTLs
larger than the upper bound as if they were equal to the upper bound. In other words,
the TTL specifies a maximum time to live, not a mandatory time to live. RFC 1035
also advises the zone file manager about suitable TTL values for different RRs in
different situations.3
Upon receiving a DNS RR, a caching resolver is supposed to cache the RR for
the time interval specified by its TTL. While the TTL is a relative value, the RFCs
do not clearly specify how the cache should determine that the TTL has elapsed.
However, there is some evidence that the RFCs assume that the cache converts the
TTL to an absolute time.
The first bit of evidence comes when RFC 1035 says “When the RR has an absolute
time, it is part of a cache”, which suggests that the RFC assumes that the cache will
implement the TTL as an absolute time.
The second bit of evidence comes from RFC 1035’s recommendations for validating
the freshness of an RR that is retrieved from the cache in order to answer a query.
Specifically, RFC 1035 recommends timestamping the query for an RR using the
current system time, and comparing that timestamp with the TTL of the RR in the
cache. Comparing the system time (an absolute time) with the TTL time implicitly
implies that the cache is storing the TTL as an absolute time.4
We checked popular caching resolver implementations ((Unbound, 2018), (Bind,
2018), (Powerdns, 2018), (Dnsmasq, 2018), (knot, 2018) (before v1.5.1) ) to see how
3For instance, RFC 1035 says that TTL values on the order of days or weeks boost Internet
performance and suggests a TTL value of zero for certain records such as SOA RR that should not
be cached. One may also choose to have lower TTL values for extremely volatile data or if a change
in the RR is anticipated to minimize inconsistency and then later revert back to the longer TTL.
4Specifically, RFC 1035 says: The “timestamp indicat[es] the time the request [for an RR] began.
The timestamp is used to decide whether RRs in the database can be used or are out of date. This
timestamp uses the absolute time format previously discussed for RR storage in zones and caches.
... When the RR has an absolute time, it is part of a cache, and the TTL of the RR is compared
against the timestamp for the start of the request.”
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their caches were implementing time. We found that these implementations all mark
the end of validity of the cached object by translating the relative time values in the
TTL into absolute time values by adding an offset equal to the TTL to the current
system time.
DNS resolver implementations do not come with a predefined mechanism for get-
ting absolute time. So the best that they can do is to rely on system time (which
represents some form of absolute time) from underlying OS to get these absolute time
value. For instance, the POSIX function to get the system time is gettimeofday(),
which gives the number of seconds and microseconds since the epoch 1970-01-01
00:00:00 +0000 (UTC). It therefore follows that DNS resolver implementations take
the correctness and security of system time for granted. This creates a security risk,
because the system time is often set by network timing protocols (e.g., NTP), which
are vulnerable to attack (see Section 4.2.1.)
Cache security and correctness. Finally, we note that the risks due to the cache’s
reliance on absolute time (or system time) are not mentioned in the DNS RFCs. RFC
1035 only minimally discusses security risks to the cache. The closest that RFCs get
to this is: (a) RFC 1035 suggests implementing the cache as separate data structure
so that it can be easily discarded without disturbing zone data (especially since the
cache is vulnerable to corruption when a system reboots, and because it can also
become full of expired RRs) and (b) RFC 3833 (Atkins and Austein, 2004), RFC
5452 (Hubert and von Mook, 2009) and RFC 7873 (III and Andrews, 2016) discuss
hardening caches to DNS spoofing and cache poisoning attacks.
4.3 Using Time to Attack the DNS Cache
We now investigate a largely overlooked and important threat in DNS: the impact of
security vulnerabilities introduced because resolver’s caches are dependent on absolute
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time, which is obtained from the system time, which is often obtained via network
timing protocols (e.g., NTP), which are vulnerable to attacks. In this section, we
present two attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in networking timing protocols: a
Cache Expiration Attack and a Cache Sticking Attack. We also discuss how each of
these attacks can harm DNS and other protocols and applications that rely on DNS.
4.3.1 Cache Expiration Attack
If the system time is shifted forward on a caching DNS resolver, then the RRs in the
cache would expire sooner than intended. This is tantamount to flushing attacks on
DNS cache and may cause a denial of DNS services to a client.
This attack is possible when the system time is updated from an external source
that is attackable, e.g., NTP (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016),
(Malhotra et al., 2017) and SNTP (Selvi, 2014). The attack follows because DNS
cache implementations use the system time to determine TTLs. Meanwhile, the DNS
protocol gives TTL as a relative time. If the cache had instead implemented TTLs
as a relative time (i.e., raw time or adjusted raw time, see Section 4.2.1) the security
of system time would have no impact on the security of the cache.
We perform the attack in the laboratory setting. For this we set up our own
validating, recursive, and caching DNS resolver Unbound v1.7.3 (Unbound, 2018) on
an Arch Linux version 2018.08.01 machine. (This was the latest version of Unbound
and Arch Linux at the time of our test). Our resolver uses NTP to update the
system time; indeed, NTP is the most common method of time synchronization on
GNU/Linux systems and on Arch Linux systems (Archlinux, 2018). We reboot the
system just to allow for a clean attack demonstration; this same attack is possible
even if the system is not rebooted. On system reboot, the resolver cache is empty.
We then perform the following experiment:
1. We initialize the empty cache by inserting an A record as follows. Send an
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A record query to the recursive resolver for the domain ndss-symposium.org
using the standard dig query for DNS lookup. (The dig query bypasses the
stub resolver cache lookup on our test machines.) Since the recursive resolver
has an empty cache, it performs a recursive lookup for the domain. It first
queries the root TLD, then .org authoritative NS and then ndss-symposium.org
authoritative NS to get the final A record as the answer. In our experiment,
the recorded time to complete the entire recursive address resolution process
was 267 ms and TTL was 3600 sec ≈ 1 hour (per the“Query time” and “TTL”
field respectively in the dig response message).
2. Next, we confirm that the A record has been cached by the resolver. To do this,
we perform another query, within the TTL window of the A record, for the same
domain.The record time to answer the query was just 4 ms, implying that the
record is served from the resolver cache.
3. Next, we attack by manually changing the system time on the resolver to be
past the TTL window of the cached A record by 1 hour 5 minutes. (There are
several techniques to perform these attacks from off-path and on-path described
in (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra et al., 2017), (Malhotra and Goldberg,
2016), (Selvi, 2014). We did not reproduce those attacks in our lab.)
4. Next, we perform the same query to the resolver. We observe now the query took
94 ms because it did not have to do the full recursion from the root. The root and
.org were still cached (because they have longer TTLs than 1 hour 5 minutes.)
The resolver had to refetch the A record for only ndss-symposium.org which
indicates that the A record was flushed from the cache.
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4.3.2 Implications of the Cache Expiration Attack
We consider the implications of cache expiration attack in three categories: (a) im-
pact on DNS, (b) making other attacks easier, and (c) economic repercussions for
outsourced domains.
Impact on DNS. Caching is critical to the DNS. All recursive resolvers are caching,
while many stub resolvers (depending on the underlying OS) support caching. (For
instance, Windows (Klein, 2018), Linux dnsmasq (dnsmasq, 2018) and Linux systemd
(systemd, 2018) do support caching in stub resolvers, but the libc stub resolver does
not.) Our attack harms caching performance and availability.
Performance A cache fetch from the resolver is much faster than a full recursive
query to one (or many) external NS(es). This is also indicated in our attack demon-
stration above which took 4 ms to respond from the cache as opposed to 267 ms
for full recursive response. Research suggests that resolvers typically have a 70-90%
cache hit rate (Jung et al., 2001), (DeGroote, 2013), so by flushing the cache using
our cache expiration attack, we can harm performance significantly. Each time this
attack is launched, flushing the cache, it harms the performance for the first query
made for a given RR. Nevertheless, we believe this performance hit is significant. As
evidence of this, (Kareem, 2017) observed that DNS resolver operators sometimes
serve RRs from the cache for 2-3 days longer than is allowed by their TTLs. In other
words, the the performance hit we have demonstrated here is important enough to
DNS operators that they sometimes are willing to disregard the requirements of the
DNS specifications.
Availability If the cached RRs expire too soon and the local caching resolver has
to go out and query the name servers for every other query it receives, the relia-
bility level of the DNS becomes the limiting factor in availability of service. RFC
1034 (Mockapetris, 1987a) says that even though the Internet is built for resiliency
104
and redundancy, nameservers can be down and/or communication link to the root
server broken due to network disruptions or other reasons. In such cases, the cache
of recursive resolver decides the availability of resolving services.
This is a real threat, as we have seen many instance when DNS services go down
but users are unaffected because of the presence of the cache. Consider, for instance
large-scale DoS attacks like as DNS flooding, which are symmetrical DoS attacks
that attempt to exhaust server-side assets (e.g., memory or CPU) with a flood of
UDP requests, generated by malicious scripts running on several compromised bot-
net machines. In one incident (rootops, 2015), some root DNS servers received high
query rates that caused network connections to saturate, denying service to valid,
normal queries. As another example, series of DDoS attacks on DNS provider Dyn
in 2016 (“2016 Dyn cyberattack”, 2016) affected many major services. (News head-
lines went so far as to say that it “broke the Internet” (Gordon, 2016), (SiteUptime,
2016), (Steinberg, 2016)). When Dyn’s targeted, authoritative DNS servers became
unavailable, the attack traveled across the world at TTL speed. That is, as soon as
a recursive resolver attempted to refresh its cache and discovered that Dyn wasn’t
available, it had no supply of IP addresses to provide. Since most of the records in
question relied on short TTLs, the impact was almost immediate. Meanwhile, longer
TTLs in DNS cache buys time for remedial action to be taken against the adversary.
However, with our cache expiration attack if the cached responses expire, then the
service is no longer available.5
Other Attacks made easier. We can use the cache expiration attack to make other
DNS attacks easier to accomplish.
DNS cache poisoning made easier With DNS cache poisoning, an attacker at-
5As a solution, there is a new draft IETF specification (Lawrence and Kumari, 2017) that proposes
to serve expired data from the cache to maintain availability and draft. Also (Pappas et al., 2012)
suggests keeping longer TTL values to improve DNS service availability during prolonged outages.
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tempts to insert a fake DNS record into the cache. If the querying resolver accepts
the fake record and saves it, the cache is poisoned and subsequent requests for that
record are answered as this fake record within its TTL window. The attacker may
poison the cache with fake A or AAAA, or CNAME, or NS RR that cause traffic
redirects to a server controlled by attacker. Since almost all communications on the
Internet require a DNS lookup, any application that is served from the DNS cache
becomes vulnerable.
Importantly, cache poisoning attacks can be difficult because they require the
victim resolver to send a query to an external NS. However, if the relevant RR is
already present in the victim resolver’s cache, then the query to the external NS will
never be sent, and the cache poisoning attack will not succeed. (Indeed, RFC 5452
explains how longer TTLs for cached responses make DNS cache poisoning harder.)
Meanwhile, our cache expiration attack flushes RRs out of the cache, making it easier
to launch a cache poisoning attack.
Fast fluxing made easier Fast Flux (Honeynet, 2018), (Holz et al., 2008) is a
DNS technique used by botnet networks to hide various malicious activities, behind
a dynamic network of compromised machines acting as proxies. The basic technique
behind fast fluxing is to have multiple IP addresses associated with a single domain
name (controlled by the attacker) which are swapped at high frequency, using short
TTL values. However, fast fluxing is commonly thwarted by DNS resolvers that
defensively reject RRs with very short TTLs. However, with our cache expiration
attack, one can effectively shorten TTLs short, thus thwarting this defense mechanism
and aiding fast fluxing. While our attack works only on individual caching resolvers
(rather than authoritative NSes), it’s important to remember that some resolvers
serve as core Internet infrastructure that are used by a large number of users (e.g.,
8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9, 1.1.1.1). Moreover, fast fluxing via cache expiration attack is more
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difficult to detect than very short TTLs.
4.3.3 Cache Sticking Attacks
If system time is shifted backwards on DNS resolver, the validity period of cached
RRs may increases. This makes them stick in the cache for longer than their intended
TTL. This attack is identical to the Cache Expiration Attack we just presented, except
that now, the attacker maliciously shifts time backwards, rather than forwards. That
said, the implications of this attack are different.
4.3.4 Implications of the Cache Sticking Attack
Cache Poisoning lasts longer If the attacker is able to poison the cache at a victim
resolver (by inserting a fake RR into the cache), then by sticking the cache he can
keep the cached poisoned for a long time. This approach circumvents many existing
defenses that try to limit the impact of cache poisoning by limiting the TTL of records
that live in the cache. For instance, by default the Unbound resolver will requery for
cached responses every 24 hours to alleviate the damage if the cache is poisoned.
(This way a poisoned record will necessarily be requeried in 24 hours, forcing the
attacker to relaunch the attack every 24 hours.) Meanwhile, our cache sticking attack
will prevent this requerying, since the victim resolver will not realize that 24 hours
have passed.
Domain Propagation Delay The TTL of a RR determines the rate at which
changes to a DNS RR propagate through the DNS ecosystem. This is why RFC
1035 suggests that when a change to an RR is anticipated, the domain owners should
reduce the TTL values of that RR prior to the change. Meanwhile, our cache sticking
attack thwarts this approach, by making even those RRs with a short TTL live longer
in the cache. While this attack targets resolvers (rather than authoritative NSes), it
can still have a big impact if those resolvers serve as infrastructure (e.g., 8.8.8.8 or
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9.9.9.9 or 1.1.1.1). We now discuss several ways that this cache sticking attack can
harm DNS.
1) Failover. Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) often use short TTLs on DNS
records to tackle failovers. Failover is defined to be the process of moving an service
from one IP to another, in the event that access to that IP fails. This failover process
should happen as quickly as possible. A low TTL for the A record bindings can reduce
the failover latency due to DNS caching and update the system more quickly, making
the failover services more effective (Jung et al., 2001), (Singh and Schulzrinne, 2007).
However, with our cache sticking attack, this approach of adding robustness to the
system can be rendered ineffective by sticking old RRs in the cache and delaying the
propagation of new RRs.
2) Load Balancing and Quality of Service (QoS): Various CDNs (Cloudflare, 2018)
(Akamai, 2018) rely on DNS-based server selection to balance load. The idea is that
the CDN’s authoritative NSes decide which RRs to serve in response to a query (e.g.,
for www.example.com) based on the location of querying resolvers. (For instance, a
resolver in Italy may be directed to a webserver for www.example.com at IP 1.2.3.4
while a resolver in China might be directed to a webserver for www.example.com at
IP 9.8.7.6.) By serving different RRs to different resolvers (that all make the same
query), the CDN can balance load across multiple webservers. Since it is a dynamic
server selection scheme that must adapt to dynamically changing loads, CDNs may
want to frequently change the RRs they serve to a given resolver. This requires TTLs
on RRs to very short (on the order of a few minutes (Pan et al., 2003)). However,
our cache sticking attack sticks a user to a particular RR, which may be outdated or
saturated with load. This affects the quality of service achieved by the load balancing
scheme.
3) Suppose a domain name is sold or transferred, orr that one wants to change the
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DNS host for a domain. Then, the RRs related to this domain need to be changed.
Short TTLs allow this change to quickly propagate through the DNS ecosystem.
Meanwhile, with our cache sticking attack, an old RR may be stuck in the victims
cache, directing the users to an old IP which may now be malicious or may have old
data. (This idea is also similar to the IP-use-after-free attacks presented by (Borgolte
et al., 2018).)
Negative Caching RFC 1034 (Mockapetris, 1987a) optionally provided a nega-
tive caching service to allow negative responses (NXDOMAIN) with TTLs to be
distributed by NSes and cached by resolvers. RFC 2308 (Andrews, 1998) makes neg-
ative caching -the storage of knowledge that something does not exist - mandatory for
the caching resolvers. This is important, as it not only reduces the response time of
negative responses, but also helps reduce DNS traffic. However, RFC 2308 is sensitive
to risk of a DoS attack that propagates via a negative response (NXDOMAIN) that
has a very high TTL; as a defense, the RFC suggests a sanity check to make sure
that the TTL on negative responses is not too high. Meanwhile, our cache sticking
attack would thwart any such defense, by sticking even those NXDOMAIN responses
with short TTLs in the cache for a very long time.
Blacklisting DNS has become the de-facto standard for the creation and distribu-
tion of blacklists of IP addresses/domains associated with spam and other anti-social
behavior on the Internet. RFC 5782 says that a blacklist of IPs that sends a spam
should have short TTLs as these IPs tend to change frequently (might change ev-
ery few minutes). However, with the cache sticking attack, one can effectively make
TTLs longer, potentially blacklisting address long after they have recovered from a
compromise by the spammer.
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4.4 Measuring the attack surface
We use measurements to find the number of DNS resolver IPs in the wild that are
vulnerable to our cache sticking and cache expiration attacks.
We perform our measurement study on two kinds of DNS resolvers (1) Open
resolvers - ones that are publicly accessible, and willing to resolve recursive queries
for anyone on the Internet (2) Private resolvers - ones that are meant to provide
resolver service to hosts in their respective network only. We test private resolvers
only in those networks that have RIPE Atlas (ripe, 2018) probes.6
4.4.1 Pivoting from NTP time-shifting attacks
Our attacks rely on shifting time on the resolvers. Resolvers that use NTP to update
their system time are vulnerable to off- and on-path time-shifting attacks (Malhotra
et al., 2016), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016) and (Malhotra et al., 2017). Thus we
measure the attack surface of our DNS cache sticking and DNS cache expiration
attacks by assuming that the attacker preforms the attack via NTP.
MiTM attacks via NTP. All NTP clients are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle
(MiTM) time-shifting attacks. This follows because NTP packets are never encrypted
and are typically not authenticated by a message authentication code (MAC) (Mal-
hotra et al., 2017). Instead, an NTP client decides whether to accept packets from
a timeserver by checking a nonce called the origin timestamp on the timeserver’s
response packet; the origin timestamp on the timeserver’s response packet (aka, an
NTP mode 4 packet) is required to match the transmit timestamp on the client’s
query packet (aka, an NTP mode 3 packet). The transmit timestamp on the client
query can trivially be read by a MiTM, making NTP vulnerable to MiTM attackers
that spoof bogus server response packets in order to shift time on the client (Malhotra
6Since these networks are maintained by individuals or enterprises for internal use, they are
generally not accessible from outside the network.
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et al., 2016), (Malhotra et al., 2017). If a resolver is vulnerable to NTP MiTM at-
tacks, the MiTM can execute our cache expiration and cache sticking attacks on DNS.
As we will soon see, we found that 33% of measured private resolvers and 5.37% of
measured open resolvers speak NTP and are thus vulnerable to these MiTM attacks.
Below we discuss how we find and interpret these results.
Off-path attacks via NTP. Next we consider whether NTP can be used to launch
our cache expiration and cache sticking attacks from off-path. One key reason that
NTP is vulnerable to off-path attacks is because it operates over UDP. Nevertheless,
clients that simply speak NTP are not necessarily vulnerable to off-path time-shifting
attacks (although several generic off-path time-shifting attacks have been found and
patched (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra et al., 2017)). This follows because an
off-path attacker cannot read the transmit timestamp nonce on an NTP client query,
and therefore cannot correctly inject a bogus server response with a correct origin
timestamp. To attack from off-path, the attacker somehow has to learn the origin
timestamp nonce.
That said, there is a known attack (Malhotra et al., 2017, Section V), called the
“Leaky Origin Timestamp” that causes the client to reveal his nonce. This attack is
possible on clients that answer unsolicited NTP mode 6 control queries from arbitrary
IPs with information that reveals the origin timestamp nonce. The specific NTP
control queries that should be answered to launch this attack are either (rv assocID
org or rv assocID rec). While patches for this attack exist (namely: stop answering
NTP control queries from unknown IPs), many machines remain vulnerable even as
of August 2018. Thus, we will decide that a DNS resolver is vulnerable to our DNS
cache expiration and cache sticking attack if they respond to either one of the above
NTP control queries. Surprisingly we find that 18.28% of the open resolvers that
replied to NTP mode 3 queries and 6% of private resolvers that replied to NTP mode
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3 queries leaked at least one of the org or rec nonces.
Finally, we note that there is another off-path time-shifting attack called the “Zero-
Origin Timestamp Attack” (Malhotra et al., 2017, Section IV.A). While this attack
was patched over two years ago, not all machines have deployed the patch. This
attack is especially powerful because it does not require the victim NTP client to
answer unsolicited mode 6 control queries from arbitrary IPs. That said, to measure
the attack surface for this zero-origin time attack, we need to use NTP mode 6 control
queries (Malhotra et al., 2017). When performing this measurement, we found that of
the resolvers that answered unsolicited mode 6 control queries, we found that 70.17%
of open resolvers and 69.14% of private resolvers were vulnerable to the zero-origin
timestamp attack.
The bottom line is that many resolvers in our dataset are vulnerable to known
attacks on NTP.
4.4.2 Private resolver measurements.
To find out the number of DNS resolvers that are vulnerable to attacks that pivot
from NTP, we use the RIPE Atlas probes. At the time of our experiment (July 29
2018 - August 2 2018), a total of 10,338 Atlas probes were active. Each probe gets its
list of DNS resolvers by either manual configuration or by default by DHCP in their
respective networks. We start by obtaining the list of IPs for DNS resolvers on each
probe from the publicly available data from another - long running - DNS measure-
ment study (ripe NCC, 2018) on RIPE network. This study builds the resolver IP list
by sending a DNS TXT query for o-o.myaddr.l.google.com from each probe using
the locally configured resolvers. The IP addresses of the locally configured resolvers
are part of the measurement results. By using the results of this query measurement,
we make sure to select only working local resolvers.
In the following steps we discuss our measurement methodology and the challenges
112
that we face.
1) MiTM attacks. First we send NTP mode 3 client queries to these privates
resolvers. From the ones that respond to these queries with a mode 4 server response,
we can determine the number of resolvers that use NTP to update their system time.
Importantly, this only gives us a lower bound on the number of resolvers that are NTP
clients, since a security-aware NTP client will only send NTP mode 3 client queries
but not respond to them (Malhotra et al., 2016). NTP clients that respond to NTP
mode 3 queries are (often unwittingly) acting as NTP timeservers. We emphasize
that there is a significant probability that there are other resolvers that are NTP
clients but are configured to ignore mode 3 queries. While an MiTM can launch our
DNS cache attacks to any resolver that speaks NTP (even those who are not acting
as timeservers), we know of no other technique to determine if a remote machine uses
NTP to set its system time. However even this measurement comes with a challenge.
Hurdle 1: Atlas probes allow NTP mode 3 queries only to public IP addresses.7.
In order to filter out the resolvers that have private address, we discard the resolvers
that have IPs in the private address space as described in RFC1918 (Rekhter et al.,
1996). We also discard well-known open DNS resolver addresses.
Stats. We then use the remaining IP addresses as target for mode 3 query. After
filtering we obtained 4,703 unique resolvers with public IP address. We then send
RFC5905-compliant mode 3 NTP queries to these resolvers from the Atlas probes that
had them configured. (Note: NTP mode 3 queries do not modify the internal state
of the queried systems.) Of the 4,703 queried resolvers, a staggering 1,535 (32.64%)
resolvers answered with a mode 4 response to our mode 3 NTP queries.
Discussion The fact that 33% of the scanned private resolvers are acting as NTP
timeservers (by responding to NTP mode 3 queries) looks pretty odd. But if we think
7Note that this restriction is only for NTP queries. One can send DNS queries to both public
and private IP addresses.
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about it, we expect a properly-configured DNS resolver to speak NTP, since accurate
time is a good operational practice, and a necessity for DNSSEC validation too.
Why then, are so many resolvers acting as NTP timeservers? This is likely because
most DNS operators do not spend time thinking through the intricacies of NTP. It
turns out that, by default, the ntpd daemon makes every NTP-speaking system run
as an NTP server (Malhotra et al., 2016); this functionality needs to be turned off
manually by the administrator. Unfortunately, most DNS resolver administrators are
unlikely to be aware of this default. NTP-speaking systems that act as timeservers
are also more vulnerable to time-shifting and DoS attacks, when compared to NTP-
speaking systems that have turned off their timeserver functionality (Malhotra et al.,
2016).8 Also, most DNS operators are probably unaware (or have not thought deeply
about the fact) that NTP is trivially vulnerable to time-shifting attacks by an MiTM,
because NTP packets are not cryptographically authenticated.
1) Off-path attacks. Which of these 1,535 NTP-speaking DNS resolvers are vul-
nerable to off-path time-shifting attacks? To answer this question, we use NTP mode
6 control queries to see how many of those leak their org and rec nonces. We run a
script that sends the following mode 3 queries in order.
ntpq -c "assocID"
ntpq -c "rv assocID org"
ntpq -c "rv assocID rec"
As described earlier, systems that reply to the above queries by revealing either org
or rec nonce are vulnerable to the off-path “Leaky Origin Timestamp” time-shifting
attack on NTP (Malhotra et al., 2017). This brings us to our next challenge.
Hurdle 2: Atlas probes do not allow mode 6 NTP queries to be sent. This means
8This follows because an NTP mode 4 server response reveals the IP address of the time source
used by the responding timeserver, which is useful for launching off-path time-shifting attacks (Mal-
hotra et al., 2016).
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that we can not query these resolvers from inside their network using Atlas probes.
We found two ways that can, to some extent, solve this problem.
One solution is to querying these resolvers from outside the network in which they
reside using NLnet Labs network. This approach is very limited since the resolvers
are inside a private network, there is a low chance that they can be queried from
outside. We queried the 1,535 resolvers. 68 resolvers leaked at least one of the org
or rec nonces. Of these, 49 resolvers also leaked information indicating that they are
vulnerable to the NTP Zero-Origin Timestamp attack.
An additional solution is to use the NLNOG RING (Snijders, 2018) nodes. 377
(24.56%) resolvers have a common network with at least one NLNOG ring node.
Of these 42 (11.15%) resolvers leaked at least org or rec, and 38 of the responding
resolvers also revealed that they are vulnerable to the Zero-Origin Timestamp attack
on NTP.9
Putting these two approaches together, we found a total of 98 resolvers that
revealed at least one of the org or rec NTP nonces (and thus are vulnerable to the
off-path“Leaky Origin Timestamp” attack). Of these 65 resolvers were also vulnerable
to the off-path “Zero Origin Timestamp” attack on NTP. Both of these NTP attacks
should have been patched years ago. Nevertheless, these resolvers remain vulnerable,
which by extension makes them vulnerable to our DNS cache attacks from off-path.
4.4.3 Open resolver measurements.
To measure the number of DNS resolver IPs in the wild, we obtain data from the
Open Resolver Project (Mauch, 2018) that runs weekly scans of IPv4 address space
to determine the IPs that respond to DNS queries. obtained a list of 23,137,317 IPs
that responded to these queries during the week of April 15, 2018. We then start our
9NLNOG RING nodes do not have inbuilt support for mode 6 NTP queries. However, NLNOG
RING allows for customized queries, so we copied NTP mode 6 queries to these nodes.
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Resolver type Total IPs replied to mode 3 leaked org OR rec leaked org 0
Open 342,131 18,385 (5.37%) 3,434 (18.68%) 2,416 (70.17%)
Private 4,703 1,535 (32.64%) 98 (6.39%) 65 (69.14%)
Table 4.1: Resolver IPs vulnerable to NTP time-shifting and our DNS cache expi-
ration and cache sticking attacks. Column 3- All IPs vulnerable to MiTM, Column
4 - All IPs vulnerable to off-path attacks, column 5 - All IPs vulnerable to off-path
Zero Origin Timestamp attack.
scan on DATE July 28, 2018 as follows:
1) We send a DNS A query for www.example.com to this list of 23,137,317 IPs.
1,458,194 IPs still replied to the DNS A query. Of the ones that replied, we found
that 342,131 (23.46%) are open resolvers (those that replied with an answer) and
1,116,063 (76.54%) were non-answering, returning either REFUSED or some other
DNS error code, indicating that they resolvers, but not open resolvers.10
2) Next, we send NTP mode 3 query to 342,131 answering open resolver IPs.
Of these, 18,385 (5.37%) replied back with a mode 4 response packet. And 87,141
(7.80%) of 1,116,063 non-answering IPs replied back with a mode 4 response. All
of these resolvers are vulnerable to MiTM NTP attacks and hence our DNS cache
expiration and cache sticking attacks by an MiTM.
3) We then send NTP mode 6 control queries to 18,385 answering open resolver
IPs and found that 3,451 (18.77%) IPs leaked at least one of the org or rec nonces.
Moreover, a total of 416 (70.17%) resolvers indicated that they are vulnerable to the
NTP “Zero-Origin Timestamp” attack.
Discussion 5.37% of scanned open resolvers answered NTP mode 3 queries. We
don’t expect open resolvers (with the exception of infrastructure open resolvers like
8.8.8.8 or 1.1.1.1) to be properly configured; the fact that they are open resolvers is
sufficient evidence of misconfiguration. Why are open resolvers (5%) less vulnerable
10These non-answering resolvers are properly configured private resolvers with access control lists
(ACLs). They may have been open resolvers at those IPs when openresolver project collected the
data, but became non-open resolvers at the time of our scan.
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than private resolvers (33%) to NTP MiTM attacks? Again this might look odd, but
this may be because nobody cares to configure NTP on open resolvers in the first
place, which could be viewed as a bad DNS operational practice. Also, a staggering
18.68% open resolvers acting as NTP timeservers (as compared to only 6% private
resolvers) were found to be vulnerable to off-path time-shifting attacks. This again
supports our argument of misconfiguration, except that now it is a bad configuration
for NTP.
4.4.4 Takeaways and Ethical Measurements
We observe that more private resolvers (as compared to open resolvers) have NTP
configured (33%) (good for DNS(SEC) operational practice), but fewer of them are
vulnerable to off-path time-shifting attack (6%) (good NTP configuration). Fewer
open resolvers are NTP configured (5%) (bad DNS(SEC) operational practice), but
more of them are vulnerable to off-path time-shifting attacks (19%) (bad NTP con-
figuration). In other words, if the DNS resolver is sloppily configured, then NTP is
sloppily configured as well. Therefore we ask: Is the risk of sloppily configuring NTP
bigger if one configures NTP at all? Our results suggest that this is indeed the case.
Therefore, DNS resolver operators that decide to turn on NTP should also be
careful with their NTP configurations. DNS resolvers should not be operating at NTP
timeservers, because this increases the surface for NTP attacks (Malhotra et al., 2016).
DNS resolvers should also regularly update their NTP software, to avoid situations
where NTP vulnerabilities remain exploitable two years after they should have been
patched.
Ethical measurements. We acknowledge that a far more ‘informative’ measure-
ment would have been to directly measure our DNS cache attacks in the wild by
launching NTP time-shifting attacks in the wild, and then checking if the DNS cache
has been flushed or stuck. Naturally, however, we did not do this, because it would be
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unethical to attack live resolvers. This is especially important since our DNS cache
attacks indiscriminately flush or stick all RRs in the cache, so we could not have a
done a very targeted “test attack” on our own RRs that we inject into the cache of
the measured resolver (as was done e.g., in (Klein et al., 2017)). Instead, we focused
on using NTP side channels for measurements. None of the side channels modify the
internal state of the NTP daemon (see also (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra et al.,
2017)), and thus also do not modify the state of the DNS cache.
4.5 Recommendations
We believe that setting TTL as relative time value is a feature of the DNS protocol.
To deal with the attacks described in Section 4.3, there is no fundamental change
required to the DNS protocol. The only thing that needs to be dealt with is the way
relative time values (TTL) are implemented in DNS cache. Since TTL represents a
duration of time, we just need the value that gives the difference in time between two
points.
We recommend to get this value from a monotonic source of time that is not sub-
ject to a) manual changes and b) adjustments by vulnerable network timing protocols.
Instead, one can use raw time or adjusted raw time,11as discussed in Section 4.2, de-
pending on their availability on different OS. If both types are available, the choice
of time value to be used is application-specific. For applications that can tolerate a
certain amount of clock drift or need to keep track of extremely small intervals of
time (say on the order of few seconds), then raw time should be used. However, if
that is an issue, then one has no choice but to fall back to adjusted raw time.
11Note that adjusted raw time is subject to adjustments by timing protocols. However, 1) it can
not be set manually, 2) it does not make large jumps, and 3) the rate of passage of time is just
slowed down or sped up which means that it will take way longer to shift time. Adjusted raw time
is better than system time but worse than raw time; see Section 4.2.
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4.5.1 Implementing our Recommendations
Unbound Unbound is a validating, recursive, and caching DNS resolver product
from NLnet Labs(Unbound, 2018). It is distributed free of charge in open source
form under the BSD license.
Unbound’s internal operation is organized around asynchronous event notification.
Different serve-threads wait for events to happen (i.e., network sockets to become
readable, writable, closed or to fail) to take appropriate action. Events are registered
with a so called “event-base” (or loop) together with a timeout value. Fired time-
outs are also events upon which (different) appropriate actions are taken (i.e., retry
scheduling of queries at different authoritatives etc.).
Unbound serve-threads read and record system time, every time events become
available (or timed out). (This is similar to the recommendation in RFC1035 to
timestamp every request/query for an RR, that we discussed in Section 4.2.3.) The
timestamp is subsequently used with Unbound’s operations dealing with the fired
events: to set expiration time for newly cached RRsets, to check the validity of
already cached RRsets, to limit the rate at which requests are send to authoritative
servers, and to check validity of DNSSEC signatures. The function which is used to
read and record system time is gettimeofday().
We have a preliminary implementation of our recommendations for Unbound, and
the implementation is publically available on GitHub. [We omit the link to preserve
anonymity.] At the time of writing, Unbound has been altered as follows. Instead
of one, two timestamps are recorded when events are available, one absolute time
value from gettimeofday() which is used for DNSSEC validation only, and one
relative time value from clock gettime() — currently with the clock id parameter
set to CLOCK MONOTONIC RAW (the unadjusted raw time on Linux systems) — which is
used for all other timing related functions, such as dealing with RRset’s TTL values
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and rate-limiting requests to authoritative servers. Several issues still remain to be
resolved:
1. Those tests — that are part of the Unbound source tree — which are testing
timing behavior of Unbound (i.e., cache expiration etc.) are failing, because
the scripts for those tests are based on absolute time values.
2. The current implementation uses the Linux specific CLOCK MONOTONIC RAW clock
which is an extension on the POSIX standard(“clockgettime”, 2018), which
defines CLOCK MONOTONIC only and leaves whether or not the value is adjusted
for drift, undefined. In general, portability of the implementation has to be
evaluated.
3. Furthermore, Unbound has a built-in event-base system based on select. The
registration and handling of timeout values with this event-base are still based
on absolute time values from gettimeofday(). This has to be rewritten to use
relative time values too.
NLnet Labs has committed to incorporate our changes into Unbound’s main devel-
opment branch once all issues have been resolved and the implementation has proven
to be stable and not negatively affecting current deployments.
Knot-resolver After a preliminary disclosure of our work at IETF 100, the Knot
resolver (knot, 2018) co-incidentally also changed how it used time for DNS caching.
This was released as Knot version 1.5.1. Because Knot’s cache is persistent, it needs
a defined epoch to be meaningful between restarts and reboots. The cache still has
expiration values in absolute time values, but timing discontinuities are detected by
comparing progression of system time with monotonic time. In default configuration,
the Knot clears the cache if time jumps more than 10 minutes into the past. This
has two implications.
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1) This opens the DNS cache to an alternate cache expiration/flushing attack.
The attacker needs to shift time backwards by only 10 minutes and the cache will be
flushed, which is equivalent to our cache expiration attack in which the attacker has
to shift the time forwards to pass the TTL window of the cached response. In fact,
this new attack could be easier, since it is independent of the TTL of a particular
RR.
2) Cache sticking attacks, on the other hand, would now require more persistent
work by the attacker. Remember, for sticking the RRs in the cache the attacker has
to shift time backwards within the TTL window of the RR to stick the RR in the
cache (Section 4.3.3). Meanwhile, knot has now imposed a restriction of 10 minutes.
The attacker can not shift time backwards by more than 10 minutes; if she did, the
cache will be flushed instead of getting stuck. As result, performing a cache sticking
attack is harder, because the attacker has to keep attacking at least every 10 minutes
for as long as he wants to stick the RRs in the cache.
We conjecture that the Knot could not fix this problem entirely because Knot
uses a persistent cache. It is not possible to store relative time values (raw time or
adjusted raw time) in a persistent cache.
4.6 DNSSEC and System Time.
DNSSEC described in RFCs (Arends et al., 2005a) (Arends et al., 2005b) and (Arends
et al., 2005c) is a set of protocols that adds a layer of trust by providing data origin
authentication and data integrity to DNS lookups and exchanges. For authentica-
tion, DNSSEC associates cryptographic digital signatures, called the Resource Record
Signature (RRSIG) records, generated using the zone’s private key with the DNS Re-
source Record Set (RRSet)12. By checking its associated RRSIG, one can verify that
12RRset is a group of records with same label, class and type, but with different data. Typically
RRsets are signed as opposed to signing individual RRs.
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a requested DNS RRset comes from its authoritative NS and wasn’t altered en-route.
A security-aware resolver understands DNSSEC and is capable of using DNSEC RR
types to provide DNSSEC services. When a security-aware resolver learns the zone’s
public key, it can validate the RRSIG as described in (Kolkman and Gieben, 2006).
RRSIG RRs have defined the inception time and expiration time to establish a
validity period for the signatures and the RRsets covered by the signature. These
inception and expiration fields are specified as absolute time values. This is unlike
DNS TTLs, that are expressed as relative time values. Thus, unlike the DNS on-the-
wire protocol, the DNSSEC on-the-wire protocol uses the notion of absolute time.
How do implementations deal with timestamps?In a typical software imple-
mentation (Unbound, Bind, PowerDNS, DNSMasq, etc.), the two absolute time values
on RRSIG RRs are compared against the current system time. The current system
time of the resolver MUST be between these two time values; otherwise the response
is discarded either as an expired or not-yet-valid record.
DNSSEC RRs expired/not-yet-valid attacks If the system time of the security-
aware validating resolver is shifted forward such that it is past the expiration time on
RRSIG, then we can effectively make RRSIG RRs expire. On the other side, if the
time is shifted backwards such that it is before the inception time on the RRSIG, then
we can make them “not-yet-valid”. In such a case, most resolver implementations
(including but not limited to Unbound) shows the SERVFAIL status to the client
and cache this failed response for 60 seconds after five retries with the same NS. This
DNSSEC DoS is tantamount to DNS DoS attack. (Note, there is no fallback to DNS
in case of too many SERVFAILs.)
So how can our attacks make DNSSEC DoS (aka DNS DoS) easier when there are
multiple NSes? First, we note that the Unbound resolver (Dai et al., 2016) (and other
resolvers) keep some statistics about NSes, and will stop querying an NS that causes
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too many SERVFAILs (or other failures) and start querying other NSes instead. Thus,
a traditional DNSSEC DoS works only if all relevant NSes are causing SERVFAILs
(or other failures). Meanwhile, our attacks directly DoS DNSSEC at the resolver by
shifting time, without controlling any NSes, lowering the bar for the attack. Our
attacks would invalidate all signed data from all correctly configured honest NSes,
and leave the resolver with no NSes to fall back to.
4.6.1 Recommendations
The use of absolute time is inherent to security protocols. This raises the question:
Why don’t we use relative time values to define the validity of cryptographic objects
just like we do for non-cryptographic records? There are two reasons we think that
absolute time is needed for DNSSEC.
Argument 1. The authority determining and setting the validity period on the ob-
ject can be different from the one delivering the object. For example, setting the TTL
value on DNS records is an operational matter and is thus left to the operators of the
DNS zone. Zone operators can change the TTL values on non-signed or non crypto-
graphic records even when they don’t own it. The content of the cryptographically
signed records (RRSIG RRs) are, however, determined by the signer of the records.
When the signer is not also the zone operator, signer has no way to determine when
the records will be queried for, and thus has to depend on cryptographically signed
absolute time values to limit the validity of the record stored in the zone13.
Argument 2. In a replay attack, an attacker records the data and maliciously
resends it later. However if the data has absolute time values on it, that limits its
lifetime. This is not possible with relative time values.
Thus, it becomes imperative for the validating resolver to use system time to
13Note however that DNSSEC signatures do contain the original TTL of an RRset, restricting the
maximum TTL value with which the operator may deliver the RRs.
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validate the absolute time values on RRSIG RRs. The only way to ensure the security
of such a system is to secure the way system time is updated. On the bright side, there
is an ongoing effort at Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) community to secure
NTP. e.g., (Franke et al., 2018) is a proposal to secure NTP’s client/server mode
using Public Key Infrastructure and another RFC 8573 (Malhotra and Goldberg,
2019) that deprecates MD5-based symmetric key authentication, which is considered
to be too weak, and recommends the use of secure AES-CMAC as a replacement.
DNSSEC resolver operators should be amoung the first to adopt these NTP security
updates.
4.7 Related Work
Attacks. Several works study DNS spoofing and cache poisoning attacks and propose
potential solutions (Kaminsky, 2008), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2012a), (Klein et al.,
2017), (Herzberg and Shulman, 2012b), (Schomp et al., 2014), (Yuan et al., 2006).
These attacks focus on how the DNS protocol can be exploited to poison DNS resolver
caches. By contrast our attacks show how to pivot from vulnerabilities in absolute
time (e.g., in NTP), to attacks that flush/stick the DNS cache. We also discuss how
our DNS cache attacks can lower the bar for classic cache poisoning attacks by a)
making them easier to launch, b) making them stick in the cache for longer. Finally,
we note that existing work tends to propose security fixes to DNS on-wire protocol,
while our recommendations focus on the DNS resolver cache implementations.
DNS measurement. Many previous studies measure DNS resolvers. For instance,
studies have analyzed resolver performance (Boulakhrif, 2015), (Jung et al., 2001),
the effectiveness of resolver caching (Jung et al., 2001), (Bhatti and Atkinson, 2011),
or the classification of open DNS resolvers and their non-legitimate responses. (Ager
et al., 2010) measures local resolvers from 50 commercial ISPs for responsiveness and
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correctness and compares them with third-party popular open DNS resolvers. (Yu
et al., 2012) measure how current caching resolver implementations distribute queries
among a set of authoritative NSs. Our measurements are different because we focus
on NTP-related vulnerabilities at DNS resolvers.
NTP measurement.In (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016),
(Malhotra et al., 2017), the authors scan the IPv4 address space to find systems that
are vulnerable to NTP attacks. While our attack surface measurement uses similar
NTP queries (as in (Malhotra et al., 2017)) our measurements are specifically focused
on open and private DNS resolvers.
4.8 Conclusion
We showed that DNS resolvers’ dependence on absolute time makes them vulnerable
to DNS caching attacks and DNS(SEC) DoS attacks. We studied the attack surface
using network measurements, focusing specifically on the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) as a vector for remotely attacking time. Our network measurements indicate
that the attack surface is large . From total 342,131 measured open resolvers, we
identified 18,385 open DNS resolvers that use NTP to set the absolute time. From
total 4703 measured private resolvers, we find 1,535 private DNS resolvers that use
NTP to set the absolute time. All these NTP-speaking resolvers are vulnerable to
attacks by a MiTM that pivot from NTP time-shifting into DNS cache sticking /
cache expiration attacks and DNSSEC downgrade attacks. In fact, we identified
3,451 out of 18,385 measured open DNS resolvers and 98 out of 1,535 measured
private DNS resolvers that are vulnerable to NTP time-shifting attacks that can be
launched from off-path, by any remote machine on the Internet with the ability to
spoof UDP packets. While these off-path NTP attacks should have been patched over
two years ago, many resolvers in the wild remain vulnerable.
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Our attacks indicate that DNS caches should lessen their reliance on absolute time.
Indeed, the DNS on-wire protocol does not actually need absolute time; instead,
DNS packets only use relative time. We therefore recommend that DNS caching
resolvers use relative time rather than absolute time. Specifically, we suggest using
the operating system’s raw time, which is monotonically increasing and not subject
to adjustment by external sources (and thus immune to the network attacks on time
explored here). We are currently working with Unbound resolver to implement and
roll out our recommendations; our implementation is publicly available on Github.
Chapter 5
The Security of NTP’s Datagram Protocol
5.1 Introduction
Millions of hosts (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Minar, 1999), (Murta et al., 2006), (Mauch,
2015), (Czyz et al., 2014a) use the Network Time Protocol (NTP) (Mills et al., 2010)
to synchronize their computer clocks to public Internet timeservers (using NTP’s
client/server mode), or to neighboring peers (using NTP’s symmetric mode). Over
the last few years, the security of NTP has come under new scrutiny. Along with
significant attention paid to NTP’s role in UDP amplification attacks (Czyz et al.,
2014a), (Kra¨mer et al., 2015), there is also a new focus on attacks on the NTP
protocol itself, both in order to maliciously alter a target’s time (timeshifting at-
tacks) or to prevent a target from synchronizing its clock (denial of service (DoS)
attacks) (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Stenn, 2016). These attacks matter because the
correctness of time underpins many other basic protocols and services. For instance,
cryptographic protocols use timestamps to prevent replay attacks and limit the use of
stale or compromised cryptographic material (e.g., TLS (Selvi, 2015), (Klein, 2013),
HSTS (Selvi, 2014), DNSSEC, RPKI (Malhotra et al., 2016), bitcoin (Corbixgwelt,
2011), authentication protocols (Klein, 2013),(Malhotra et al., 2016)), while accurate
time synchronization is a basic requirement for various distributed protocols.
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5.1.1 Problems with the NTP specification.
We start by identifying three fundamental problems with the NTP specification in
RFC 5905, and then exploit these problems in four different off-path attacks on ntpd,
the “reference implementation” of NTP.
Problem 1: Lack of respect for basic protection measures. The first issue
stems from a lack of respect for TEST2, the mechanism that NTP uses to prevent
off-path attacks. Off-path attacks are essentially the weakest (and therefore the most
scary) threat model that one could consider for a networking protocol. An off-path
attacker cannot eavesdrop on the NTP traffic of their targets, but can spoof IP
packets i.e., send packets with a bogus source IP. This threat model captures ‘remote
attacks’ launched by arbitrary IPs that do not occupy a privileged position on the
communication path between the parties. (See Figure 5·2.)
NTP attempts to prevent off-path attacks much in the same way that TCP and
UDP do: every client query includes a nonce, and this nonce is reflected back to
the client in the server’s response. The client then checks for matching nonces in
the query and response, i.e., “TEST2”. Because an off-path attacker cannot see the
nonce (because it cannot eavesdrop on traffic), it cannot spoof a valid server response.
Despite the apparent simplicity of this mechanism, its specification in RFC 5905 is
flawed and leads to several off-path attacks.
Problem 2: Same code for different modes. NTP operates in several different
modes. Apart from the popular client/server mode (where the client synchronizes
to a time server), NTP also has a symmetric mode (where neighboring peers take
time from each other), and several other modes.RFC 5905 recommends that all of
NTP’s different modes be processed by the same codepath. However, we find that
the security requirements of client/server mode and symmetric mode conflict with
each other, and result in some of our off-path attacks.
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Figure 5·1: Chapter overview.
Problem 3: Leaky control queries. NTP’s control-query interface is not specified
in RFC 5905, but its specification does appear in the obsoleted RFC 1305 (Mills, 1992)
from 1992 and a new IETF Internet draft (Mills and Haberman, 2016). We find that
it can be exploited remotely to leak information about NTP’s internal timing state
variables. While the DDoS amplification potential of NTP’s control query interface
is well known (Czyz et al., 2014a), (Kra¨mer et al., 2015), here we show that it is also
a risk to the correctness of time.
We exploit these three problems to find working off-path attacks on ntpd (Sec-
tion 5.3-5.4, Appendix A), and use IPv4 Internet scans to identify millions of IPs
that are vulnerable to our attacks (Section 5.5). The first three attacks maliciously
shift time on a client using NTP’s client/server mode, and the fourth prevents time
synchronization in symmetric mode.
Attack 1: Leaky Origin Timestamp Attack (Section 5.4). Our network scans find a
staggering 3.8 million IPs that leak the nonce used in TEST2 in response to control
queries made from arbitrary IPs (CVE-2015-8139). An off-path attacker can mali-
ciously shift time on a client by continuously querying for this nonce, and using it to
spoof packets that pass TEST2.
Attack 2: Zero-0rigin Timestamp Attack (Section 5.3.3 and Appendix A.1). This
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attack (CVE-2015-8138) follows from RFC 5905, and is among the strongest timeshift-
ing attacks on NTP that has been identified thus far. The attacker bypasses TEST2
by spoofing server response packets with their nonce set to zero. We use leaky NTP
control queries as a side-channel to measure the prevalence of this attack. We find 1.3
million affected IPs. However, we expect that the true attack surface is even larger,
since this attack itself does not require the control-query interface, works on clients
operating in default mode, and has been part of ntpd for seven years (since ntpd
v4.2.6, December 2009).
Attack 3: Interleaved-Pivot Attack (Section 5.4). Our third off-path timeshifting
attack (CVE-2016-1548) exploits the fact that NTP’s client/server mode shares the
same codepath as NTP’s interleaved mode. First, the attacker spoofs a single packet
that tricks the target into thinking that he is in interleaved mode. The target then
rejects all subsequent legitimate client/server mode packets. This is a DoS attack
(Section 5.4, Appendix A.2).
We further leverage NTP’s leaky control queries to convert this DoS attack to
an off-path timeshifting attack. NTP’s control-query interface also leaks the nonce
used in the special version of TEST2 used in interleaved mode. The attacker spoofs
a sequence of interleaved-mode packets, with nonce value revealed by these queries,
that maliciously shifts time on the client. Our scans find 1.3 million affected IPs.
Attack 4: Attacks on symmetric mode (Appendix B). We then present security analy-
sis of NTP’s symmetric mode, as specified in RFC 5905, and present off-path attacks
that prevent time synchronization. We discuss why the security requirements of sym-
metric mode are at odds with that of client/server mode, and may have been the root
cause of the zero-0rigin timestamp attack.
Disclosure. Our disclosure timeline is in Appendix E. Our research was done against
ntpd v4.2.8p6, the latest version as of April 25, 2016. Since then, three versions have
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been released: ntpd v4.2.8p7 (April 26, 2016), ntpd v4.2.8p8 (June 2, 2016), ntpd
v4.2.8p9 (November 21, 2016). Most of our attacks have been patched in these re-
leases. We provide recommendations for securing the client/server mode in Section 5.7
and symmetric mode in Appendix B.4.
5.1.2 Provably secure protocol design.
Our final contribution is to go beyond attacks and patches, and identify a more
robust security solution (Section 5.6) We propose a new backwards-compatible pro-
tocol for client/server mode that preserves the semantics of the timestamps in NTP
packets (Figures 5·6, 5·7). We then leverage ideas from the universal composability
framework (Canetti, 2001) to develop a cryptographic model for attacks on NTP’s
datagram protocol. We use this model to prove (Section 5.6.3,5.6.4) that our protocol
correctly synchronizes time in the face of both (1) off-path attackers when NTP is
unauthenticated and (2) on-path attackers when NTP packets are authenticated with
a MAC. We also use our model to prove similar results about a different protocol that
is used by chronyd (chronyd, 2015) and openntpd (openNTPD, 2012) (two alternate
implementations of NTP). The chronyd/openntpd protocol is secure, but unlike our
protocol, does not preserve the semantics of packet timestamps.
Our cryptographic model models both on-path attackers and off-path attackers.
An on-path attacker can eavesdrop, inject, spoof, and replay packets, but cannot drop,
delay, or tamper with legitimate traffic. An on-path attacker eavesdrops on a copy
of the target’s traffic, so it need not disrupt live network traffic, or even operate at
line rate. For this reason, on-path attacks are commonly seen in the wild, disrupting
TCP (Weaver et al., 2009), DNS (Duan et al., 2012), BitTorrent (Weaver et al.,
2009), or censoring web content (Clayton et al., 2006). Meanwhile, we cannot prove
that NTP provides correct time synchronization in the face of the traditional Man-
in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks (aka. ‘in-path attacks’) because an MiTM can always
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Figure 5·2: Threat models.
prevent time synchronization by dropping packets. Moreover, an MiTM can also bias
time synchronization by delaying packets (Mizrahi, 2012a), (Mizrahi, 2012b).1
Taking a step back, our work can be seen as a case study of the security risks that
arise when network protocols are underspecified. It also highlights the importance of
handling diverse protocol requirements in separate and rigourously tested codepaths.
Finally, our network protocol analysis introduces new ways of reasoning about network
attacks on time synchronization protocols.
5.1.3 Related work
Secure protocols. Our design and analysis of secure client/server protocols comple-
1This follows because time-synchronization protocols use information about the delay on the
network path in order to accurately synchronize clocks (Section 5.2). A client cannot distinguish the
delay on the forward path (from client to server) from the delay on the reverse path (from server to
client). As such, the client simply takes the total round trip time δ (forward path + reverse path),
and assumes that delays on each path are symmetric. The MiTM can exploit this by making delays
asymmetric (e.g., causing the delay on the forward path to be much longer than delay on the reverse
path), thus biasing time synchronization.
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ment recent efforts to cryptographically secure NTP and its “cousin” PTP (Precision
Time Protocol) (Mizrahi, 2012b). Our interest is in securing the core datagram pro-
tocol used by NTP, which was last described in David Mills’ book (Mills, 2011).
To the best of our knowledge, the security of the core NTP datagram protocol has
never previously been analyzed. Meanwhile, our analysis assumes that parties cor-
rectly distribute cryptographic keys and use a secure MAC. A complementary stream
of works propose protocols for distributing keys and performing the MAC, begin-
ning with the Autokey protocol in RFC5906 (Haberman and Mills, 2010), which was
broken by Rottger (Ro¨ttger, 2012), which was followed by NTS (Sibold et al., 2015),
ANTP (Dowling et al., 2016), other works including (Itkin and Wool, 2016), (Moreira
et al., 2015), and on-going activity in the IETF (Franke et al., 2018).
Attacks. Our analysis of the NTP specification is motivated, in part, by discovery
of over 30 ntpd CVEs between June 2015 to July 2016 (Stenn, 2016). These imple-
mentation flaws allow remote code execution, DoS attacks, and timeshifting attacks.
Earlier, Selvi (Selvi, 2014), (Selvi, 2015) demonstrated MiTM timeshifting attacks
on ‘simple NTP (SNTP)’ (rather than full-fledged NTP). Even earlier, work (Klein,
2013), (Mills, 2011), (Corbixgwelt, 2011) considered the impact of timeshifting on the
correctness of other protocols. The recent academic work (Malhotra et al., 2016) also
attacks NTP, but our attacks are stronger. (Malhotra et al., 2016) presented attacks
that are on-path (weaker than our off-path attacks), or off-path DoS attacks (weaker
than our timeshifting attacks), or off-path time-shifting attacks that needed spe-
cial client/server configurations (our Zero-0rigin Timestamp attack works in default
mode). Also, our measurements find millions of vulnerable clients, while (Malhotra
et al., 2016) finds thousands. Finally, NTP’s broadcast mode is outside our scope;
see (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2016), (Franke et al., 2018), (Mizrahi, 2012b) instead.
Measurement. Our work is also related to studies measuring the NTP ecosystem
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Figure 5·3: Timestamps induced by the server response packet (mode 4).
T1: Origin timestamp. Client’s local time when sending query.
T2: Receive timestamp. Server’s local time when receiving query.
T3: Transmit timestamp. Server’s local time when sending response.
T4: Destination timestamp. Client’s local time when receiving response.
(in past decades) (Minar, 1999), (Murta et al., 2006), the use of NTP for DDoS ampli-
fication attacks (Czyz et al., 2014a), the performance of NIST’s timeservers (Sherman
and Levine, 2016), and network latency (Durairajan et al., 2015). Our attack surface
measurements are in the same spirit as those in (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra
and Goldberg, 2016), but we use a new set of NTP control queries. We also pro-
vide updated measurements on the presence of cryptographically-authenticated NTP
associations.
5.2 NTP Background
NTP’s default mode of operation is a hierarchical client/server mode. In this mode,
timing queries are solicited by clients from a set of servers; this set of servers is typ-
ically static and configured manually. Stratum i systems act as servers that provide
time to stratum i + 1 systems, for i = 1, ...15. Stratum 1 servers are at the root
of the NTP hierarchy. Stratum 0 and stratum 16 indicate failure to synchronize.
Client/server packets are not authenticated by default, but a Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC) can optionally be appended to the packet. NTP operates in several
additional modes. In broadcast mode, a set of clients listen to a server that broad-
casts timing information. In symmetric mode, peers exchange timing information
(Appendix B). There is also an interleaved mode for more accurate timestamping
(Appendix A.2).
NTP’s client/server protocol consists of a periodic two-message exchange. The
client sends the server a query (mode 3 ), and the server sends back a response (mode
4 ). Each exchange provides a timing sample, which uses the four timestamps in
Figure 5·3. All four timestamps are 64 bits long, where the first 32 bits are seconds
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elapsed since January 1, 1970, and the last 32 bits are fractional seconds. T1, T2, and
T3 are fields in the server response packet (mode 4) shown in Figure 5·4. The delay
δ is an important NTP parameter (Mills et al., 2010) that measures the round trip
time between the client and the server:
δ = (T4 − T1)− (T3 − T2) (5.1)
If there are symmetric delays on the forward and reverse network paths, then the
difference between the server and client clock is T2− (T1 + δ2) for the client query, and
T3 − (T4 − δ2) for the server response. Averaging, we get offset θ:
θ = 1
2
((T2 − T1) + (T3 − T4)) (5.2)
A client does not immediately update its clock with the offset θ upon receipt of
a server response packet. Instead, the client collects several timing samples from
each server by completing exchanges at infrequent polling intervals (on the order of
seconds or minutes). The length of the polling interval is determined by an adaptive
randomized poll process (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 13). The poll p is a field on the
NTP packet, where (Mills et al., 2010) allows p ∈ {4, 5, .., 17}, which corresponds to
a polling interval of about 2p (i.e., 16 seconds to 36 hours).
Once the client has enough timing samples from a server, it computes the jitter
ψ. First, it finds the offset value θ∗ corresponding to the sample of lowest delay δ∗
from the eight most recent samples, and then takes jitter ψ as
ψ2 = 1
k−1
k∑
i=1
(θi − θ∗)2 (5.3)
Typically, 4 ≤ k ≤ 8. A client considers updating its clock only if it gets a stream of
k timing samples with low delay δ and jitter ψ. This is called TEST11.2
2A single server response packet is sufficient to set time on a SNTP (“simple NTP”) client, but
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Figure 5·4: NTP server response packet (mode 4). (Client queries have the same
format, but with mode field set to 3. Symmetric mode uses mode 1 or 2. Broadcast
mode uses mode 5).
TEST11: Check that the root distance Λ does not exceed MAXDIST = 1.5 seconds.
Λ is proportional 3to:
Λ ∝ ψ + (δ∗ + ∆)/2 + E + 2ρ (5.4)
The root delay ∆, root dispersion E and precision ρ are from fields in the server’s
mode 4 response packet (Figure 2·1). Precision ρ is the quality of the system’s local
clock; ρ = 12 implies 2−12 = 244µs precision.
After each exchange, the client chooses a single server to which it synchronizes its
local clock. This decision is made adaptively by a set of selection, cluster, combine
and clock discipline algorithms (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 10-12). Importantly, these
algorithms can also decide not to update the client’s clock; in this case, the clock
a stream of self-consistent packets is required for full NTP.
3The exact definition of Λ differs slightly between RFC5905 (Mills et al., 2010, Appendix A.5.5.2)
and the latest version of ntpd.
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runs without input from NTP.
Implementation vs. Specification. RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010) specifies NTP
version 4, and its “reference implementation” is ntpd (Stenn, 2015d). David Mills,
the inventor of NTP, explains (Mills, 2011) the “relationship between the published
standard and the reference implementation” as follows: “It is tempting to construct a
standard from first principles, submit it for formal verification, then tell somebody to
build it. Of the four generations of NTP, it did not work that way. Both the standard
and the reference implementation were evolved from an earlier version... Along the
way, many minor tweaks were needed in both the specification and implementation...”
For this reason, we consider both ntpd and the specification in RFC 5905.
5.3 The Client/Server Protocol in RFC 5905
We now argue that the client/server datagram protocol in RFC 5905 is underspecified
and flawed. RFC 5905 mentions the protocol in two places: in its main body (Section
8) and in a pseudo-code listing Appendix A. Because the two mentions are somewhat
contradictory, we begin with an overview of the components of NTP’s datagram
protocol, and then present its specification in Appendix A (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 8),
and in the prose of (Mills et al., 2010, Sec. 8).
5.3.1 Components of NTP’s datagram protocol.
NTP uses the origin timestamp field of the NTP packet to prevent off- and on-path
attacks. (Recall from Figure 5·2 that an off-path attacker can spoof IP packets but
cannot eavesdrop on its target’s NTP traffic, while an on-path attacker can eavesdrop,
inject, spoof, and replay packets, but cannot drop, delay, or tamper with legitimate
traffic.) Whenever a client queries its server, the client records the query’s sending
time T1 in a local state variable (Mills et al., 2010) named “xmt”. The client then
sends T1 in the transmit timestamp of its client query (Figures 5·3 and 5·4). Upon
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1 receive()
2 if (pkt.T3 == 0 or # fail test3
3 pkt.T3 == org): # fail test1
4 return
5
6 synch = True
7 if !broadcast:
8 if pkt.T1 == 0: # fail test3
9 synch = False
10 elif pkt.T1 != xmt: # fail test2
11 synch = False
12
13 org = pkt.T3
14 rec = pkt.time_received
15 if (synch):
16 process(pkt)
Figure 5·5: Pseudocode for the receive function, RFC 5905 Appendix A.5.1.
receipt of the query, the server learns T1 and copies it into the origin timestamp field
of its server response (Figure 5·4). When the client receives the server response, it
performs TEST2:
TEST2: The client checks that the origin timestamp T1 on the server response matches
the client’s time upon sending the query, as recorded in the client’s local state variable
xmt.
The origin timestamp is therefore a nonce that the client must check (with TEST2)
before it accepts a response.4 An off-path attacker cannot see the origin timestamp
(because it cannot observe the exchange between client and server), and thus has
difficulty spoofing a server response containing a valid origin timestamp. Indeed, the
origin timestamp looks somewhat random to the off-path attacker. Specifically, its
first 32 bits are seconds, and the last 32 bits are subseconds (or fractional seconds).
The first 32 bits appear slightly random because the off-path attacker does not know
4Note that ntpd does not randomize the UDP source port to create an additional nonce; instead,
all NTP packets have UDP source port 123.
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the exact moment that the client sent its query; indeed, Appendix A of RFC 5905 has
a comment that says “While not shown here, the reference implementation randomizes
the poll interval by a small factor” and the current ntpd implementation randomizes
the polling interval by 2p−4 seconds when poll p > 4. Moreover, the last 32 bits
also appear somewhat random because RFC 5905 requires a client with a clock of
precision ρ randomize the (32− ρ)- lowest-order bits of the origin timestamp.
The origin timestamp thus is analogous to source port randomization in TCP/UDP,
sequence number randomization in TCP, etc. When NTP packets are cryptograph-
ically authenticated with a MAC, this nonce also provides some replay protection:
even an on-path attacker cannot replay a packet from an earlier polling interval be-
cause its origin timestamp is now stale.
NTP also has mechanisms to prevent replays within the same polling interval.
These are needed because an NTP client continuously listens to network traffic, even
when it has no outstanding (i.e., unanswered) queries to its servers. Whenever a client
receives a server response packet, it records the transmit timestamp field from the
packet in its org state variable. The client uses the following test to reject duplicate
server response packets:
TEST1: The client checks that the transmit timestamp field T3 of the server response
is different from the value in the client’s org state variable.
The client deals with the duplicates of the client’s query as follows:
Clear xmt: If a server response passes TEST2, the client sets its local xmt state
variable to zero.
Suppose the server receives two identical client queries. The server would send re-
sponses to both (because NTP servers are stateless (Mills et al., 2010)). If the client
cleared xmt upon receipt of the first server response, the second server response packet
will be rejected (by TEST2) because its origin timestamp is non-zero. At this point,
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one might worry that an off-path attacker could inject a packet with origin timestamp
set to zero. But, TEST3 should catch this:
TEST3: Reject any response packet with origin, receive, or transmit timestamp
T1, T2, T3 set to zero.
5.3.2 Query replay vulnerability in Appendix A of RFC 5905.
Pseudocode from Appendix A of RFC 5905 (see Figure 5·5) handles the processing
of received packets of any mode, including server mode packets (mode 4), broadcast
mode packets (mode 5), and symmetric mode packets (mode 1 or 2). Importantly,
this pseudocode requires a host to always listen to and process incoming packets.
This is because some NTP modes (e.g., broadcast) process unsolicited packets, and
RFC 5905 suggest that all modes use the same codepath. We shall see that this single
codepath creates various security problems.
On-path query replay vulnerability. The pseudocode in Figure 5·5 is vulnerable
to replays of the client’s query. Suppose a client query is replayed to the server. Then,
the server will send two responses, each with a valid origin timestamp field (passing
TEST2) and each with a different transmit timestamp field (passing TEST1). The client
will accept both responses. Our experiments show that replays of the client query
harm time synchronization; see Appendix C.
5.3.3 Zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability in RFC 5905 prose.
Meanwhile, we find the following in Section 8 of RFC 5905:
Before the xmt and org state variables are updated, two sanity checks are
performed in order to protect against duplicate, bogus, or replayed packets. In
the exchange above, a packet is duplicate or replay if the transmit timestamp t3
in the packet matches the org state variable T3. A packet is bogus if the origin
timestamp t1 in the packet does not match the xmt state variable T1. In either
of these cases, the state variables are updated, then the packet is discarded. To
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protect against replay of the last transmitted packet, the xmt state variable is
set to zero immediately after a successful bogus check.
This text describes TEST1 and TEST2, but what does it mean to update the state
variables? Comparing this to the pseudocode in Appendix A of RFC 5905 (Figure 5·5
lines 13-14) suggests that this means updating org and rec upon receipt of any packet
(including a bogus one failing TEST2), but not the xmt state variable.5 Next, notice
that the quoted text does not mention TEST3, which rejects packets with a zero-0rigin
timestamp. Thus, we could realize the quoted text as pseudocode by deleting lines
8-9 of Figure 5·5. Finally, notice that the quote suggests clearing xmt if a received
packet passes TEST2. Thus, we could add the following after line 11 of Figure 5·5
(with lines 8-9 deleted):
else: xmt = 0
However, if xmt is cleared but TEST3 is not applied, we have:
Zero-0rigin Timestamp Attack. The zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability allows an
off-path attacker to hijack an unauthenticated client/server association and shift time
on the client.
The attacker sends its target client a spoofed server response packet, spoofed with
the source IP address of the target’s server.6 The spoofed server response packet has
its origin timestamp T1 set to zero, and its other timestamps T2, T3 set to bogus values
5Indeed, suppose we did update the xmt variable even after receipt of a bogus packet that fails
TEST2, with the bogus origin timestamp in the received packet. In this case, we would be vulnerable
to a chosen-origin-timestamp attack, where an attacker injects a first packet with an origin timestamp
of the their choosing. The injected packet fails TEST2 and is dropped, but its origin timestamp gets
written to the target’s local xmt variable. Then, the attacker injects another packet with this same
origin timestamp, which passes TEST2 and is accepted by the target.
6As observed by (Malhotra et al., 2016), hosts respond to unauthenticated mode 3 queries from
arbitrary IP addresses by default. The mode 4 response (Figure 5·4) has a reference ID field that
reveals the IPv4 address of the responding host’s time server. Thus, our off-path attacker sends its
target a (legitimate) mode 3 query, and receives in response a mode 4 packet, and learns the target’s
server from its reference ID. Moreover, if the attacker’s shenanigans cause the target to synchronize
to a different server, the attacker can just learn the IP of the new server by sending the target a
new mode 3 query. The attacker can then spoof packets from the new server as well.
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designed to convince the client to shift its time. The target will accept the spoofed
packet as long is it does not have an outstanding query to its server. Why? If a client
has already received a valid server response, the valid response would have cleared
the client’s xmt variable to zero. The spoofed zero-0rigin packet is then subjected to
TEST2, and its origin timestamp (which is set to zero) will be compared to the xmt
variable (which is also zero). TEST3 is never applied, and so the spoofed zero-0rigin
packet will be accepted.
Suppose that the attacker wants to convince the client to change its clock by x
years. How should the attacker set the timestamps on its spoofed packet? The origin
timestamp is set to T1 = 0 and the transmit timestamp T3 is set to the bogus time
now + x. The destination timestamp T4 (not in the packet) is now + d, where d
is the latency between the moment when the attacker sent its spoofed packet and
the moment the client received it. Now, the attacker needs to choose the receive
timestamp T2 so that the delay δ is small. (Otherwise, the spoofed packet will be
rejected because it fails TEST11 (Section 5.2).) Per equation (5.1), if the attacker
wants delay δ = d, then T2 should be:
T2 = δ + T3 − (T4 − T1) = d+ now + x− (now + d+ 0) = x
The offset is therefore θ = x− d
2
. If the attacker sends the client a stream of spoofed
packets with timestamps set as described above, their jitter φ is given by the small
variance in d (since x is a constant value). Thus, if the attacker sets root delay ∆, root
dispersion E and precision ρ on its spoofed packets to be tiny values, the packet will
pass TEST11 and be accepted. This vulnerability is actually present in the current
version of ntpd. We discuss how we executed it (CVE-2015-8138) against ntpd in
Appendix A.1.
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5.4 Leaky Control Queries
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that the timestamps stored in a target’s state
variables are difficult for an attacker to obtain from off-path. However, we now show
how they can be learned from off-path via NTP control queries. Interestingly, the
control queries we use are not mentioned at all in the latest NTP specification in
RFC5905 (Mills et al., 2010). However, they are specified in detail in Appendix B of
the obsolete RFC1305 (Mills, 1992) from 1992, and are also specified in a new IETF
Internet draft (Mills and Haberman, 2016). They have been part of ntpd since at
least 1999.7 NTP’s UDP-based control queries are notorious as a vector for DDoS
amplification attacks (Czyz et al., 2014a), (Kra¨mer et al., 2015). These DoS attacks
exploit the length of the UDP packets sent in response to NTP’s mode 7 monlist
control query, and sometimes also NTP’s mode 6 rv control query. Here, however,
we will exploit their contents.
The leaky control queries. We found control queries that reveal the values stored
in the xmt (which stores T1 per Figure 5·3) and rec (which stores T4) state variables.
First, launch the as control query to learn the association ID that a target uses for
its server(s). (Association ID is a randomly assigned number that the client uses
internally to identify each server (Mills, 1992).) Then, the query rv assocID org
reveals the value stored in xmt (i.e., expected origin timestamp T1 for that server).
Moreover, rv assocID rec reveals the value in rec (i.e., the destination timestamp
T4 for the target’s last exchange with its server).
Off-path timeshifting via leaky origin timestamp. If an attacker could continuously
query its target for its expected origin timestamp (i.e., the xmt state variable), then
all bets are off. The off-path attacker could spoof bogus packets that pass TEST2 and
shift time on the target. This is CVE-2015-8139.
7https://github.com/ntpsec/ntpsec/blob/PRE_NT_991015/ntpq/ntpq.c
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Off-path timeshifting attack via interleaved pivot. NTP’s interleaved mode is designed
to provide more accurate time synchronization. Other NTP modes use the 3-bit mode
field in the NTP packet (Figure 5·4) to identify themselves (e.g., client queries use
mode 3 and server responses use mode 4). The interleaved mode, however, does
not. Instead, a host will automatically enter interleaved mode if it receives a packet
that passes Interleaved TEST2. Interleaved TEST2 checks that the packet’s origin
timestamp field T1 matches rec state variable, which stores T4 from the previous
exchange. Importantly, there is no codepath that allows the host to exit interleaved
mode. Appendix A.2 shows that this leads to an extremely low-rate DoS attack that
works even in the absence of leaky control queries. This is CVE-2016-1548.
Now consider an off-path attacker that uses NTP control queries to continuously
query for rec. This attacker can shift time on the client by using its knowledge of
rec to (1) spoof a single packet passing ‘interleaved TEST2’ that pivots the client into
interleaved mode, and then (2) spoof a stream of self-consistent packets that pass
‘interleaved TEST2’ and contain bogus timing information. We have confirmed that
this attack works on ntpd v4.2.8p6.
Recommendation: Block control queries! By default, ntpd allows the client
to answer control queries sent by any IP in the Internet. However, in response to
monlist-based NTP DDoS amplification attacks, best practices recommend config-
uring ntpd with the noquery parameter (Stenn, 2015d). While noquery should block
all control queries, we suspect that monlist packets are filtered by middleboxes,
rather than by the noquery option, and thus many “patched” systems remain vul-
nerable to our attacks. Indeed, the openNTPproject’s IPv4 scan during the week of
July 23, 2016 found 705,183 unique IPs responding to monlist. Meanwhile, during
the same week we found a staggering 3,964,718 IPs responding to the as query.8 The
control queries we exploit likely remain out of firewall blacklists because (1) they are
8To avoid being blacklisted, we refrained from sending monlist queries.
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rv ‘associd’
rv ‘associd’ org
rv ‘associd’ rec
rv
mode 3 NTPv4 query
undocumented in RFC5905 and (2) are thus far unexploited. As such, we suggest
that either (1) noquery be used, or (2) firewalls block all mode 6 and mode 7 NTP
packets from unwanted IPs.
5.5 Measuring the Attack Surface
We use network measurements to determine the number of IPs in the wild that are
vulnerable to our off-path attacks. We start with zmap (Durumeric et al., 2013) to
scan the entire IPv4 address space (from July 27 - July 29, 2016) using NTP’s as
control query and obtain responses from 3,964,718 unique IPs. The scan was broken
up into 254 shards, each completing in 2-3 minutes and containing 14,575,000 IPs.
At the completion of each shard, we run a script that sends each responding IP the
sequence of queries shown below.
These queries check for leaky origin and destination timestamps, per Section 5.4, and
also solicit a regular NTP server response packet (mode 4). Our scan did not modify
the internal state of any of the queried systems. We solicit server responses packets
using RFC 5905-compliant NTP client queries (mode 3), and RFC 1305-compliant
mode 6 control packets identical to those produced by the standard NTP control query
program ntpq. We obtained a response to at least one of the control queries from
3,822,681 (96.4%) of the IPs responding to our as scan of IPv4 address space. We
obtained server response packets (mode 4) from 3,274,501 (82.6%) of the responding
IPs. Once the entire scan completed on July 29, 2016, we identified all the stratum 1
servers (from the rv and mode 4 response packets), and send each the NTP control
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Table 5.1: Hosts leaking origin timestamp.
Total unauthenticated Stratum 2-15 good timekeepers
3,759,832 3,681,790 2,974,574 2,484,775
query peers using ntpq; we obtained responses from 3,586 (76.6%) IPs out of a total
of 4,683 IPs queried. (We do this to check if any stratum 1 servers have symmetric
peering associations, since those that do could be vulnerable to our attacks.)
5.5.1 State of crypto.
The general wisdom suggests that NTP client/server communications are typically not
cryptographically authenticated; this follows because (1) NTP uses pre-shared sym-
metric keys for its MAC, which makes key distribution cumbersome (NIST, 2010),
and (2) NTP’s Autokey (Haberman and Mills, 2010) protocol for public-key authen-
tication is widely considered to be broken (Ro¨ttger, 2012). We can use our scan to
validate the general wisdom, since as also reveals a host’s ‘authentication status’ with
each of its servers or peers. Of 3,964,718 IPs that responded to the as command, we
find merely 78,828 (2.0%) IPs that have all associations authenticated. Meanwhile,
3,870,933 (97.6%) IPs have all their associations unauthenticated. We find 93,785
(2.4%) IPs have at least one association authenticated. For these hosts, off-path at-
tacks are more difficult but not infeasible (especially if most of the client’s associations
are unauthenticated, or if the authenticated associations provide bad time, etc.).
5.5.2 Leaky origin timestamps.
Of 3,964,718 IPs responding to the as query, a staggering 3,759,832 (94.8%) IPs leaked
their origin timestamp. (This is a significantly larger number than the 705,183 IPs
that responded to a monlist scan of the IPv4 space by the openNTPproject during
the same week, suggesting that many systems that have been ‘patched’ against NTP
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DDoS amplification (Czyz et al., 2014a), (Kra¨mer et al., 2015) remain vulnerable to
our leaky-origin timestamp attack.)
But how many of these leaky hosts are vulnerable to off-path timeshifting attacks
described in Section 5.4? Our results are summarized in Table 5.1. First, we find that
only 78,042 (2.1%) of the IPs that leak org to us have authenticated all associations
with their servers, leaving them out of the attackable pool. Next, we note that
stratum 1 hosts are not usually vulnerable to this attack, since they sit a the root
of the NTP hierarchy (see Section 5.2) and thus don’t take time from any server.
The only exception to this is the stratum 1 servers that have symmetric peering
associations. Combining data from rv and mode 3 responses, we find the stratum
of the remaining 3,681,790 (97.9%) leaky IPs. We combine this information with
the output of the peers command, which reveals the ‘type of association’ each host
uses with its servers and peers. Of the 4,608 (0.1%) stratum 1 servers, none have
symmetric peering associations. Thus, we do not find any vulnerable stratum 1
servers.
On the other hand, there are 2,974,574 (80.8%) stratum 2-15 IPs that leak their
origin timestamp and synchronize to at least one unauthenticated server. These are
all vulnerable to our attack. We do not count 601,043 (16.3%) IPs that have either
(1) stratum 0 or 16 (unsynchronized), OR (2) conflicting stratums in rv and server
responses (mode 4). Finally, we check if these 3M vulnerable IPs are ‘functional’ or
are just misconfigured or broken systems by using data from our mode 3 query scan
to determine the quality of their timekeeping. We found that 2,484,775 (83.5%) of
these leaky IPs are good timekeepers—their absolute offset values were less than 0.1
sec.9 Of these, we find 490,032 (19.7%) IPs with stratum 2. These are good targets
for attack, so that the impact of the attack trickles down the NTP stratum hierarchy.
9We compute the offset θ using equation (6.2), with T1, T2, T3 from the packet timestamps and
T4 from the frame arrival time of the mode 4 response packet .
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Table 5.2: Hosts leaking zero-0rigin timestamp.
Total unauthenticated Stratum 2-15 good timekeepers
1,269,265 1,249,212 892,672 691,902
Table 5.3: Hosts leaking rec and zero-0rigin timestamps. (Underes-
timates hosts vulnerable to the interleaved pivot timeshifting attack.)
Total unauthenticated Stratum 2-15 good timekeepers
1,267,628 1,247,656 893,979 691,393
5.5.3 Zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability.
The zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability was introduced seven years ago in ntpd v4.2.6
(Dec 2009), when a line was added to clear xmt after a packet passes TEST2.10(This is
Line 18 in Figure A·1.) Thus, one way to bound the attack surface for the zero-0rigin
timestamp vulnerability is to use control queries as measurement side-channel. We
consider all our origin-timestamp leaking hosts, and find the ones that leak a times-
tamp of zero. Of 3,759,832 (94.8%) origin-timestamp leaking IPs, we find 1,269,265
(33.8%) IPs that leaked a zero-0rigin timestamp. We scrutinize these hosts in Ta-
ble 5.2 and find ≈ 700K interesting targets. Importantly, however, that this is likely
an underestimate of the attack surface, since the zero-0rigin vulnerability does not
require the exploitation of leaky control queries.
5.5.4 Interleaved pivot vulnerability.
The interleaved pivot DoS vulnerability (Appendix A.2)was introduced in the same
version as the zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability. Thus, the IPs described in Sec-
tion 5.5.3 are also vulnerable to this attack.
10See Line 1094 in ntp proto.c in https://github.com/ntp-project/ntp/commit/fb8fa5f
6330a7583ec74fba2dfb7b6bf62bdd246.
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Next, we check which IPs are vulnerable to the interleaved pivot timeshifting
attacks (Section 5.4). These hosts must (1) leak the rec state variable and (2) use
a version of ntpd later than 4.2.6. Leaks of rec are also surprisingly prevalent:
3,724,465 IPs leaked rec (93.9% of the 4M that responded to as). These could be
vulnerable if they are using ntpd versions post v4.2.6. We cannot identify the versions
of all of these hosts, but we do know that hosts that also leak zero as their expected
origin timestamp are using versions post v4.2.6. We find 1,267,265 (34%) such IPs
and scrutinize them in Table 5.3.
5.6 Securing the Client/Server Protocol.
We now move beyond identifying attacks and prove security for modified client/server
datagram protocols for NTP.
5.6.1 Protocol descriptions.
Our protocol. Figure 5·6,5·7 present our new client/server protocol that provides
32-bits of randomization for the origin timestamp used in TEST2.
Clients use the algorithm in Figure 5·6 to process received packets. While the
client continues to listen to server response packets (mode 4) even when it does not
have an outstanding query, this receive algorithm has several features that differ from
RFC 5905 (Figure 5·5).First, when a packet passes TEST2, we clear xmt by setting it
to a random 64-bit value, rather than to zero. We also require that, upon reboot,
the client initializes its xmt values for each server to a random 64-bit value. Second,
TEST2 alone provides replay protection and we eliminate TEST1 and TEST3. (TEST3 is
not needed because of how xmt is cleared. Eliminating TEST3 is also consistent with
the implementation in ntpd versions after v4.2.6.)
Clients use the algorithm in Figure 5·7 to send packets. Recall that the first 32
bits of the origin timestamp are seconds, and the last 32 bits are subseconds. First, a
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def client_receive_mode4( pkt ):
server = find_server(pkt.srcIP)
if (server.auth == True and
pkt.MAC is invalid):
return # bad MAC
if pkt.T1 != server.xmt:
return # fail test2
server.xmt = randbits(64) # clear xmt
server.org = pkt.T3 # update state variables
server.rec = pkt.receive_time()
process(pkt)
return
Figure 5·6: Pseudocode for pro-
cessing a response. We also require
that the xmt variable be initialized as
a randomly-chosen 64-bit value, i.e.,
server.xmt = randbits(64), when
ntpd first boots.
def client_transmit_mode3_e32( precision ):
r = randbits(precision)
sleep for r*(2**(- precision)) seconds
# fuzz LSB of xmt
fuzz = randbits(32 - precision)
server.xmt = now ^ fuzz
# form the packet
pkt.T1 = server.org
pkt.T2 = server.rec
pkt.T3 = server.xmt
... # fill in other fields
if server.auth == True:
MAC(pkt) #append MAC
send(pkt)
return
Figure 5·7: This function is run when
the polling algorithm signals that it is
time to query server. If server.auth
is set, then pkt is authenticated with
a MAC.
client with a clock of precision ρ put a (32−ρ)-bit random value in the (32−ρ) lowest
order bits. Next, the client obtains the remaining ρ bits of entropy by randomizing
the packet’s sending time. When the polling algorithm indicates that a query should
be sent, the client sleeps for a random subsecond period in [0, 2−ρ] seconds, and then
constructs the mode 3 query packet. We therefore obtain 32 bits of entropy in the
expected origin timestamp, while still preserving the semantics of NTP packets—the
mode 4 packet’s origin timestamp field (Figure 5·4) still contains T1 (where T1 is as
defined in Figure 5·3).
Notice that this protocol only modifies the client, and is fully backwards-compatible
with today’s stateless NTP servers:
Stateless server algorithm. Today’s NTP servers are stateless, and so do not keep
org or xmt state variables for their clients. Instead, upon receipt of client’s mode 3
query, a server immediately sends a mode 4 response packet with (1) origin timestamp
field equal to the transmit timestamp field on the query, (2) receive timestamp field
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def client_transmit_mode3_e64( precision ):
# store the origin timestamp locally
server.localxmt = now
# form the packet
server.xmt = randbits(64) #64-bit nonce
pkt.T1 = server.org
pkt.T2 = server.rec
pkt.T3 = server.xmt
... # fill in other fields
if server.auth == True:
MAC(pkt) #append MAC
send(pkt)
return
Figure 5·8: Alternate client/server protocol used by chronyd/openNTPd, that ran-
domizes all 64-bits of the origin timestamp. This function is run when the polling
algorithm signals that it is time to query server.
set to the time that the server received the query, and (3) transmit timestamp field
to the time the server sent its response.
Chronyd/openNTPd protocol. The chronyd and openNTPd implementations
also use a client/server protocol that differs from the one in RFC5905. This protocol
just sets the expected origin timestamp to be a random 64-bit nonce (see Figure 5·8).
While this provides 64-bits of randomness in the origin timestamp, it breaks the se-
mantics of the NTP packet timestamps, because the server response packet no longer
contains T1 as defined in Figure 5·3. (Instead, the client must additionally retain T1 in
local state variable server.localxmt.) This means that the chrony/openNTPd pro-
tocol cannot be used for NTP’s symmetric mode (mode 1/2), but our protocol (which
preserves timestamp semantics) can be used for symmetric mode. (See footnote 1.)
Security. Both our protocol (Figures 5·6,5·7) and the chronyd/openNTPd protocol
(Figures 5·6,5·8) can be used to protect client/server mode from off-path attacks
(when NTP packets are unauthenticated) and on-path attacks (when NTP packets
are authenticated with a secure message authentication code (MAC)11.) Security holds
11RFC 5905 specifies MD5(key||message) for authenticating NTP packets, but this is not a secure
MAC (Bellare et al., 1996). We are currently in the processes of standardizing a new secure MAC
for NTP (Malhotra and Goldberg, 2019).
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as long as (1) all randomization is done with a cryptographic pseudorandom number
generator (RNG), rather than the weak ntp random() function currently used by
ntpd (NTPrand, 2014), (2) the expected origin timestamp is not leaked via control
queries, and (3) NTP strictly imposes k = 4 or k = 8 as the minimum number of
consistent timing samples required before the client considers updating its clock. The
last requirement is needed because 32-bits of randomness, alone, is not sufficient to
thwart a determined attacker. However, by requiring k consistent timing samples in
a row, the attacker has to correctly guess about 32k random bits (rather than just
32 random bits). Fortunately, because of TEST11 (see Section 5.2), ntpd already
requires k ≥ 4 most of the time.
To obtain these results, we first develop a cryptographic model for security against
off- and on-path NTP attacks (Section 5.6.2). We then use this model prove security
for off-path attacks (Section 5.6.3) and on-path attacks (Section 5.6.4), both for our
protocol, and for the chronyd/openNTPd protocol.
5.6.2 Security Model.
Our model, which is detailed in Appendix F, is inspired by prior cryptographic work
that designs synchronous protocols with guaranteed packet delivery (Katz et al.,
2013a), (Achenbach et al., 2015). However, unlike these earlier models, we consciously
omit modeling the more powerful MiTM who can drop, modify, or delay packets (see
Section 5.1 and Figure 5·2). We assume instead that the network delivers all packets
sent between the ` honest parties P1,...,P`. We also assume that the network does
not validate the source IP in the packets it transits, so that the attacker can spoof
packets. Honest parties experience a delay % before their packets are delivered, but
the attacker can win every race condition.
The network orchestrates execution of several NTP exchanges (akin to the ‘envi-
ronment’ in the universal composability framework (Canetti, 2001)) through the use
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of a transcript that stipulates (1) which parties engage in two-message client/server
exchanges with each other, (2) when they engage in each exchange, and (3) the times
tc and ts on the local clocks of the client and server respectively during each exchange.
We require security over all possible transcripts. This means, as a corollary, that the
attacker can choose the optimal transcript for her to attack, including having control
over the local clocks of all honest parties. An on-path attacker can see every packet
sent between honest parties, while an off-path attacker can only see the packet’s IP
header. (See Figure 5·2.) Clients update their local state which includes (1) the set
of servers they are willing to query, (2) the state variables (e.g., xmtj, orgj, recj) for
each server Pj, and (3) timing samples from their k most recent exchanges with each
server. Then:
Definition 5.6.1 (Soundness (Informal)). NTP is (k, )-sound on transcript ts if for
all resource-bounded attackers A and all parties Pi who do not query A as an NTP
server, Pi has k consecutive timing samples from one of its trusted servers that have
been modified by A with probability . The probability is over the randomness of all
parties.
We parameterize by k because NTP has mechanisms that prevent synchronization
until the host has a stream of consistent timing samples from a server or peer most
likely to represent accurate time. TEST11 enforces this, for example, by requiring
jitter ψ < 1.5 seconds. (See Section 5.2).
But how should we parameterize k? One idea is k = 8, because TEST11 depends
on the jitter ψ which is computed over at most eight consecutive timing samples
(equation 5.3). k = 8 is also consistent with pseudocode in Appendix A.5.2 of RFC
5905; this pseudocode describes the algorithm used for clock updates and includes
the comment “select the best from the latest eight delay/offset samples”. This may
be too optimistic though, because we have observed that ntpd v4.2.6 requires only
k = 4 before it updates its clock upon reboot. ntpd v4.2.8p6 requires only one sample
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Figure 5·9: Success probability of off-path attacker per Theorem 1: (Top) for Fig-
ures 5·6,5·7 and (Bottom) for Figures 5·6,5·8. τ ∈ {56, 1350, 9540} is the number of
polling intervals attacked. We assume one server (s = 1) and latencies of at most
% = 1 second.
upon reboot but this is a bug (CVE-2016-7433); see Appendix D. Thus, we consider
k ∈ {1, 4, 8}.
5.6.3 Security analysis: Unauthenticated NTP & off-path attacks.
We now discuss the security guarantees for the protocols described in Appendix 5.6.
We start by considering off-path attacks. At a high level, our protocol and the
chronyd/openNTPd protocols thwart off-path attackers due to the unpredictability
of the origin timestamp. Preventing off-path attacks is the best we can hope for when
NTP is unauthenticated, since on-path attackers (that can observe the expected origin
timestamp per Figure 5·2) can trivially spoof unauthenticated server responses.
We assume that honest parties can send and receive packets at rate at most R
bits per second (bps). The network imposes latencies of ≤ % for packets sent by any
honest party. The polling interval is 2p, where RFC 5905 constrains p ≤ 17. Let
offA denote the off-path attackers and let ts be any transcript that involves ` honest
parties, τ the maximum number of exchanges involving any single client-server pair,
k is the minimum number of consistent timing samples needed for a clock update
and s the maximum number of trusted servers per client. Also let Adv(RNG) denote
the maximum advantage that any attacker with offA’s resource constraints has of
154
distinguishing a pseudorandom number generator from a random oracle. Then both
protocols satisfy the following:
Theorem 1. Suppose NTP is unauthenticated. Let offA, k, %, p, R, ts, `, s, τ and
Adv(RNG) be as described above. Then the protocol Figures 5·6 5·7 is (k, offA)-sound
on transcript ts with
offA = Adv(RNG) + (k + 1)sτ ·
[
2−32kR%
360
]k
(5.5)
12And the protocol in Figure 5·6 5·8 is (k, offA)-sound on transcript ts with
offA = Adv(RNG) + (k + 1)sτ ·
[
2p−64kR
720
]k
(5.6)
Figure 5·9 plots offA versus the bandwidth R at honest parties for k ∈ {1, 4, 8} and
different values of τ , where τ is the number of polling intervals for which the attacker
launches his attack. We do this both for our protocol in Figure 5·7 (Figure 5·9(top))
and the chronyd/openNTPd protocol in Figure 5·8 (Figure 5·9(bottom)).Since hosts
typically use a minimum poll value pmin = 6, the values τ = (9450, 1350, 56) in
Figure 5·10 correspond to attacking one (week, day, hour) of 2pmin = 64 second polling
intervals. We also assume one server s = 1, overestimate network latencies as % = 1
second, overestimate poll p in equation (5.6) as p = 17. We assume a good RNG so
Adv(RNG) is negligible.
k = 4 is sufficient with 32-bits of randomness. Recall that k is the minimum number
of consistent timing samples needed for a clock update. Figure 5·9(top) indicates that
k = 4 suffices for our protocol (that randomizes the 32-bit sub-second granularity of
12Our soundness definition (Appendix 5.6.2) both allows the off-path attacker to choose the tran-
script (and thus also the clients local time tc when it sends the packet) and to see the IP header
(only) of the sent packet. Thus, for our protocol (that provides 32-bits of randomness), the off-path
attacker essentially knows T1 up to the second (but not sub-second) granularity. This allows us to
claim security even against an off-path attacker that predicts the behavior of a target’s polling algo-
rithm (but not her cryptographic random number generators (RNGs)). Some off-path attackers may
realistically be able to do this. Consider an off-path attacker that sends a target a ‘packet-of-death’
that triggers a reboot of ntpd (e.g., CVE-2016-9311 or CVE-2016-7434). Because the attacker knows
when ntpd rebooted, it may be able to predict the behavior of its polling algorithm.
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the expected origin timestamp). Even if an off-path attacker attacks for a week, his
success probability remains less than 0.1% as long as k = 4 and the target accepts
packets at bandwidth R = 5 Gbps or less. When the attacker attacks for an hour,
the target’s bandwidth must be R ≈ 19 Gbps for a 0.1% success probability. To put
this in context, endhosts typically send < 10 NTP packets per minute, and even the
large stratum 1 timeservers operated by NIST process queries at an average rate of
21 Gbps (Sherman and Levine, 2016). Therefore, it seems unlikely that an attacker
could attack for hours or days without being detected. If more security is needed, we
could take k = 8, which requires a bandwidth of R ≈ 40 Gbps for a one-hour attack
with success probability of 0.1%. Meanwhile, Figure 5·9(top) suggests that 32-bits of
randomness do not suffice to limit off-path attacks when k = 1. This should provide
further motivation for fixing the ntpd v4.2.8p6 bug that allows k = 1 upon reboot
(see Appendix D).
k = 1 is sufficient with 64-bits of randomness. Meanwhile, Figure 5·10 (bottom)
indicates that k = 1 suffices for the chronyd/openNTPd protocol that randomizes all
64 bits of the expected origin timestamp. Even if an off-path attacker attacks for a
week, his success rate remains less than 0.1% as long as the target’s bandwidth is
limited to R = 5 Gbps. Moreover, when k = 4, attacking for a week at 100 Gbps
only yields a success probability of 10−17.
5.6.4 Security analysis: Authenticated NTP & on-path attacks.
Both our protocol (Figure 5·6,5·7) and the chronyd/openNTPd protocol (Figure 5·6,5·8)
thwart on-path attackers when NTP packets are authenticated with a MAC.
We let sending rate R, network latency %, poll p and Adv(RNG) be as before.
Let onA be an on-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript that involves ` honest
parties, a maximum of s trusted servers per client and a maximum of τ exchanges
involving any single client-server pair that replicate any tc value (up to the second) at
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Figure 5·10: Success probability of on-path attacker per Theorem 2: (Top) for
Figures 5·6,5·7; in this case we overestimate the number of legitimate client queries
that have identical 32 high-order bits of origin timestamp as γ = 100. (Bottom) for
Figures 5·6,5·8. τ ∈ {56, 1350, 9540} is the number of polling intervals attacked. We
assume one server (s = 1), latencies of at most % = 1 second, MAC of length 2n =
128 bits and maximum poll value p = 17.
most γ times. Let Adv(EU-CMA) be the maximum probability that an attacker with
onA’s resource constraints can forge a MAC of length 2n under a chosen-message
attack. Then both protocols satisfy the following:
Theorem 2. Suppose NTP is authenticated with a MAC of length 2n. Let onA, k,
%, p, R, ts, `, s, τ , γ, Adv(EU-CMA) and Adv(RNG) be as described above. Then,
both protocols are (k, onA)-sound on transcript ts with
onA ≤ Adv(RNG) + (k + 1)sτ(kQ)k, (5.7)
where
Q = max
{
qE +
R% · Adv(EU-CMA)
360 + n
,
2p−64R%
720 + 2n
}
. (5.8)
where qE = 2
−32γ for the protocol in Figures 5·6 5·7 and qE = 2−64τ for the protocol
in Figures 5·6 5·8.
To argue about security, we assume a good MAC (like CMAC (Malhotra and
Goldberg, 2019)) so that Adv(EU-CMA) ≈ 2−128. We overestimate p = 17 in equa-
tion (5.8) and % = 1 second and plot onA versus R for one server (s = 1) and different
choices of τ in Figure 5·10.
With 32-bits of randomness, k = 4 is sufficient. Suppose the 32-bits sub-second
granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized. When R is small, Fig-
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ure 5·10(top) indicates that the on-path attacker’s success rate is dominated by the
first term inside the maximum in equation (5.8). This corresponds to a successful
replay attack, because the client has sent multiple queries with the same expected
origin timestamp. Meanwhile, when R is large, second term in the maximum in
equation (5.8) dominates. This corresponds to a successful replay attack, because the
client ‘cleared’ xmt to a random 64-bit value that matches an origin timestamp in an
earlier query. Again, the attacker’s success probability is disconcertingly high when
k = 1. 13 On the other hand, excellent security guarantees are obtained for k = 4, so
it is safer to have k ≥ 4.
With 64-bits of randomness, k = 4 is sufficient. Suppose now that the entire 64-
bits of the expected origin timestamp is randomized. Now the second term in the
maximum in equation (5.8) always dominates. This again corresponds to a successful
replay attack, because the client ‘cleared’ xmt to a random 64-bit value that matches
an origin timestamp in an earlier query.
5.7 Summary and Recommendations
We have identified several vulnerabilities in the NTP specifications both in RFC5905 (Mills
et al., 2010) and in its control query specification in (obsoleted) RFC1305 (Mills,
1992), leading to several working off-path attacks on NTP’s most widely used client/server
mode (Section 5.3-5.4). Millions of IPs are vulnerable our these attacks (Section 4.4).
We present denial-of-service attacks on symmetric mode in Appendix B.
Many of our attacks are possible because RFC5905 recommends that same code-
path is used to handle packets from all of NTP’s different modes. Our strongest
attack, the zero-0rigin timestamp attack (CVE-2015-8139), follows because NTP’s
13The poor results for k = 1 and 32-bits of randomization follow because our model allows the 32
high-order bits of the expected origin timestamp to repeat in at most γ different queries. It might
be tempting to dismiss this by assuming γ = 0, but basing security on this is not a good idea. For
example, a system might always boot up thinking that it is January 1, 1970.
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client/server mode shares the same codepath as symmetric mode. (In Section B.3,
we explain why the initialization of symmetric mode requires that hosts accept NTP
packets with origin timestamp set to zero; this leads to the zero-0rigin timestamp
attack on client/server mode, where the attacker convinces a target client to accept
a bogus packet because its origin timestamp is set to zero.) Similarly, the fact that
interleave mode and client/server mode shares the same codepath gives rise to the
interleave pivot attack (CVE-2016-1548). Thus, we recommend that different code-
paths be used for different modes. This is feasible, since a packet’s mode is trivially
determined by its mode field (Figure 5·4). The one exception is interleaved mode,
so we suggest that interleaved mode be assigned a distinguishing value in the NTP
packet.
Our attacks also follow because the NTP specification does not properly respect
TEST2. We therefore propose a new backwards-compatible client/server protocol that
gives TEST2 the respect it deserves (Section 5.6.1). We developed a framework for eval-
uating the security of NTP’s client/server protocol and used it to prove that our pro-
tocol prevents (1) off-path spoofing attacks on unauthenticated NTP and (2) on-path
replay attacks when NTP is cryptographically authenticated with a MAC. We have
proved the similar results for a different client/server protocol used by chronyd and
openNTPD. (See Section 5.6.3,5.6.4.) We recommend that implementations adopt
either protocol.
Our final recommendation is aimed at systems administrators. We suggest that
firewalls and ntpd clients block all incoming NTP control (mode 6,7) and timing
queries (mode 1,2 or 3) from unwanted IPs (Section 5.4), rather than just the notorious
monlist control query exploited in DDoS amplification attacks.
Chapter 6
Universally Composable Treatment of
Network Time
6.1 Introduction
Most existing large-scale networks, and in particular the global Internet, are predom-
inantly asynchronous and do not require the participants to be “synchronized” with
other entities in any way or have a global sense of time. In fact, this non-reliance
on a common notion of time can be seen as one of the reasons for the success of the
TCP/IP design.
However, as it turns out, several important mechanisms that are central to the
usability of networks as a platform for communication and distributed computation
do indeed require parties to have some global, common sense of real-time. Interest-
ingly, the need for a global sense of time does not arise from the desire to provide
synchronous communication, quality of service, or other “sophisticated” networking
primitives. Rather, awareness to real time is often coupled with the safe use of cryp-
tography to thwart attacks against the network.
One prevalent use of real time is in revoking, and limiting the duration of certifi-
cates for public keys. Indeed, verifying the validity of the public key of one’s peer for
communication is a crucial step in setting up authenticated communication, which in
turn is the basis for practically any security-aware interaction on the Internet today.
Setting time limit to the validity of certificates, and furthermore revoking certificates
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when necessary, is a crucial component in making Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) a
valid, usable basis for secure communication. Such ability, in turn, hinges on having
good sense of current real time. Furthermore, not only mainframe servers need to
have such ability – even low end clients need it, in fact arguably even more so than
servers. Indeed, without a good sense of current time, a client cannot verify whether a
certificate is valid, or whether a given certificate revocation list is the up-to-date one.
Other uses of real time to improve security include various forms of timestamping for
contracts and timing transactions in public ledgers.
It may appear that measuring real time is a relatively easy task; indeed, most
computing platforms today, even low-end ones, are equipped with a built-in clock.
Still, synchronizing and adjusting these clocks, and in particular reaching agreement
on time in a large, asynchronous network like the Internet turns out to be non-trivial.
In particular, NTP, the current IETF standard protocol for computers on the Internet
to determine time (Mills et al., 2010), is rather complex. It assumes a hierarchical
system of “time servers,” where lower-stratum servers are assumed to have a more ac-
curate notion of time, and higher-stratum servers determine time by querying several
lower-stratum ones and performing some complex aggregation of the responses. The
protocol has mechanisms for protecting from errors introduced by network delays, but
is built on complete trust in the queried time servers, as well as in the authenticity
of the communication. Indeed, NTP has been demonstrated to be easily subvertible,
resulting in massive loss of security (Malhotra et al., 2016), (Malhotra and Goldberg,
2016), (Malhotra et al., 2017), (Czyz et al., 2014b).
Several variants of NTP such as sntpd (Mills, 2006), ptpd (ptpd, 2015), chronyd (chronyd,
2015), OpenNTPD (openNTPD, 2012), ntimed (ntimed, 2015), and Roughtime (rough-
time, 2015) have been proposed. These protocols offer varying degree of clock ac-
curacy, correctness, precision and security guarantees. They have different packet
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semantics and a different mechanism on how the querying client chooses to update
its local time, if at all, after interacting with one or potentially many time servers.
When coming to assess these proposals, it becomes evident that we don’t currently
have a good measure to test these proposals against. Indeed, while great many analyt-
ical works propose ways to model time (either real, global, or relative) within network
protocols, and even within security protocols, we do not have a way to rigorously cap-
ture the security guarantees from a network time protocol that provably suffice for
security-sensitive applications that require an agreed-upon time measurement— for
instance for guaranteeing the validity of certificates in a way that, in turn, will guar-
antee authenticated and secure communication. (See Section 6.1.4 for a brief account
of related work on the modeling of time.)
6.1.1 Our Contributions
We provide a modular, composable formalism of the security requirements from
network-time protocols — or, more generally from protocols that provide a read-
ing of real time with the assistance of other nodes over an asynchronous network.
Specifically, we propose formal abstractions of secure network time, and show that:
• Our abstractions of network-time suffice for securely incorporating expiration
times in certificates, as well as freshness guarantees for public certificate lists,
in a way that guarantees PKI-based secure communication even in face of an
adversary who tries to subvert the measurement of time and at the same time
corrupts revoked and expired certificates.
• Our abstractions are realizable by simple protocols that mimic the behavior of
authenticated NTP.
We use the Universally Composable (UC) security framework as a basis for our formal-
ism. Indeed, the UC framework provides a general mechanism for specifying security
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properties of cryptographic protocols in a way that facilitates composing protocols
together, and in particular guarantees that composition of secure components re-
sults in overall security of the composed protocol. Furthermore, the UC framework is
geared towards analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols, which facilitates in-
corporating the results in this work with existing analytical results for cryptographic
protocols.
Specifically, we build upon an existing analytical work by Canetti et al. that
asserts, within the UC framework, the security of authentication and key exchange
protocols that are based on global public-key infrastructure (PKI) (Canetti et al.,
2016). We incorporate our analysis of timing consensus achieved via network time
into the UC analysis of a global PKI. The combined analysis extends the security
guarantees provided by (Canetti et al., 2016) to the case of revocable and expirable
certificates.
Our methodology of incorporating network time into existing UC protocols and
functionalities is quite generic. Hence, our work paves the way toward instantiating
time consensus and reaping its security benefits within other UC formalisms in a
seamless fashion.
Technical and Conceptual Challenges. A priori it appears that the UC frame-
work might be unsuitable for representing real time. Indeed, the framework is cen-
tered around modeling completely asynchronous, event-driven systems. Furthermore,
in the UC formalism the basic computational elements (Turing machine instances)
are activated one by one, and the order of execution and activation of components
is under total adversarial control. This is done with good reason, namely in order
to provide security even against adversaries that have full control over the network;
however, this structure appears to be incompatible with the modeling of real time
that advances “at the same rate” within all components of a physically spread-out
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system. (It should be noted that this asynchronous, event-driven formalism that
gives the adversary total control over the scheduling of events is not unique to the
UC framework. Indeed, it is the common methodology for modeling and analyzing
cryptographic protocols in general — for the same reason outlined above.)
Our first contribution is thus to propose a construct that represents global time
even within such a system. The construct is simple: It is a trusted entity (formalized
as a global ideal functionality) that keeps a counter. This counter is incremented
adversarially by the environment, but is guaranteed to never decrease. All entities in
the system have access to this counter (or, rather, some perturbed version of it, as
described below) — which they treat as Time. Indeed, this adversarially incremented
counter does not in any way approximate the passing of real physical time. Still,
we argue that from the point of view of capturing the validity of mechanisms that
use time in order to provide some security guarantees, this simple gadget is good
enough. Said otherwise, any security property that is expressible and asserted within
our formal framework would be preserved even when implemented in a real system
that has access to real physical time.
Another set of challenges has to do with the modeling of the “imperfections” that
one encounters when using the currently available mechanisms for measuring time.
We consider two main methods for measuring time, each with its own imperfections:
One method is measuring one’s own local physical clock. This method provides
fast response and relatively accurate measurement of time elapsed between events
that occur at the same location; however, the response may be arbitrarily “shifted”
relative to actual real time. The second method is asking one (or more) other entities
in the network (“time servers”) for their current time reading. This method can
potentially provide reading of real time, but is susceptible to measurement errors
due to network delays, spoofing attacks, and faulty servers. It may also be slow in
164
Figure 6·1: Overview of our formalism, from the exact, approximate, and relative
time functionalities to ideal certification with limited-time certificates. Double arrows
mean “UC realizes,” and single arrows mean “uses as a subroutine.”
providing a response. Indeed, a good network time protocol is one that combined
these two methods in a “secure way” in order to provide a reliable reading of real
time. Our goal is to capture that property.
6.1.2 Our Formalism in a Nutshell
We provide a brief overview of our formalism. See Figure 6·1 for the relationships
between these primitives.
The GUC framework. Writing a specification within the Global Universal Com-
posability (GUC) framework amounts to writing a program for an ideal functionality
F that captures the expected behavior of the analyzed system pi. Here F captures
both the expected functionality and the expected security properties. Formally, sys-
tem pi is said to GUC-realize F if for any adversary A there exists a simulator S such
that no external environment E can tell whether it is interacting with A and pi or
with S and F . Here E plays the role of a calling protocol that provides inputs to pi
(or F) and obtains the outputs of pi (or F), whereas A controls the communication
between the parties running pi. The communication between S and F captures the
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“security imperfections” that F allows.
The main added feature of the GUC framework beyond the original UC framework
is that it allows incorporating in the model of execution “global functionalities” that
represent trusted services that exist in the system regardless of the analyzed protocol.
That is, the global functionalities exist both in the ideal model for functionality F
and in the model for executing pi. This modeling allows to better capture long-
term services such as public-key infrastructure (as done in (Canetti et al., 2016)), or
network time — as done here.
Exact and Approximate Clocks. Our first basic construct is a global ideal func-
tionality GrefClock that provides an exact clock. Formally, it provides a non-decreasing
counter that the environment can increment at will. In a sense, the clock’s idealistic
time serves as a reference or benchmark to which everyone aspires, even though none
of the parties directly interacts with GrefClock itself.
Instead, parties only interact with GrefClock indirectly through a timer functionality
and a network clock functionality that provide approximate relative and absolute
notions of time, respectively. The timer functionality Ftimer captures a cheap but
low-latency device that can only provide measurements locally without delay, and
the measurements “drift” significantly.
The network clock Gclock provides information more globally, to all parties in the
system; however it may not respond to queries right away (or ever!). This func-
tionality captures the behavior expected from a single client-server execution of the
network time protocol, since the adversary controls the delays of packets transmitted
over the asynchronous network. On the plus side, Gclock guarantees that timing mea-
surements are approximately accurate (up to some bound) at the moment that they
are eventually given.
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Realizing Gclock. We provide two network protocols that realize the network clock
functionality. The first protocol pitimeSync involves a single query-response exchange
between a client C with has access to a local timer (i.e., an instance of Ftimer) and
a server S that has access to her own clock. This protocol allows the client to
“bootstrap” the server’s clock into one of her own, as long as the server is honest
(i.e., uncorrupted).
We also capture a generalization of Gclock whose accuracy depends on multiple
servers in such a way that it is robust to the corruption of a few servers. This gen-
eralization, denoted GmultiClock, allows a client to request time from multiple servers
(each with their own Gclock) and then to select time as a function of all responses ob-
tained before its Ftimer times out (e.g., by picking the median response). By selecting
the time in this way, the client obtains resilience against network corruptions. Even if
many of the sessions are compromised, the client’s timing measurement approximates
the reference time as long as the majority of the servers whose Gclock boxes responded
quickly to a query were uncorrupted, akin to the “sleepy model” of consensus (Pass
and Shi, 2016), (Micali, 2016).
PKI with Expiration and Revocation. The final piece in our formalism is a
time-aware variant of public-key infrastructure and signature verification. The start-
ing point of our formalism is the certified signature verification functionality Gcert of
(Canetti et al., 2016) that utilizes infinite-duration keys. However, since the guaran-
tee provided by Gcert has no time limit, it follows that Gcert cannot be realized in a
system where signature keys get compromised after some time has elapsed.
In this work, we extend Gcert by allowing each signer to provide an expiration time
t∗; furthermore, the signer can update this time in order to emulate revocation. Our
extended functionality guarantees that if the global time at the time of verification
is larger than t∗ plus some “fudge factor” that accounts for the inaccuracies in time
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measurement, then the verification necessarily fails. This “fudge factor” is of crucial
importance: it determines the length of time for which certificate authorities must
respond to CRL or OCSP queries about certificates after they expire.
6.1.3 Additional Discussion
Incorporating Time in Existing UC Modeling, a General Paradigm. Our
method for incorporating the time constraints in Gcert and in the protocol that realizes
it minimal and general: To obtain time-aware certification, we only add a simple, self-
contained time check to the existing code of to Gcert. Additionally, we observe that the
security of timing-agnostic protocols is unaffected by the presence of time-sensitive
protocols.
Putting together these two observations, we obtain a general methodology for
adding time-sensitive protocols and functionalities to the existing UC framework and
its corpus of secure functionalities in a seamless way.
Time is Global. We model time as a global construct. That is, the time-related
functionalities GrefClock, Gclock, and GmultiClock are global: they are accessible by anyone
in the system. In particular, they always exist both in the “ideal” and in the “real”
system. This modeling simplifies the composition of protocols that use these joint
functionalities and provide a closer modeling of reality. We choose to model Ftimer as a
local functionality since it represents a service that is available only locally to a party.
However this functionality too can in principle be modeled as a global functionality.
(Such modeling might indeed be useful for analyzing systems where several protocols
that use time have access to the same local physical clock.)
Implementing Authenticated Communication. Our network time protocols
rely upon authenticity of communication between C and S. When specifying the
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protocols, we assume the existence of an ideal authenticated communication func-
tionality Fauth (Canetti, 2004) as specified in Fig. 6·2, and we use the modularity of
the framework to remain agnostic about Fauth’s underlying implementation.
Functionality Fauth
1. Upon receiving (Send, sid, B,m) from party A, send (Sent, sid, A,B,m) to A.
2. Upon receiving (Send, sid, B′,m′) from the A, do: If A is corrupted then output
(Sent, sid, A,m′) to party B′. Else, output (Sent, sid, A,m) to party B. Halt.
Figure 6·2: The authenticated communication functionality, Fauth. Reproduced
from (Canetti, 2004).
We can instantiate Fauth using a PKI-based authenticated communication, as in,
e.g., (Canetti et al., 2016). But we intend to use time to bolster the PKI! Ergo, we
must avoid circularity in our arguments.
One way to do so is to assume that time servers have certificates that do not expire,
or else where revocation is done out-of-band. Alternatively can instantiate Fauth as
NTP does: have the client and server use an out-of-band key exchange mechanism to
perform symmetric key authentication. Specifically, the maintainer of most stratum
1 NTP servers, NIST, shares keys with its clients over U.S. mail or fax machines
(NIST, 2018). This method completely circumvents the reliance on PKI for realizing
Fauth. Potentially, there are other out-of-band mechanisms for key exchange such as
biometric human identification.
6.1.4 Related Work
The ability for parties to obtain a notion of time is an integral part of distributed
computations (Lamport, 1978). These computations often require that timing mea-
surements satisfy specific properties depending on the nature of the computation.
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The most basic of these is that time be monotonically increasing to allow for a con-
sistent and correct ordering of events in, e.g., a time stamping protocol (Haber and
Stornetta, 1991), (Matsuo and Matsuo, 2005), (Buldas et al., 2005). However, many
protocols such as those of (Goldreich, 2006) and (Kalai et al., 2005) require stronger
guarantees, namely that time is both synchronized between parties and advances in
a relatively uniform and expected pace.
A number of formalisms have been proposed over the years for incorporating time
(both absolute and relative) in the security analysis of protocols. Some of these
formalisms, like ours, are based on the UC framework (Kalai et al., 2005), (Backes
et al., 2014), (Vajda, 2016), (Katz et al., 2013b), (Canetti, 2013). We briefly review
them.
UC Analyses of Time. The modeling of time by (Kalai et al., 2005) is perhaps
the closest to the one in this work. There too, time is modeled as an additional
“counter” that is available to all machines, and is incremented by the adversary on
each machine, individually, subject to some global constraints. However, there it
is assumed that all parties have ideal access to the global time (and furthermore
that communication delays are within known time bounds.) In fact our work can be
viewed as a more detailed and “faithful” modeling of the propagation of time in real-
life networks, in a way justifying the more abstract modeling of (Kalai et al., 2005).
In other words, if one assumes that a majority of the instances of GP,S,Σclock used by the
parties are uncorrupted, (Kalai et al., 2005) can be used as an additional application
for our modeling. Furthermore, the impossibility result in (Kalai et al., 2005) implies
that one cannot realize GP,S,Σclock or GrefClock with appropriate parameters in the plain
model.
(Katz et al., 2013b) and (Canetti, 2013) provide, within the UC framework, ideal
functionalities that give abstractions that mimic synchronous communication among
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participants. However, these works do not provide ways for realizing these abstrac-
tions from existing mechanisms like network time. Furthermore, these abstractions
do not suffice to capture the prevalent use of limited-time certificates.
(Backes et al., 2014) provide an alternative formalism of time based on the UC
framework that differs from the present formalism in a number of crucial ways. First,
(Backes et al., 2014) significantly modifies the existing UC framework, thus making
its formalism incompatible with the body of work in the existing framework. Second,
the (Backes et al., 2014) modeling assumes that machines have specific and fixed
relative speeds and where time passage is directly proportional to the number of
computational steps. In contrast, in our modeling time is not necessarily tied to
other computational aspects of the system. Third, (Backes et al., 2014) analyzes only
standard, time-unaware protocols; the modeling of time is used only to bound the
success of attacks on the protocol. In contrast, we model protocols where time is
crucially used by the protocol itself.
(Vajda, 2016) provides a number of high-level proposals for general modeling of
real-time within the UC framework. However this work does not address network
time protocols or the cryptographic applications treated here.
Security-Aware Network Time Protocols. Several frameworks (Malhotra
et al., 2017), (Dowling et al., 2016), (Mizrahi, 2012b), (Itkin and Wool, 2016) aim to
define and analyze the security requirements of time synchronization protocols. RFC
7384 (Mizrahi, 2012b) provides guidelines for important security features of PTP and
NTP as they relate to possible attacks. (Itkin and Wool, 2016) build on this with new
attack vectors and suggested mitigations for PTP, but they do not provide proofs for
their mitigations nor any accuracy guarantees for the time protocols themselves.
(Dowling et al., 2016) extend NTP to include lightweight authentication for
servers and provide game based proofs for its accuracy relative to the time at the
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server. They do not provide any accuracy guarantees relative to a global notion of
time, and thus they fail to provide the global synchronization that is necessary for
time sensitive crypto such as PKI.
(Malhotra et al., 2017) focus on several security concerns when deploying NTP
in practice, at the expense of full coverage. They study concrete security bounds for
NTP against off/on-path attacks in the standalone model. By contrast, the security
guarantee in our work addresses composable security and additionally covers adver-
saries who have full control over the network and may use it to drop packets sent by
honest parties. Both of these properties are crucial towards our work in Section 6.6
of realizing time-sensitive crypto primitives like the PKI.
6.1.5 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of the Network
Time Protocol. In Section 6.3, we introduce three new ideal functionalities: GrefClock,
GP,S,Σclock , and FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer . Section 6.4 formalizes and proves the security of a protocol
that permits a single server to share its view of time with a single client. Section
6.5 generalizes this basic protocol in two ways for improved resilience: a client takes
timing measurements from multiple servers, and the network topology is dispersed to
reduce resource and network resource congestion. Finally, Section 6.6 integrates our
time consensus protocol with time-sensitive applications such as PKI.
6.2 Preliminaries
This section summarizes (separately!) the universally composable security framework
and the network time protocol.
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6.2.1 Universally Composable Security
We provide a brief overview of the UC framework. See (Canetti, 2013) and (Canetti
et al., 2007) for more details. (This overview is taken almost verbatim from (Canetti
et al., 2016).)
We focus on the notion of protocol emulation, wherein the objective of a protocol
pi is to imitate another protocol φ. In this work, the entities and protocols we con-
sider are polynomial-time bounded Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs), in the sense
detailed in (Canetti, 2013).
Systems of ITMs. To capture the mechanics of computation and communica-
tion among entities, the UC framework employs an extension of the ITM model. A
computer program (such as for a protocol, or perhaps program of the adversary) is
modeled in the form of an ITM. An execution experiment consists of a system of
ITMs which are instantiated and executed, with multiple instances possibly sharing
the same ITM code. A particular executing ITM instance running in the network is
referred to as an ITI. Individual ITIs are parameterized by the program code of the
ITM they instantiate, a party ID (pid) and a session ID (sid). We require that each
ITI can be uniquely identified by the identity pair id = (pid,sid), irrespective of the
code it may be running. All ITIs running with the same code and session ID are said
to be a part of the same protocol session, and the party IDs are used to distinguish
among the various ITIs participating in a particular protocol session.
The Basic UC Framework. At a very high level, the intuition behind security
in the basic UC framework is that any adversary A attacking a protocol pi should
learn no more information than could have been obtained via the use of a simulator
S attacking protocol φ. Furthermore, we would like this guarantee to hold even if
φ were to be used as a subroutine in arbitrary other protocols that may be running
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concurrently in the networked environment and after we substitute pi for φ in all
the instances where it is invoked. This requirement is captured by a challenge to
distinguish between actual attacks on protocol φ and simulated attacks on protocol pi.
In the model, attacks are executed by an environment E that also controls the inputs
and outputs to the parties running the challenge protocol. The environment E is
constrained to execute only a single instance of the challenge protocol. In addition,
the environment E is allowed to interact freely with the attacker (without knowing
whether it is A or S). At the end of the experiment, the environment S is tasked
with distinguishing between adversarial attacks perpetrated by A on the challenge
protocol pi, and attack simulations conducted by S with protocol φ acting as the
challenge protocol instead. If no environment can successfully distinguish these two
possible scenarios, then protocol pi is said to UC-emulate the protocol φ.
Balanced environments. In order to keep the notion of protocol emulation from
being unnecessarily restrictive, we consider only environments where the amount of
resources given to the adversary (namely, the length of the adversary’s input) is at
least some fixed polynomial fraction of the amount of resources given to all protocols
in the system. From now on, we only consider environments that are balanced.
Definition 1 (UC-emulation). Let pi and φ be multi-party protocols. We say that pi
UC-emulates φ if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that for any
(constrained) environment E , we have:
EXECpi,A,E ≈ EXECφ,S,E
Defining protocol execution this way is sufficient to capture the entire range of
network activity that is observable by the challenge protocol but may be under ad-
versarial control.
Furthermore, the UC framework admits a very strong composition theorem, which
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guarantees that arbitrary instances of φ that may be running in the network can be
safely substituted with any protocol pi that UC-emulates it. That is, given protocols
ρ, pi and φ, such that ρ uses subroutine calls to φ, and protocol pi UC-emulates φ, let
ρφ→pi be the protocol which is identical to ρ except that each subroutine call to φ is
replaced by a subroutine call to pi. We then have:
Theorem 3 (UC-Composition). Let ρ,pi and φ be protocols such that ρ makes sub-
routine calls to φ. If pi UC-emulates φ and both pi and φ are subroutine-respecting,
then protocol ρφ→pi UC-emulates protocol ρ.
The Generalized UC Framework. As mentioned above, the environment E in
the basic UC experiment is unable to invoke protocols that share state in any way
with the challenge protocol. In contrast, in many scenarios we would like to be able
to analyze challenge protocols that share information with other network protocol
sessions. For example, protocols may share information via a global setup such as
a public Common Reference String (CRS) or a standard Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). To overcome this limitation and allow analyzing such protocols in a modu-
lar way, (Canetti et al., 2007) propose the Generalized UC (GUC) framework. The
GUC challenge experiment is similar to the basic UC experiment, only with an un-
constrained environment. In particular, now E is allowed to invoke and interact with
arbitrary protocols, and even multiple sessions of the challenge protocol. Some of the
protocol sessions invoked by E may even share state information with challenge pro-
tocol sessions, and indeed, those protocol sessions might provide E with information
related to the challenge protocol instances that it would have been unable to obtain
otherwise. To distinguish this from the basic UC experiment, we denote the output of
an unconstrained environment E , running with an adversary A and a challenge pro-
tocol pi in the GUC protocol execution experiment, by GEXECpi,A,E . GUC emulation
is defined analogously to the definition of basic UC emulation outlined above:
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Definition 2 (GUC-emulation). Let pi and φ be multi-party protocols. We say that
pi GUC-emulates φ if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that for
any (unconstrained) environment E , we have:
GEXECpi,A,E ≈ GEXECφ,S,E .
The UC theorem directly extends to the GUC model.
6.2.2 The Network Time Protocol (NTP)
As the name suggests, NTP permits several computers on a network to share infor-
mation about the time.
In this work, we focus on NTP’s most popular method of operation: a hierarchical
client-server fashion in which a client queries a server who has (ostensibly) higher
fidelity timing information than the client. A client can use multiple invocations
of NTP’s fundamental query-response protocol (either with the same server or with
multiple servers) to gather several timing measurements, which it then uses to set or
update its own notion of time.
Query-Response Protocol. We first describe NTP’s two-round timing exchange
protocol over IPv4. Four timing measurements are relevant during the execution of
this protocol:
T1 Origin timestamp. Client’s system time at the moment that the client sends the
query.
T2 Receive timestamp. Server’s system time at the moment that the server receives
the query.
T3 Transmit timestamp. Server’s system time at the moment that the server sends
the response.
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T4 Destination timestamp. Client’s system time at the moment that the client re-
ceives the response.
The client’s query packet includes measurement T1. The server’s response packet
repeats T1 and appends T2 and T3. The client locally computes T4 upon receipt of
the response packet.
Setting, or Updating, the Client’s Time. The client makes two assumptions
when analyzing the timestamps.
1. Its clock and the server’s clock move in relative synchrony while the NTP session
is live (even if they have different absolute notions of time).
2. The network delay is symmetric. That is, the query packet’s client → server
latency equals the response packet’s server → client latency.
Deviations from these assumptions do lead to small but bounded error in the client’s
eventual measurement of time; we will return to this issue later.
If assumption 1 is accurate, then the round-trip network delay δ during the ex-
change equals:
δ = (T4 − T1)− (T3 − T2) (6.1)
If assumption 2 is accurate, then the absolute gap between the server and client clock
is T2−(T1+ δ2) for the client query, and T3−(T4− δ2) for the server response. Averaging
these two quantities gives us the absolute offset between the client and server clocks:
θ = 1
2
((T2 − T1) + (T3 − T4)) (6.2)
While talking to multiple servers, the client chooses a single server to which it
synchronizes its local clock. This decision is made adaptively by a set of selection,
cluster, combine and clock discipline algorithms. For the purpose of this paper, we
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assume that the client will make an update to its clock if median θ is less than a certain
threshold. Client/server packets are not authenticated by default, but a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) can optionally be appended to the packet (Mills et al.,
2010, Sec. 13). In this work, we restrict our attention to authenticated NTP.
6.3 Modeling Absolute and Relative Time
In this section, we introduce three ideal functionalities that aid a client C or server
S to learn the time. The first two provide exact and approximate absolute notions
of time, whereas the third functionality approximates the relative passage of time.
These functionalities are depicted formally in Figs. 6·4 through 6·5. We stress that
the functionalities only respond to the methods explicitly stated in the figures; when
given a message that cannot be parsed into one of the provided forms, they simply
hand the execution back to the caller without providing any output.
The functionalities themselves are referred to as Gparamatersfunctionality for global function-
alities and as Fparamatersfunctionality for local (i.e., non-global) functionalities. Protocols are
specified in the format piparamatersfunctionality. The protocols and functionalities may use sub-
routines, which we indicate in the text and sometimes denote using square brackets.
6.3.1 The Reference Clock Functionality GrefClock
We begin by introducing a simple global functionality GrefClock that provides a univer-
sal reference clock. When queried, it provides an abstract notion of time represented
as an integer G. It is monotonic, and only the environment may increment it; we
stress that the simulator S cannot forge the reference time.
In this work we use subscripts to denote the relative order in which requests are
made to the reference clock. Hence, if x > y then Gx ≥ Gy.
Figure 6·4 formally codifies GrefClock. It functions similarly to Vadja’s ideal notion
of time (Vajda, 2016), with one crucial exception: we do not intend for any honest
178
Functionality GP,S,Σclock [ GrefClock ]
A clock functionality identified by a session id sidclock = (sid
′
clock, P, S) that denotes
its owner P as well as a (potentially but not necessarily different) party S whose
honesty influences the accuracy of the clock. It is also parameterized by the maximum
allowable shift Σ from the reference time. It operates as follows.
Corrupt: Upon receiving a Corrupt message, record that S is now corrupted.
GetTime: Upon receiving input (GetTime, sidclock) from party P
′, ignore this request
if P ′ 6= P , otherwise:
1. Send (Sleep, sidclock) to the adversary A. Wait for a response of the form
(Wake, sidclock, σ) from A.
2. If σ == ⊥, output (TimeReceived, sidclock,⊥) to P .
3. Else send GetTime to GrefClock to receive G. Next, compute TP = G + σ. Then
do the following:
• If |σ| > Σ and no Corrupt record exists, then reset TP = ⊥.
• Output (TimeReceived, sidclock, TP ) to P .
Figure 6·3: Ideal functionality GP,S,Σclock that provides delayed, approximately accurate
time measurements to its owner P . The functionality doesn’t provide any guarantee
on when a timing measurement will be delivered. It only guarantees that at the
instant the measurement is given, its value is approximately correct.
party to access GrefClock directly. Instead, in this work GrefClock exclusively functions
as a subroutine for the remaining two functionalities.
6.3.2 Delayed Approximate Clock Functionality GP,S,Σclock
In Figure 6·3, we construct the global functionality GP,S,Σclock that provides delayed,
approximate time. This functionality has three major distinctions from GrefClock.
First, the clock communicates with a single party P , who we refer to as its owner,
and the accuracy of the clock can be influenced by (potentially but not necessarily
different) party S. This degree of freedom allows us to use the clock functionality in
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Functionality GrefClock
GrefClock maintains an integer G corresponding to the reference time. When created,
the box initializes G = 0.
IncrementTime: Upon receiving an IncrementTime request from E , update G ←
G+ 1 and send an ok message to E . Ignore IncrementTime requests sent by any other
entity.
GetTime: Upon receiving a GetTime command, return G to the calling entity.
Figure 6·4: Global Ideal functionality representing reference time GrefClock. It is
expected that honest parties do not talk to this functionality directly.
this work as an abstraction of two very different situations: (1) a physical clock that
is actually under the control of its owner, such as an atomic clock owned by a stratum
1 NTP server, and (2) an ideal service akin to that expected from the Network Time
Protocol itself, which permits a client to operate “as if” she owned a clock herself,
modulo the unavoidable imperfections (cf. Theorems 4-5).
Second, the clock is inaccurate, in the sense that its belief about the time T = G+σ
is somewhat shifted away from the reference time. Still, the clock is guaranteed to
approximate the reference time up to some maximum shift value |σ| ≤ Σ.
Third, the clock is not instantaneous. Instead, it only returns a time measurement
after some adversarially-controlled delay δ (which may be infinite). The approximate
correctness guarantee from above holds at the moment that the time is eventually
returned.
GP,S,Σclock is used both as a goal, or benchmark, in the sense that everyone strives to
attain it (with the best parameters possible), and at the same time it is used as a
service for other protocols in order to achieve other tasks (or even another instance
of GP,S,Σclock but with better parameters or another server S).
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6.3.3 Approximate Timer Functionality FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer
In Figure 6·5, we construct the FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer functionality. Like local clocks, a timer
functionality has a single owner C and its measurements only guarantee approximate
correctness. However, FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer differs from the prior two functionalities in three
ways. First, it doesn’t provide an absolute notion of time; instead, it provides the
relative difference in time between a starting and ending point.
Second, the timer has a short lifetime: after a maximum delay ∆C , it will “time
out” and only output ⊥. This limitation ensures that FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer cannot be used as
a substitute for long-term time measurements of the type provided by GrefClock and
GP,S,Σclock .
Third, it is only used locally within a specific instance of a time synchronization
protocol. By contrast, GrefClock and GP,S,Σclock are Global UC functionalities.
6.4 Single Server Time Sync
In this section, we formally specify a simplified version of the way that a client C
uses the Network Time Protocol (NTP) to query a single server S for its belief about
the time. We show that this protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync allows C to operate as if she had
a delayed approximate clock of her own. Formally, we prove that pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync GUC-
realizes a clock GC,S,Σ∗Cclock owned by the client.
As depicted in Fig. 6·7, pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync internally uses the functionalities specified in
Section 6.3. The server has access to its own instance of GS,S,ΣSclock that approximates
the reference time, whereas the client can only measure the relative passage of time
via FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer . Additionally, S and C communicate using Fauth.
We fully specify the protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync in Figure 6·6. The protocol is natural:
C sends a time request to S and uses FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer to measure the time elapsed until
the response arrives. S responds with (roughly) the times at which she receives the
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Functionality FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer [ GrefClock ]
A timer functionality identified by a session id sidtimer = (sid
′
timer, C) that denotes its
owner C. It is also parameterized by the maximum allowable delay ∆C , and the
maximum allowable shift ΣC . It operates as follows.
SetShift: Upon receiving a command (SetShift, sidtimer,M) from E , record M as the
code of a Turing machine (replacing any previously-stored code) and send an (ok,
sidtimer) message to E .
Start: Upon receiving input (Start, sidtimer) from a party P : if P 6= C or if a Start
command was previously received then ignore this request. Otherwise:
1. Send GetTime to GrefClock. Denote its response as G’. Record the tuple
(G′, sidtimer).
2. Send an (ok, sidtimer) message to C.
TimeElapsed: Upon receiving input TimeElapsed from a party P : if no previous
Start command was issued or if P 6= C then ignore this request. Otherwise:
1. Send GetTime to GrefClock. Denote its response as G. Also, retrieve the
previously-recorded G′.
2. Run M(sidtimer,G
′,G) and denote its output as σC . (Also, maintain M ’s state
for future calls.)
3. Compute δ = G − G′ + σC . If δ ≤ ∆C , output (δ, sidtimer) to C. Else output
(⊥, sidtimer) to C.
Figure 6·5: Ideal functionality FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer that returns to its owner C the approx-
imate relative time elapsed between the Start and TimeElapsed commands. While
the environment E may influence the timer’s accuracy, it must do so ‘out of band’:
once C requests TimeElapsed, it learns the answer instantaneously. Additionally, the
adversary doesn’t directly interact with FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer at all.
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Protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync [ Fauth, FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer , GS,S,ΣSclock ]
GetTime: Begins when the caller (e.g., E) sends the input (GetTime, sidts) to
C, where sidts = (sid
′
ts, C, S). Ends when C responds back to the caller with
(TimeReceived, sidts, Tc).
E Client C Fauth Server S A
−→ 1: Record the tuple (sidts, sidtimer)
2: Send Start to FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer , receive (ok,sidtimer)
3: Send (query, sidts) to S −→ 4: Record the tuple (sidts, sidclock)
5: Send (GetTime, sidclock) to GS,S,ΣSclock ←→
6: Get (TimeReceived, sidclock, T2)
7: Append T2 to the record (sidts, sidclock)
8: Send (Sleep, sidts) to A −→
9: Get (Wake, sidts) from A ←−
10: Send (GetTime, sidclock) to GS,S,ΣSclock
again ←→
11: Get (TimeReceived, sidclock, T3)
12: Retrieve (sidts, sidclock, T2)
←− 13: Send (response, sidts, T2, T3) to C
14: Retrieve (sidts, sidtimer), abort if no tuple exists
15: Send TimeElapsed to FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer , receive (δ, sidtimer)
16: If δ == ⊥, then set TC = ⊥
17: Else, set TC = T3 +
1
2
· (δ − T3 + T2)
18: Delete record (sidts, sidtimer)
←− 19: Output (TimeReceived, sidts, TC) to E
Continue: Begins when A sends a Continue message to C, so that C can determine
whether an ongoing session of pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync has timed out. If so, C ends the session.
A Client C
−→ 1: Retrieve (sidts, sidtimer), abort if no tuple exists
2: Send TimeElapsed to FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer , receive (δ, sidtimer) in response
←− 3: If δ == ⊥, then delete record (sidts, sidtimer) and output (TimeReceived, sidts,⊥) to E
←− 4: If δ 6= ⊥, then end activation
Figure 6·6: Time Synchronization Protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync . The two participants C
and S communicate through Fauth, and they have access to FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer and GS,S,ΣSclock ,
respectively. Note that S does not have any inputs or outputs.
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Figure 6·7: Interactions between participants and functionalities during an execu-
tion of the single server time synchronization protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync .
Figure 6·8: Interactions between participants in the ideal world execution of single
server time sync, including the emulation of the real world inside of the simulator.
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client query (T2) and sends the response packet (T3) to allow the client to distinguish
network transmission time from server processing time. The client uses its local timer
to determine how long the server took to respond as well as to calculate the average
network delay in an NTP-like manner; however, the client times out if the server
responds after too long a delay (measured on the client’s local timer).
For simplicity of exposition, we chose to “hardwire” the identity of the server
in the code of both the ideal functionality and the protocol. However this is not
essential: our results continue to hold in an alternative model where the identity of
the server (or servers, in Section 6.5) is given to the client as a part of the input.
The remainder of this section contains a formal theorem and proof about the
accuracy of pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync .
Theorem 4 (Single server UC security). Given any parameters that satisfy Σ∗C ≥
1
2
· ∆C + ΣC + ΣS, it holds that the single server approximate time synchronization
protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync GUC-realizes GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock .
We emphasize that the shift of the client’s purported time depends on the delay
that the client waits for the timing information. Hence, C’s insistence upon a max-
imum delay ∆C isn’t merely a matter of convenience: it affects the accuracy of her
notion of time as well.
Our proof has two components. First, in Section 6.4.1 we design a simulator
S that successfully emulates the execution of any real-world adversary A from the
environment E ’s point of view. Then, in Section 6.4.2 we analyze the time bound
that it achieves.
6.4.1 Designing the Simulator
Fig. 6·8 depicts the high-level interaction between components in the ideal world. As
usual, the simulator S runs an emulated copy of the real world protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync
inside its head while also playing the role of E inside this simulation.
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In more detail, S internally emulates the execution of A, FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer , Fauth and
each of the involved parties. In addition, S externally instantiates the global GS,S,ΣSclock
that’s called by the protocol (unless it already exists). S also relays the messages
sent from the emulated parties to GS,S,ΣSclock and GrefClock, and from GS,S,ΣSclock and GrefClock
to the emulated parties.
While conducting this simulation, S monitors the traffic of its emulated A and E ,
along with any messages that S directly receives from GC,S,Σ∗Cclock . The messages that S
views/receives causes it to make changes in the ideal world or the emulated world.
Simulating GetTime: When GC,S,Σ∗Cclock sends a message of the form (Sleep, sidclock),
then S instantiates C with the environmentally-provided message (GetTime, sidts).
Simulating Continue: When S observes A sending a Continue message to the
emulated C, it waits to see which of the two possible outcomes occur at C. If C
simply ends its activation, then a timeout event has not yet occurred and S does
nothing. If instead C outputs (TimeReceived, sidclock,⊥) then a timeout event has
occurred; in this case, S sends a (Wake, sidclock, σ) message to GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock to cause the
dummy C to produce the same output in the ideal world.
Relaying messages to E: When the emulated A sends a message to the emulated
E , S relays it to the real E . Conversely, S forwards messages sent by the real E to
the emulated A.
Corrupting the server: When A sends a Corrupt message in the emulated world,
then S sends a Corrupt message to GC,S,Σ∗Cclock .
Completing the simulation: When the emulated C sends to E its output
(TimeReceived, sidts, TC), then S knows both when and what to send back to GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock .
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If TC == ⊥, then S simply sends (Wake, sidclock,⊥) to GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock . Otherwise: S send
GetTime to GrefClock to retrieve the current reference time T . Then, S computes the
shift σSim = (TC − T ) and sends (Wake, sidclock, σSim) to GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock .
6.4.2 Analyzing the Accuracy of the Simulator
It is straightforward to verify that the simulator’s Wake responses perfectly emulate
those in the real world: its simulation of Continue ensures that time-out actions occur
identically in the real and ideal worlds, and otherwise its calculation of σSim within
the Wake message agrees with the message sent by A.
Therefore, it only remains to show that the answer S returns can meet the ap-
proximate correctness bound required by GC,S,Σ∗Cclock . If S is corrupted or if C times out
then there is no bound to meet. Ergo, in the rest of this section we assume that S is
uncorrupted and also that δ < ∆C in response to all queries C makes to FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer so
that no timeout occurs.
In the emulated protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync , the output time TC is computed by the client
as TC = T3 +
1
2
(δ − T3 + T2). T2 and T3 are the times returned from the server
and are equal to G2 + σ2 and G3 + σ3 respectively. δ is returned from FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer
to the client and is computed as G4 + σ4 − G1 − σ1. So, for the emulated client,
TC = G3 + σ3 +
1
2
(G4 + σ4 − G1 − σ1 − G3 − σ3 + G2 + σ2).
In the ideal world, the client interacting with GC,S,Σ∗Cclock outputs the time G4 + σSim,
where the simulator provides σSim to account for discrepancy between the emulated
client’s output and the output of the client interacting with the GC,S,Σ∗Cclock . Combining
the two equations yields:
σSim =
G2 − G1 + G3 − G4
2
+
σ2 − σ1 + σ3 + σ4
2
.
The simulator must be able to correct for the maximum possible value of σSim. It
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is straightforward that |σSim| is maximized when the following criteria hold.
1. The server’s clock is maximally shifted: σ3 and σ2 both equal ΣS.
2. The client’s timer shifts to the maximum extent permissible between the Start
and TimeElapsed queries: σ4 = ΣC and σ1 = −ΣC .
3. The network latency is maximally asymmetric: E maximizes (G2−G1 +G3−G4)
by incrementing the reference time a large amount between G1 and G2 and not
at all between G3 and G4, or vice versa.
We desire an upper bound on the network asymmetry described in item 3. For the
client to avoid timing out, it must be the case that the total time elapsed obey the
constraint that
(G4 + σ4)− (G1 + σ1) ≤ ∆C .
It follows that G4 − G1 ≤ ∆C + 2 · ΣC . Also, since the four times are monotonic,
0 ≤ G4−G3 ≤ G4−G1 and 0 ≤ G2−G1 ≤ G4−G1. Therefore: |G2−G1 +G3−G4| ≤
∆C + 2 · ΣC .
Combining the three bounds above yields
|σSim| ≤ ∆C
2
+ ΣC + ΣS.
Hence, it suffices for the Σ∗C for the GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock to be
1
2
∆C + ΣC larger than the shift
in the server-owned clock GS,S,ΣSclock in order for the simulator to be able to simulate
correctly, proving Theorem 4.
6.5 More Robust Network Time
In this section, we provide a more robust method to acquire time over the Internet. It
is better representative of the way NTP operates: each client queries multiple servers
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Protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync [ GC,S1,Σ
∗
C
clock , . . . , GC,Sn,Σ
∗
C
clock and 2n instances of FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer ]
GetTime: Begins when the caller sends to C the input (GetTime, sidmts). In response,
C provisions a timing measurement array Tsidmts of length n with all values initialized
to a special ‘?’ symbol. C also allocates sufficient storage space to record the session
ids of all timers and clocks with which it interacts. Finally, C invokes QueryClock.
QueryClock: Begins when invoked by GetTime or Continue. Invariant: at least one
clock has not been invoked.
1. C identifies a previously-unqueried GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock .
2. C sends a Start command to the ith timer and waits for an ok response.
3. C sends the command (GetTime, sidclocki) to GC,Si,Σ
∗
C
clock .
ResponseReceived: Begins when C receives a response (TimeReceived, sidclocki, Ti)
from a clock GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock :
1. C records Tsidmts [i]← Ti.
2. C sends a TimeElapsed message to the ith timer. If it returns ⊥, then C updates
Tsidmts [i]←⊥.
3. If Tsidmts [i] 6=⊥, then C sends a Start command to the (n+ i)th timer and waits
for an ok response.
4. Invoke the Continue routine.
Continue: Begins when A sends to C the Continue command or when
ResponseReceived ends.
1. If C has not yet queried each GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock , then C begins the QueryClock protocol
as stated above.
2. Else, C begins the CheckTimeout protocol as stated below.
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CheckTimeout: Begins when invoked by Continue. Invariant: each GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock has
already received a GetTime query.
1. For all i: C sends a TimeElapsed message to the ith timer if Tsidmts [i] == ? and
to the (n + i)th timer otherwise. If the timer returns a ⊥ response, then C
updates Tsidmts [i]←⊥.
2. If none of the records in Tsidmts equal ‘?’, then invoke Finalize. Else, end the
current activation.
Finalize: Begins when invoked by CheckTimeout. Note that A never gets control
during Finalize.
1. For all i such that Tsidmts [i] 6=⊥, send a TimeElapsed message to the (n + i)th
timer and wait for a response of the form (δ, sidtimern+i).
• If δ ==⊥, then update Tsidmts [i]←⊥.
• Otherwise, update Tsidmts [i]← Tsidmts [i] + δ.
2. C sets TC to be the median of the non-⊥ values within Tsidmts . If all values equal
⊥, then C sets TC to ⊥.
3. Output (TimeReceived, sidmts, TC) to the caller.
Figure 6·9: Time Synchronization Protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync in between a client C with
access to unused FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer functionalities and a set of n GC,Si,Σ
∗
C
clock functionalities each
parameterized by a server Si from the set {S1, ..., Sn}.
to increase its resilience to compromise, and different clients query different servers
to remove network and resource bottlenecks.
Section 6.5.1 considers the case of a single client accessing multiple servers. Then,
Section 6.5.2 considers the multi-stratum case in which each server in a stratum re-
ceives its notion of time not from a local clock, but instead by acting also as a client
and querying several servers in the stratum below. We use the composition theo-
rem to provide modular and relatively simple analysis of these these rather intricate
interactions.
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Functionality GP,S,ΣmultiClock [ GrefClock ]
This ideal functionality is identified by a session id sidmclock = (sid
′
mclock, P, {S1, ..., Sn})
where sid′mclock = sidclock1 . . . sidclockn that denotes the clock’s owner P as well as a set
of parties S = {S1, ..., Sn} whose honesty influences the accuracy of the clock. It is
also parameterized by the maximum allowable shift Σ from the reference time. It
operates as follows.
Corrupt: Upon receiving a message (Corrupt, S), if S ∈ {S1, . . . , Sn} then record Si
as corrupted.
GetTime: Upon receiving input (GetTime, sidmclock) from party P
′, ignore this re-
quest if P ′ 6= P , otherwise:
1. Send (Sleep, sidmclock) to the adversary. Wait for a response from the adversary,
of the form (Wake, sidmclock, σ, L) where L is the list of servers that are deemed
to provide non-⊥ timing measurements.
2. If σ == ⊥, output (TimeReceived, sidclock,⊥) to P .
3. Else send GetTime to GrefClock. Denote its response as T .
(a) If the majority of servers in L are corrupted or |σ| ≤ Σ, output
(TimeReceived, sidmclock, T + σ) to P .
(b) Else output (TimeReceived, sidmclock,⊥) to P .
Figure 6·10: Ideal functionality GP,S,ΣmultiClock that outputs a time influenced by the
corruption status of servers in S. Note that the GP,S,Σclock functionality in Fig. 6·3 is a
special case of this one with a singleton set S = {S}.
6.5.1 Multiple Server Time Sync
At a high level, the new pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync protocol involves a client who queries n different
servers for the time. Once all timing measurements have been collected or time-out,
then the client outputs the median of all non-⊥ timing measurements.
The full protocol to aggregate times from multiple servers is shown in Fig. 6·9.
This protocol requires the client to keep an extra timer per server in order to calculate
and remember the freshness of responses.
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Producing a real multi-server protocol should involve the composition of pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync
protocols with each server. Thanks to the UC composition theorem, it suffices to
analyze a simpler protocol in which the pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync with each server Si is replaced
with its corresponding ideal functionality GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock . We make a few remarks about
this use of composition:
• There are implicitly two uses of Gclock here: the server’s clock GS,S,ΣSclock in the
real protocol and the entire ideal functionality GC,S,Σ∗Cclock . We stress the lack of
circularity here, as shown in Fig. 6·1: the first clock is a subroutine of pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣStimeSync
whereas the second clock is an ideal abstraction of it.
• The protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync contains ΣS as a parameter but its specification in
Fig. 6·9 never mentions ΣS explicitly. Instead, the only impact of ΣS is its
influence over Σ∗C , as shown in Theorem 4.
In comparison to the single-server case, this protocol offers one drawback and
one benefit. The extra timer adds the price of 2 · ΣC additional shift to the time
computed by the client. On the plus side, the multiple server protocol can guarantee
approximate correctness even if some servers are corrupted, due to the following two
observations. First, uncorrupted measurements must be close to the reference time
G. Second, if the majority of servers are uncorrupted, then the median time must be
bounded on both sides by uncorrupted samples.
These observations yield an approximate correctness guarantee that is quite ro-
bust! We do not require that all or even most timing measurements reach the client;
on the contrary, the adversary might corrupt, drop, or delay almost all requests.
Additionally, the adversary may corrupt parties adaptively and may choose their re-
sponses conditioned upon the timing measurements of the honest parties. We simply
require the following constraint: of the servers whose interactions result in the client
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receiving a timing measurement (i.e., anything but ⊥), a majority of those servers
are uncorrupted.1
The ideal functionality GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock specified in Figure 6·10 formally captures
this accuracy constraint.
Theorem 5 (Multiple server UC security). Given parameters that satisfy Σ′C ≥
2.5 ·∆C + 3 ·ΣC + ΣS, the multiple server approximate time synchronization protocol
pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync GUC-realizes GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock .
As before, the simulator S internally runs an emulated copy of the real world
protocol pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync, where S plays the role of E inside this simulation. In particular,
S internally emulates the execution of adversary A, all n FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer functionalities,
all the instances of Fauth, and each of the involved parties. In addition, S relays the
messages sent from the emulated parties to GrefClock and GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock , and from GrefClock
and GC,S,Σ∗Cclock to the emulated parties.
While conducting this simulation, S monitors the traffic of its emulated A and E ,
along with any messages that S directly receives from GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock . The messages
that S views/receives causes it to make changes in the ideal world or the emulated
world.
Simulating GetTime: When GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock sends a message of the form (Sleep, sidmclock),
then S instantiates C with the environmentally-provided message (GetTime, sidmts).
Simulating Continue: When S observes A sending a Continue message to the
emulated C, then S sends a Continue message to C. (Upon receiving this message,
the emulated C might invoke QueryClock or CheckTimeout.)
1This threshold constraint corresponds to the strong “sleepy model of consensus” of (Pass and
Shi, 2016) and (Micali, 2016).
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Maintaining Records: Upon receiving a message of the form (TimeReceived, sidclocki, Ti)
from GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock , if Ti ==⊥, initialize an empty list L if there does not exist one. Ap-
pend i to list L. Subsequently, if a CheckTimeout procedure ever returns a ⊥ when
querying the ith timer, then remove i from L.
Relaying messages to E: When the emulated A sends a message m to the
emulated E , then S relaysm to the real environment. Conversely, S forwards messages
sent by the real E to the emulated A.
Corrupting a server: When A sends a (Corrupt, Si) message in the emulated
world, then S sends a (Corrupt, Si) message to GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock .
Completing the simulation: When the emulated C sends to E its output
(TimeReceived, sidmts, TC), then S knows both when and what to send back to GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock .
If TC == ⊥, then S sends (Wake, sidmclock,⊥,⊥) to GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock . Otherwise: S sends
GetTime to GrefClock to retrieve the current reference time T and also retrieves the list
L. Then, S computes the shift σsim = (TC −T ) and sends (Wake, sidmclock, σsim, L) to
GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock .
In the ideal model (namely in the execution of GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock with S), GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock
receives from S an offset σ′Sim and a list of the servers whose GP,S,Σclock boxes output ⊥
in the simulated pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync. It is also informed when a server is corrupted.
From this information GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock computes TC as Gx + σ′Sim where, if fewer
than half of the servers whose GS,S,ΣSclock boxes did not output ⊥ are corrupted, σ′Sim ≤
Σ′C , the maximum offset that a GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock box will allow.
The value output by pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync is selected as the median of the values returned
from its GC,S,Σ∗Cclock boxes plus a δ corresponding to the time passed since the response
was received. The value returned from GC,Si,Σ∗Cclock is of the form Ti = Gi + σi where
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Figure 6·11: Interactions between participants in the real world execution of multi-
server time sync
Figure 6·12: Interactions between participants in the ideal world execution of multi-
server time sync, including the emulation of the real world inside of the simulator.
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|σi| ≤ Σ∗CSi the max offset for the G
C,S,Σ∗C
clock owned by server Si if Si is uncorrupted.
The client in pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync will then add a δ to this corresponding to the elapsed time
since receiving the response Ti from the i
th GC,S,Σ∗Cclock . The delay δ is computed like
before as G2 + σ2 − G1 − σ1 and is at most ∆′C . Finally, it must be the case that
∆′C > ∆C or else valid responses could timeout while C is waiting for all GC,Si,Σ
∗
C
clock to
respond.
In this case G2 = Gx as the FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer is queried for a δ when all the responses are
received in the simulation and there is not a chance for the environment to update
the reference time between this point and when it is obtained by GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ′CmultiClock .
Additionally, G1 = Gi as the timer is started once the response is received. Therefore,
Gx − Gi ≤ ∆′C + 2 ∗ ΣC where ΣC is, as before, the max allowable shift for a C’s
FC,∆C ,ΣCtimer .
The TC output by pi
∆C ,ΣC ,ΣS
multiTimeSync is Gi + σi + δi so in order to properly simulate S
must be able to input a σSim that will make Gx + σ
′
Sim equal to Gi + σi + δ. Gx is at
most ∆′C + 2 · ΣC greater than Gi, σi is at most Σ∗CSi , and δ ≤ ∆
′
C . Finally, recall
from Section 6.4.2 that Σ∗CSi ≤
∆C
2
+ ΣC + ΣSi .
Combining the above bounds yields
|σ′Sim| ≤ 2.5 ·∆C + 3 · ΣC + ΣS.
Therefore, it suffices for the Σ′C for the GP,{S1,...,Sn},Σ
′
C
multiClock to be 2(∆
′
C + ΣC) larger
than the Σ∗C for the simulated GC,S,Σ
∗
C
clock in order for the simulator to be able to simulate
correctly, proving Theorem 5.
6.5.2 Multiple Strata Network Time
In this section, we add another feature of the network time protocol: a hierarchical
structure to distribute the network load required to propagate network time. Partici-
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pants in NTP are stratified, with stratum-0 servers possessing their own source of time
GS,S,Σ0clock and all other participants serving as both clients and servers. We restrict our
attention to the case in which NTP servers communicate within the following ‘rigid
topology.’
• We insist that each individual machine be statically pegged to a single stratum
forever. We impose this restriction so that we may compose invocations of
pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync. In the more realistic scenario where machines can change strata,
the UC composition theorem breaks down since a feedback loop may occur
where a client provides an input into its own time measurement.
• We require that machines in stratum j only take timing measurements from
servers located in stratum j − 1 and thus only provide time to stratum j + 1
clients. We impose this restriction merely to simplify our calculations in The-
orem 6; the UC composition theorem would enable more complicated analyses
if so desired.
• We use the following parameters: Stratum 0 servers are within shift Σ0 of
GrefClock. All machines in higher strata have timers with maximum delay ∆∗
and maximum shift Σ∗.
Additionally, we make two observations that generalize the work we have already
provided. First pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync continues to be well-defined if it receives multi-server
ideal functionalities GP,S,ΣmultiClock as subroutines rather than single-server functionalities.
Additionally, if all servers within all of the GP,S,ΣmultiClock used by the client have the
same ΣS bound, then the statement and proof of Theorem 5 continue to hold in this
setting.
Second, we may further generalize pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync by permitting S to be a set of
sets and by modifying the consistency rule in step 3a to state that the adversary
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only has free reign to alter the time if the set of servers S is ‘bad,’ as defined below.
Furthermore, Theorem 5 continues to provide bounds on consensus and accuracy in
this case as well.
Definition 3. During an execution of pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync, we denote a server as bad if it is
corrupted. Additionally, a set of parties is deemed to be bad if a majority of elements
are corrupted. Note that these elements may either be parties or sets themselves; in
the latter case, the notion of corruptedness is defined recursively.
Here, the majority vote is only taken over elements that respond to the client’s
request for timing measurements within its maximum allowable delay ∆ (which we
stress that the adversary has the capacity to control). The fact that non-responsive
servers do not factor either positively or negatively into the badness of a set of parties
is consistent with the sleepy model of consensus (cf. footnote 1).
These two observations and the UC composition theorem allow us to bound the
worst-case error when timing measurements percolate down multiple strata.
Theorem 6. Consider several machines who conduct multiple server timing mea-
surements following the network topology specified above. Then, a client C at stratum
j who executes pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync using the set of servers S will receive a time whose in-
accuracy is bounded by Σj ≥ 2.5j · ∆∗ + 3j · Σ∗ + Σ0 as long as the set S is not
bad.
The proof of this theorem is straightforward. First, we apply the UC theorem to
replace all instances of the pi∆C ,ΣC ,ΣSmultiTimeSync protocol (for C and for all of the timeservers
who get their measurements from lower strata as well) with instances of the ideal
functionality GP,S,ΣmultiClock. We remark that our definition of good and bad timeservers
matches precisely with the (modified) constraint for timing consensus in step 3a of
GP,S,ΣmultiClock. Ergo, Theorem 5 upper bounds the inaccuracy of all good servers at
stratum i as Σi ≥ 2.5∆∗ + 3Σ∗ + Σi−1. Summing these inequalities for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , j} yields the desired result.
We stress that Theorem 6 provides a worst case bound. By contrast, in the remain-
der of this section we mathematically analyze and computationally simulate average
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case error propagation over multiple strata by timeservers with accidental rather than
adversarial timing inaccuracies. Suppose that these accidental network asymmetries
and server clock imprecisions contribute to delays δ and shifts σ (respectively) that
are randomly distributed (e.g., using a uniform or Gaussian distribution). In this
average case setting, the central limit theorem provides much more stringent bounds
on error propagation.
• Within a single stratum, the fact that each client invokes multiple servers means
that their individual shift errors are very likely to interfere destructively. Net-
work jitter effects do cause a noticeable delay, however.
• The effect of network asymmetry at a particular stratum i upon the shift (as
found in Theorems 4 and 5) is also reduced significantly when progressing down
the strata.
The net result of the average case analysis is that the expected shift at a high stratum
is influenced mostly by the magnitude of the network asymmetry at that stratum only.
Hence, a high stratum timeserver with low latency network connections may actually
possess better timing measurements than a low stratum timeserver in a high latency
environment, even if the latter contributes toward the timing measurements of the
former.
6.6 Using Approximate Time in UC Protocols
In this section, we explore the ramifications of injecting approximate time into exist-
ing, time-agnostic GUC protocols and functionalities. Although our principal interest
is in the expiration and revocation of PKI certificates, much of our analysis applies
generically to any protocol whose security depends in part on the approximate accu-
racy of time.
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6.6.1 Adding Time to Existing Protocols & Functionalities
We begin by considering generically the influence of time upon existing UC protocols
and functionalities that have previously been proved secure in the usual untimed,
asynchronous setting. The following straightforward theorem states that UC security
continues to hold for all untimed protocols:
Theorem 7. Let pi be a protocol that GUC-realizes functionality G in an untimed
setting. Then, pi continues to GUC-realize G even in the presence of exact or approx-
imate time functionalities like GrefClock or GP,S,Σclock .
This theorem follows immediately from the UC security guarantee in the presence
of global functionalities. Since no environment can distinguish pi from G, in particular
this condition must hold for environments that either keep track of, or have access
to, a time functionality such as G.
More interestingly, we can automatically add a time dependency on top of proto-
cols that previously lacked an understanding of time. In this section, we focus upon
protocols and functionalities of the following type.
Definition 4 (Binary decider). We say that a protocol pibin is a binary decider if the
following constraints hold:
• Only one party P receives output. We denote the collection of inputs by ~x and
the output as (b, y).
• The value b is a single bit. (By contrast, y and the elements of ~x are strings of
arbitrary length.)
Intuitively, binary deciders provide P with a putative output and a verification
bit that determines whether P chooses to accept the answer. Protocols of this form
include bit commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, and (of particular interest to us)
signature and certificate verification checks.
Given any binary decider protocol pibin, Fig. 6·13 constructs a new protocol pˆiΣ,t∗bin
that operates identically to pibin except that it subjects the verification bit to a new
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constraint that rejects responses when P ’s time is past a threshold t∗. For simplicity,
in this section we assume that P ’s clock GP,P,Σclock is corrupted only if P is, so the only
relevant parameter is the maximum clock shift Σ. Note that t∗ and Σ are explicitly
provided to the adversary; pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin makes no attempt to hide them.
Next, we demonstrate a canonical method to transform ideal functionalities anal-
ogously. Given any Gbin, Fig. 6·14 constructs a new ideal functionality GˆΣ,t∗bin that
executes Gbin as a subroutine and also determines the reference time G. It is more
restrained than before: the adversary can only change an otherwise-valid response if
G is close to the threshold t∗.
Next, we show that these two transformations produce identical outcomes. Intu-
itively, the adversary can control the output bit of GˆΣ,t∗bin only when her clock skew
capability can be used to affect pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin ’s output.
Theorem 8. Suppose that the binary decider pibin GUC-realizes Gbin and that pibin’s
output party P has access to a clock GP,P,Σclock . Then, pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin GUC-realizes GˆΣ,t
∗
bin .
Let Dpi denote the dummy adversary against pibin and SimG denote its correspond-
ing simulator. Additionally, let Dpˆi denote the dummy adversary against pˆiΣ,t∗bin . Our
objective is to design a simulator SimGˆ that connects with GˆΣ,t
∗
bin and produces a view
indistinguishable from Dpˆi.
SimGˆ emulates the real world interaction with Dpˆi in its head, and it behaves as
follows during each step of the execution of GˆΣ,t∗bin in the ideal world.
1. SimGˆ sends (t
∗,Σ) to E and relays E ’s response to GˆΣ,t∗bin , just as Dpˆi does with
pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin .
2. During the execution of Gbin, the simulator SimGˆ simply acts as SimG would.
3. SimGˆ observes the shift σ that Dpˆi applies to P ’s clock and then sends b′ =
b ∧ [t ?≤ t∗] to GˆΣ,t∗bin .
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Protocol pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin [ pibin, GP,P,Σclock ]
When instantiated with inputs ~x where party P ’s input has the form xP = (x
′
P , t
∗,Σ),
do the following:
1. P sends (t∗,Σ) to A and waits for an ok response.
2. The parties execute the subroutine protocol pibin on inputs ~x
′, where x′P ′ = xP ′
for all P ′ 6= P . Eventually, P produces output of the form (b, y).
3. Before submitting this output, P queries her clock (with max shift Σ) for the
current time t. This request invokes A to provide a shift σ.
4. Compute b′ = b ∧ [t ?≤ t∗].
5. P outputs (b′, y) to the caller.
Figure 6·13: Time-conditional protocol pˆiΣ,t∗bin . It connects to two subroutines: a
binary decider pibin and P ’s clock.
Note that SimGˆ has nothing to do during steps 4-5.
The messages sent to the environment during steps 1-2 are clearly identical to
those of Dpˆi. The only other message received by E is the output (b′, y).
Ergo, to prove simulation, it suffices to show that the output values b′ are identical
in pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin and GˆΣ,t
∗
bin . This follows from the fact that the adversary’s ability to shift P ’s
clock is bounded such that:
[t
?≤ t∗] =

1, if G < t∗ − Σ,
0, if G > t∗ + Σ,
controlled by SimGˆ, otherwise.
Hence, SimGˆ’s inability to influence b
′ in the first two cases of step 4 is irrelevant
because pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin ’s output must equal b and 0, respectively. In the third case, SimGˆ
chooses b′ just as pˆiΣ,t
∗
bin does during step 4, so the simulation is perfect.
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Functionality GˆΣ,t∗bin [ Gbin, GrefClock ]
When instantiated with inputs ~x where party P ’s input has the form xP = (x
′
P , t
∗,Σ),
do the following:
1. Send (t∗,Σ) to A. Wait for an ok response.
2. Send ~x′ (as defined in Fig. 6·13) to subroutine Gbin. Eventually, receive a re-
sponse of the form (b, y).
3. Query the adversary for a value b′.
4. Obtain the reference time G from GrefClock. Update the value of b′ as follows:
• If G < t∗ − Σ, then set b′ = b.
• If G > t∗ + Σ, then set b′ = 0.
• If b = 0, set b′ = 0.
5. Output (b′, y) to P .
Figure 6·14: The time-conditional GˆΣ,t∗bin functionality with two subroutines: GrefClock
and an untimed binary decider Gbin. The max shift Σ of P ’s clock affects the behavior
of GˆΣ,t∗bin , even though they never communicate.
Functionality Gtimed-bb
Report: Upon receiving from party P a message of the form (Register, P, serial, v, t),
send the message to the adversary and wait for an ok response. If this is the first
request involving (P, serial) then record the tuple (P, serial, v, t). Otherwise, ignore
the message.
Retrieve: Upon receiving from some party Pi or the adversary a mes-
sage (Retrieve, Pj, serial), retrieve the record r containing (Pj, serial) and return
(Retrieve, r). If no such record exists, return (Retrieve,⊥).
ChangeExpiration: Upon receiving from party P a message of the form
(ChangeExpiration, P, serial, t′), retrieve the record of the form (P, serial, v, t). If t′ < t,
then replace t with t′ in this record. Otherwise (including if the record does not exist),
do nothing.
Figure 6·15: A public bulletin board that augments (Canetti et al., 2016, Fig. 3) to
incorporate an expiration time.
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6.6.2 Application to Public Key Infrastructure
In this section, we augment Canetti, Shahaf, and Vald’s GUC analysis of signature-
based authentication (Canetti et al., 2016) to enable revocation and expiration. The
goal of (Canetti et al., 2016) is to provide, within the UC framework, modeling
and analysis of the process of (1) generating signing and verification keys for a dig-
ital signature scheme, (2) certifying the verification key, and (3) using these keys to
authenticate and verify messages by way of signing them on the sending end and
verifying the verification key and the signature on the receiving end. An important
innovation within (Canetti et al., 2016) is to provide adequate treatment to the fact
that the certified verification keys are universally available and may be used to au-
thenticate several messages within many different protocols. The main components
of their modeling are:
• A public bulletin-board Gbb where parties can publicly associate values with
their identities. The bulletin board is globally available and guarantees authen-
ticity (a party can only associate values with her own true ID).
• A certification functionality Gcert that provides its owner with a public key, that
it then posts globally using Gbb. When the owner provides a message m to be
signed, Gcert returns an idealized signature string S; later on, when asked by
anyone, Gcert correctly verifies valid message-signature pairs.
• An existentially unforgeable signature scheme Fsig that is used to realize Gcert.
• An authenticated message transmission functionality Fcert-auth that properly
models the non-deniability of an authenticated message, i.e., that it is possible
for third parties to verify whether a given message was indeed sent and signed by
the sender. (This stands in contrast with the “standard” authenticated message
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transmission functionality in Fig. 6·2, which only allows the specified receiver
to tell whether a message is authentic.)
• A protocol piauth for realizing Fcert-auth using Gcert, by way of signing the message
by the sender and later verifying the signature on the receiving end, against Gcert
of the sender. An important aspect of this analysis is that Gbb is global and
exists regardless of the specific instance of Gcert. Furthermore, while Gcert is
specific for a single “party” (i.e., long-term entity), it is global in the sense that
it exists regardless of any single message-authentication instance.
We remark that, while the analysis of (Canetti et al., 2016) only considers the setting
in which each party registers a single certificate, one can verify that their modeling
and proofs continue to hold when each pid is replaced with a (pid, serial) pair, where
serial denotes a unique identifier of a certificate issued by a particular CA (Cooper
et al., 2008, §4.1.2.2). As a result, the same analysis applies when participants can
request the creation of multiple certificates, which is essential when certificates expire.
Adding time awareness and certificate revocation. To capture expiration
and revocation requests, we extend Canetti et al.’s public bulletin board Gbb into
a time-aware bulletin board Gtimed-bb that supports expiration and revocation. Our
extension augments the Report method to record the expiration time and adds a new
third method called ChangeExpiration to support revocations. Figure 6·15 shows the
details.
Then, we may apply Theorem 8 to “lift” the certification functionality Gcert and
the authentication functionality Fcert-auth described in (Canetti et al., 2016) to their
respective time-dependent versions. In the lifted GˆΣ,t∗cert , the recipient determines the
appropriate threshold t∗ to use by querying Gtimed-bb with the sender’s credentials.
Finally, the timed version of the real authentication protocol pitime-auth , pˆiΣ,t
∗
auth GUC-
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realizes the timed ideal functionality Ftime-cert-auth , FˆΣ,t
∗
cert-auth based upon Theorem 8
and (Canetti et al., 2016, Claim 4.4).
This protocol pitime-auth combines all of the components designed so far to provide
time-based non-deniable authentication, as shown in Fig. 6·1. It requires a clock,
which we know how to instantiate from Sections 6.4-6.5. Additionally, it uses Gcert as
a subroutine just as its untimed counterpart did.
By imbuing this subroutine with a notion of time itself, GˆΣ,t∗cert can interface with our
timed bulletin board Gtimed-bb to attest that (1) the signature is valid, just as before
and (2) the certificate hasn’t yet expired, using the new expiration time t contained
within the record returned by Gtimed-bb’s Retrieve command. Furthermore, in case of
key compromise, the signer can request that her certificate be revoked.
Impact upon use of the PKI today. An important lesson learned from this
modeling is that real-life certificate revocation lists and online certificate status re-
quests must continue to answer requests about revoked or expired certificates during
the interval [t∗, t∗ + Σ] because clients may not be able to adjudicate them correctly
on their own before this time. Here, Σ denotes the maximum shift expected by The-
orems 4 and 5 for all clients on the Internet. After this interval, the adversary cannot
convince any clients of the validity of a revoked or expired certificate via network
manipulation, so the CA may forget about its existence.
Appendix A
The Client/Server Protocol in ntpd
We present several ntpd vulnerabilities that stem from ambiguities in RFC5905. Fig-
ure A·1 is a (simplified) description1 of the code used for the datagram protocol in
ntpd v4.2.8p6 (the most recent release as of mid-April 2016).
Our attacks assume that client/server connections are unauthenticated, which is
the default in ntpd and is the most common configuration in the wild (Section 5.5.1).
Appendix A.1 presents our Zero-0rigin Timestamp vulnerability (CVE-2015-8138)
that allows an off-path attacker to completely hijack an unauthenticated association
between a client and its server, shifting time on the client. Appendix A.2 presents
our Interleaved Pivot vulnerability (CVE-2016-1548), an extremely low-rate off-path
denial-of-service attack. Importantly, both vulnerabilities affect ntpd clients operat-
ing in default mode, are performed from off-path, and require no special assumptions
about the client’s configuration. Both have been present in ntpd for seven years,
since the first release of ntpd v4.2.6 in December 2009. In Section 5.4 we combine
the interleaved pivot vulnerability with information-leaking NTP control queries and
obtain a new off-path timeshifting attack.
A.1 Zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability.
The zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability allows an off-path attacker to completely
hijack an unauthenticated client/server association and shift the client’s time.
1Note that the actual ntpd code swaps the names of the xmt and org state variables; we have
chosen the description that is consistent with the RFCs.
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1 def receive( pkt ):
2 if pkt.T3 == 0:
3 flash |= test3 # fail test3
4 elif pkt.T3 == org
5 flash |= test1 # fail test1
6 return
7 elif broadcast == True:
8 ; # skip further tests
9 elif interleave == False:
10 if pkt.T1 == 0:
11 xmt = 0
12 elif (xmt == 0 or pkt.T1 != xmt):
13 flash |= test2 # fail test2
14 if (rec !=0 and pkt.T1 == rec):
15 interleave = True
16 return
17 else:
18 xmt = 0 # pass test2, clear xmt
19 elif (pkt.T1 == 0 or pkt.T2 == 0):
20 flash |= test3 # fail test3
21 elif (rec != 0 and rec != pkt.T1):
22 flash |= test2
23 return # fail interleave test2
24
25 if interleave == False:
26 rec = pk.receive_time()
27 org = pkt.T3
28
29 if flash == True:
30 return
31 else
32 process( pkt )
33 return
Figure A·1: Simplified implementation of the datagram protocol from ntpd v4.2.8p6.
The packet will not be processed if the flash variable is set. interleave variable is
set when the host is in interleaved mode. Line 16 was introduced at ntpd v4.2.8p4
and 10-11 at ntpd v4.2.8p5.
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Injecting 0rigin packets from off-path. In this attack, the attacker sends a
spoofed mode 4 response packet to the target client. The spoofed packet has its
origin timestamp T1 set to zero, and its other timestamps T2, T3 set to bogus values
designed to convince the target to shift its time, and its source IP set to that of the
target’s server. (The off-path attacker learns the server’s IP via the reference ID, per
footnote 6.) Now, consider how the target processes the received spoofed zero-0rigin
timestamp packet:
(1) For ntpd v4.2.8p5 or v4.2.8p6, a spoofed zero-0rigin packet will always be
accepted, because it passes through lines 10-11, which skip TEST2 altogether. While
the addition of lines 10-11 may seem strange, we suspect that they were added to
handle the initialization of NTP’s symmetric mode, which shares the same code path
as client/server mode. Further discussion is in Appendix B.3.
(2) For ntpd v4.2.6 to v4.2.8p4, lines 10-11 of Figure A·1 were absent. Thus, the
target will accept the spoofed packet when it does not have an outstanding query to
the server. Why? When the target does not have an outstanding query to its server,
its xmt variable is cleared to zero. Thus, when the spoofed zero-0rigin packet is
subjected to TEST2 (line 12), its origin timestamp (which is zero) will be compared to
the xmt variable (which is also zero) and be accepted. The vulnerability arises because
Figure A·1 fails to apply TEST3, which rejects packets with zero origin timestamp.2
Thus, an off-path attacker can send the target a quick burst of self-consistent zero-
0rigin packets with a bogus time, and cause the target to shift its time. The spoofed
zero-0rigin packets are always accepted in case (1), and usually accepted in case (2)
because the target is unlikely to have outstanding query to its server. (In case (2),
this follows because the server is queried so infrequently—NTP’s polling intervals are
at least 16 seconds long, but are often up to 15 minutes long.) After accepting the
2TEST3 is applied in the fifth clause in Figure A·1, but a client will not enter this clause unless it
is in interleaved mode.
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burst of zero-0rigin packets, the target immediately shifts its time; in fact, the target
shifts its time more quickly than it would under normal conditions, when legitimate
responses arrive from the server at the (very slow) NTP polling rate (Section 5.2).
Experiment. On April 29, 2016, we performed a zero-0rigin timestamp attack on
an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client. The target client uses the -g option on an operating system
that restarts ntpd when it quits.3 The target is configured to take time from a single
server. The target starts and completes 15 timing exchanges with its server, averaging
about one exchange per minute. We then attack, sending the target a spoofed zero-
0rigin timestamp packet every second for ten seconds; these spoofed packets have T3
as October 22, 1985 and T2 as August 1, 2006. (This choice of T2 sets δ ≈ ψ ≈ 0,
so we pass TEST11; see Section 5.2.) The target panics and restarts after the ninth
spoofed packet. It then receives the tenth spoofed packet before it queries its server,
and per the reboot bug in Appendix D, immediately shifts to 1985. (Our attack would
still work even without this bug; the target would shift to 1985 after we sent it a few
more packets.)
Eventually, the attacker decides to check if the attack has been successful by
sending a mode 3 query to the target. By checking the transmit timestamp of the
mode 4 response, the attacker realizes that the target is in 1985. Then, the attacker
sets T2 = 0 on his spoofed packets to maintain the target client in 1985. (This
3NTP’s has a panic threshold that is 1000 seconds (16 mins). If the client gets a time shift that
exceeds the panic threshold, the client quits. Thus, at first glance, it seems that that the worst an
attacker can do is alter the client’s clock by 16 minutes. However, as noted in (Malhotra et al.,
2016), this panic behavior can be exploited. ntpd has a -g option that allows a client to ignore the
panic threshold when it reboot; -g is the default ntpd configuration on many OSes including CoreOS
Alpha (1032.1.0), Debian 8.2.0, Arch Linux 2016.05.01, etc. Moreover, many operating systems uses
process supervisors (e.g., systemd), which can be configured to automatically restart any daemons
that quit. (This behavior is the default in CoreOS and Arch Linux. It is likely to become the default
behavior in other systems as they migrate legacy init scripts to systemd.) Thus, an an attacker
can circumvent the protections of panic threshold by sending the client a timeshift that exceeds the
panic threshold, causing the NTP daemon to quit. The OS subsequently automatically reboots the
NTP daemon. Now, if the NTP daemon is running with the -g option, it will ignore the panic
threshold because it has just rebooted.
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is necessary because the target client’s T4 is now October 22, 1985, so maintaining
δ ≈ 0 so we pass TEST11 requires T2 = 0.) The attacker continues pelting the target
with spoofed packets at a higher rate (≈ 1 packet/second) than that of the legitimate
server response packets (≈ 1 packet/minute). The legitimate packets look like outliers
(due, in part, to TEST11, Section 5.2) and the target sticks to the attacker’s bogus
time.
A.2 Interleaved pivot vulnerability.
We next consider a vulnerability introduced by NTP’s interleaved mode, which is
designed to allow for more accurate time synchronization.
What is interleaved mode? Recall that NTP uses timestamps on the packets to
determine the offset θ between the client and the server. Because these timestamps
must be written to the packet before the packet is sent out on the network, there is a
delay between the time when the packet is ‘formed’ and the time when the packet is
sent. This delay is supposed to introduce small errors in the offset. Interleaved mode
eliminates this delay by spreading the computation of the offset (equation (6.2)) over
two exchanges, rather than just one. In interleaved mode, hosts record timestamps
for the moment that they actually transmit packet onto the network, and send them
in the packet transmitted in the subsequent polling interval. Interleaved mode is not
mentioned in RFC 5905 (Mills et al., 2010), but is implemented in ntpd. Mills (Mills,
2011) indicates that interleaved mode is intended for use on top of the broadcast or
symmetric modes only.
We will exploit the following issues: (1) Interleaved mode shares the same code
path as the client/server code (Figure A·1). (2) Interleaved mode changes the mean-
ings of the values stored in the timestamp fields of an NTP packet. Importantly,
the origin timestamp field of the mode 4 server response now contains T4 from the
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previous exchange (rather than T1 from the current exchange). Thus, the usual TEST2
no longer works; instead, there is ‘interleaved TEST2’ comparing the packet’s origin
timestamp to the rec variable, which stores T4 from the previous exchange. (Line
21 in Figure A·1.) (3) A host automatically switches into interleaved mode when it
detects that the host on the other side of the association is in interleaved mode. (Line
15 in Figure A·1.)
Interleaved mode as a low rate DoS vector. The implementation of interleaved
mode in ntpd introduces a low rate denial-of-service attack. The vulnerability is
introduced in line 14 of Figure A·1. Namely, if a server response packet fails the usual
TEST2, the client subjects the packet to ‘interleaved TEST2’. If the packet passes, the
client sets the interleave variable and enters interleaved mode. Importantly, a client
cannot escape from interleaved mode—there is no code path to clear the interleave
variable.
Thus, an off-path attacker can inject a spoofed server response packet that passes
‘interleaved TEST2’ because its origin timestamp equals T4 from the previous exchange.
But how can the attacker learn T4? It turns out that whenever an ntpd client updates
its clock, it sets its reference time to be T4 from the most recent exchange with the
server to which it synchronized. This T4 is sent out with every subsequent packet in
the reference timestamp field.4 Thus, to learn T4, the off-path attacker first sends the
client a regular mode 3 query, and learns the reference time from the client’s response.
If the target updated its clock in the previous exchange, the reference time will be
T4 from the previous exchange. The target will then react to the spoofed packet by
switching into interleaved mode (Line 14 of Figure A·1). All subsequent legitimate
server responses are rejected because they fail ‘interleaved TEST2’.
Worse yet, this vulnerability also leads to a low-rate DoS attack that could be
sprayed across the Internet (e.g., using Zmap (Durumeric et al., 2013)). The attack
4Miroslav Lichvar noted that T4 leaks in the reference timestamp.
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leads to a DoS for each one of the target’s servers. The attack works by repeating the
process of (1) sending a timing query to the target to learn the IP of the server that
the target synchronizes to, and its T4 timestamp, and then (2) pivoting the target
into interleaved mode for that server by sending a spoofed interleaved pivot packet.
Thus, whenever the target synchronizes to a new server, the attacker will detect this
(in step (1)) and DoS that new server as well (in step (2)). (This process is similar
to the DoS by Spoofed Kiss-o’-Death attack from (Malhotra et al., 2016, Sec V.C).)
Timeshifting attacks. Section 5.4 shows how nptd’s control query interface can
be leveraged to turn the interleaved pivot vulnerability into a time-shifting attack
(rather than just a DoS attack). Section 5.5.4 finds 700K vulnerable IPs.
Appendix B
Flaws in Symmetric Mode
Some of the vulnerabilities in NTP’s client/server mode (mode 3/4) follow because
it shares the same code path as NTP’s symmetric mode (mode 1/2). Therefore,
we now consider the security of NTP’s symmetric mode. We identify several flaws
in its specification in RFC5905 (including several off-path denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks on unauthenticated symmetric mode, and several replay attacks (i.e., on-
path DoS attacks) on authenticated symmetric mode), explain how these flaws harm
client/server mode, and conclude with recommendations.
B.1 Background: Symmetric mode.
In symmetric mode, two peers Alice and Bob can give (or take) time to (or from)
each other via either ephemeral symmetric passive (mode 2) or persistent symmetric
active (mode 1) packets. The symmetric active/passive association is preconfigured
and initiated at the ‘active’ peer (Alice), but not preconfigured at the ‘passive’ peer
(Bob). Upon arrival of a persistent mode 1 NTP packet from Alice, Bob mobilizes
a new ephemeral association if he does not have one already. Because this is a
potential security risk—an arbitrary attacker ask Bob to become its symmetric peer
and start offering time to Bob—ntpd requires symmetric passive associations to be
cryptographically authenticated by default. Active/active symmetric associations are
also possible, where both peers are preconfigured with persistent associations. In this
case, authentication is not required by default.
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Symmetric mode has two additional quirks. First, each peer uses its own polling
algorithm to decide when to respond to its peer. As such, Bob will not immediately
respond to Alice upon receipt of her packet. (This is in contrast to the client/server
mode, where servers immediately respond to queries.) Second, both peers perform
TEST2 (and other tests) on the same volley of packets, and use the same packet
timestamps to obtain timing samples.
B.2 Problems with bogus packets.
In both RFC5905 and ntpd, a host processes (mode 1 and 2) symmetric mode packets
it receives using the same code used to process (mode 4) server response packets.
Another look at this code in Appendix A of RFC 5905 (Figure 5·5) shows that the
org state variable is updated even when a received packet fails TEST2. ntpd prior to
v4.2.8p4 does this as well (Lines 16 and 27 in Figure A·1). But should a bogus packet
really be allowed to update the client’s state? We now explain why there is no easy
answer to this question.
What if bogus packets do not update org? We first suppose that the org state variable
is not updated upon receipt of a bogus packet (i.e., a packet that fails TEST2). We
show this leads to persistent failures in two cases:
1) Packet drop leads to persistent failure. In Figure B·1 Alice’s second packet to
Bob is dropped. After Alice’s packet is dropped, Bob’s orgb state variable still stores
the (now stale) time T1. Bob uses T1 as the origin timestamp of the packet he now
sends to Alice. Alice drops this packet because its origin timestamp T1 does not
match her xmta = T5 variable. Now this ‘bogus’ packet also does not update Alice’s
orga variable. Next, Alice sends a new packet to Bob at time T9, using the (now
stale) value orga = T3 as the new packet’s origin timestamp. Now Bob drops the
packet, because its origin timestamp T3 does not match xmtb = T7. This continues
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Figure B·1: Alice (left) exchanges symmetric mode packets with Bob (right). Each
grey packet depicts the following fields (per Figure 5·4) in order: origin timestamp,
receive timestamp, transmit timestamp. Alice’s state variables orga and xmta are
shown on the left. Bob’s state variables orgb and xmtb are shown on the right. (Alice
initializes the association by sending Bob an initialization packet, with origin and
receive timestamps set to zero, and transmit timestamp set to Alice’s sending time T1.
Alice writes T1 to xmta. Bob receives the packet and copies the transmit timestamp
T1 from the packet to his orgb. When Bob’s polling algorithm indicates he is ready to
respond, he sends Alice a packet with origin timestamp T1 copied from his orgb and
transmit timestamp T3 equal to his time when he sent the packet. Bob then writes
T3 to his xmtb. Upon receipt of Bob’s packet, Alice performs TEST2, updates her
state variables, computes offset, delay, etc., and decides whether to update her clock.
When her polling algorithm indicates that she is ready to respond, she constructs
her next packet to Bob using her state variables in the same way Bob did.) In this
Figure, Alice’s second packet to Bob is dropped. If bogus packets (failing TEST2) do
not update org, as shown here, then one dropped packet can cause persistent failure.
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ALICE BOB 
orga = T0 
xmta = Ta Ta 
T0 
xmtb = T0 
Pass TEST2! 
(T0==xmtb) 
set orgb = Ta 
clear xmtb = 0 
Ta 
Fail TEST2! 
(Ta!=xmta) 
Fail TEST2! 
(T0!=xmtb) 
xmta = Tc 
T0 
Tc 
Figure B·2: Alice (left) exchanges symmetric mode packets with Bob (right). Alice
sends two consecutive packets to Bob due to unsynchronized polling intervals. The
first packet passes TEST2, but all subsequent packets fail TEST2 on both peers, leading
to persistent failure.
indefinitely, so all future packets fail TEST2.
2) Unsynchronized poll leads to persistent failure. We saw a similar failure happen
naturally during an authenticated active/active symmetric association between peers
Alice and Bob both running ntpd v4.2.8p6. This version of ntdp does not update org
upon receipt of a bogus packet (because of the return added on line 16 in Figure A·1).
In Figure B·2 Alice was a symmetric peer with Bob. Bob was a symmetric peer
with Alice, and also a client to an external server. Alice had a clock synchronization
event that caused her to set her polling interval to 64 seconds. Meanwhile, Bob’s
polling interval was 128 seconds. Next, Alice sent Bob a packet with the correct
origin timestamp T0 expected by Bob. Bob accepted this packet and cleared xmtb
and updates his orgb = Ta. However, Bob did not yet respond, since his polling
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interval was longer than Alice’s. In the meantime, Alice sent Bob another packet
with this same origin timestamp T0. (Alice sends the same T0 because she has not
yet received a new packet from Bob to cause her to update her orga variable.) This
time Bob rejected the packet by TEST2 because he had cleared xmtb. When Bob was
ready to respond to Alice, he sent a packet with origin timestamp Ta matching to
that in the first packet sent by Alice. (This is because Bob did not update his orgb
variable from the second rejected packet.) But Bob’s packet failed TEST2 at Alice,
because she was expecting origin timestamp Tc corresponding to the second packet.
We are back in the persistent failure scenario of Figure B·1.
What if bogus packets do update org? The reader might now conclude that bogus
packets should update org, as is required by Appendix A of RFC 5905. However,
this leads to two denial-of-service attacks:
1) On-path denial-of-service for authenticated symmetric mode. Suppose that org
can be updated by bogus packets that pass cryptographic validation (of the MAC)
but fail TEST2. Consider an on-path attacker (who does not have the ability to
drop/modify/delay packets) who attacks an authenticated symmetric association.
(Note that symmetric active/passive associations are authenticated by default.) We
show that this on-path attacker can parlay his ability to replay packets into the ability
to (effectively) drop packets.
To do this, the on-path attacker replays any stale packet from Alice to Bob (1)
after Alice sends Bob a legitimate packet but (2) before Bob sends his response as per
Figure B·3. If these polling intervals are not synchronized, the attacker has plenty
of time (i.e., seconds or minutes) to perform this replay. The stale replayed packet
overwrites Bob’s orgb variable to T9. Thus, Bob responds to Alice with a packet
whose origin timestamp is equal to the (stale) transmit timestamp T9 from the stale
replayed packet. This stale origin timestamp T9 fails TEST2 at Alice. The attacker
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ALICE BOB ATTACKER 
orga = T101 
set xmta = T103 
T101 
T102 
T103 
set orgb = T103 
T7 
T8 
T9 
set orgb = T9 
set xmtb = T105 
T9 
T104 
T105 
Fail TEST2! 
 (T9!=xmta) 
Figure B·3: Alice (left) exchanges symmetric mode packets with Bob (center).
Attacker (right) is on-path for authenticated NTP and off-path for unauthenticated
NTP. For the on-path authenticated DoS attack, the attacker’s packet (timestamps
T7, T8, T9) is a replay of a stale packet sent from Alice to Bob. For the off-path
unauthenticated DoS attack, the attacker’s packet is spoofed.
can repeat this replay each time Alice sends Bob a packet, thus preventing Alice from
ever synchronizing to Bob.
Note also this attacker need not be ‘on-path’ forever. Indeed, once the attacker
gets his hands on a single stale packet sent from Alice to Bob, he can move off-path,
and keep launching this attack forever by replaying this stale packet.
2) Off-path denial-of-service for unauthenticated symmetric mode. Suppose org can
be updated by bogus packets that fail TEST2. We show how an off-path attacker can
launch an identical attack on unauthenticated symmetric mode by spoofing (rather
than replaying) a packet from Alice. This is a serious threat, since active/active
symmetric associations are not cryptographically-authenticated by default.
We performed this attack on two ntpd v4.2.8p2 hosts Alice and Bob. (We use
v4.2.8p2 because this implementation lets bogus packets update org.) Both Alice and
Bob are preconfigured to be each other’s symmetric active peer. Additionally, Bob
is also preconfigured in client/server mode with four other servers. Upon restarting
ntpd on both hosts, Bob gets synchronized to one of his servers in the very first
exchange (per the reboot bug, see Appendix D). Alice sends symmetric active mode
packets to Bob and gets back symmetric active response packets from Bob. After
four exchanges with Bob, Alice synchronizes to Bob and indicates this by putting
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Bob’s IP address in the reference ID of her fifth packet. After two more exchanges,
the off-path attack begins.
In symmetric mode, the time between a packet and its response is often up to
several seconds (62 seconds in this experiment), giving our off-path attacker plenty of
time to inject packets. So the attacker sends Bob a symmetric mode packet spoofed
to look like it came from Alice; this query is sent after Alice sends her legitimate
query to Bob, and before Bob sends his reply (per Figure B·3). Bob updates orgb =
T9 from attacker’s bogus packet. Now Bob sends the response to Alice with origin
timestamp T9 corresponding to orgb. This packet fails TEST2 at Alice. The attacker
continues to inject spoofed packets to Bob for the next 16 exchanges between Alice
and Bob. Bob’s responses fail TEST2 at Alice and so Alice never updates her clock.
Summary. Thus, we are between a rock and a hard place. Should bogus packets
update org or not? Our recommendations are in Appendix B.4.
B.3 Problems with initialization.
Consider what happens if Alice reboots and sends Bob a packet initializing their
association. Alice has no timing information, so this ‘initialization packet’ has T1 =
T2 = 0 (as in the first packet in Figure B·1). If Bob did not reboot, he has xmt !=
0. Now, if Bob performed TEST2 on the initialization packet, it would be dropped
(because T1 != xmt). Also, it would be dropped if Bob performed TEST3 (because
T1 = T2 = 0). Thus, if the protocol is to tolerate a reboot, initialization packets
cannot be subject to TEST2 or TEST3.
Denial-of-service via initialization packets. We use the fact that TEST2 cannot
be performed on initialization packets to perform DoS attacks identical to those in
Appendix B.2. We can perform on-path DoS attacks on authenticated symmetric
associations by replaying initialization packets (instead of replaying stale packets).
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Off-path DoS attacks on unauthenticated symmetric mode can also be accomplished
by spoofing initialization packets (rather than spoofing arbitrary packets); notice that
spoofing initialization packets is trivial because they do not contain any unpredictable
information. Importantly, both of these DoS attacks exist regardless of whether bogus
packets update org or not (Appendix B.2).
Impact on client/server mode. The initialization of symmetric mode requires that
TEST2 and TEST3 are not performed on a received packet with a zero-origin timestamp.
However, this is at odds with the security of client/server mode. Unfortunately,
however, client/server and symmetric modes share the same code path. ntpd deals
with symmetric mode initialization using Lines 10-11 in Figure A·1, which clears xmt
and skips TEST2 if a received packet has a zero-origin timestamp. These lines of
code, however, create the zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability in client/server mode
(Appendix A.1). Meanwhile, RFC 5905 Appendix A deals with this by not performing
TEST3 (Figure 5·5). However, because TEST3 is not performed, the xmt variable cannot
be cleared, creating the query-replay vulnerability (Section 5.3.2).
B.4 Symmetric Mode: Choose your poison!
Many problems in symmetric mode occur because both peers update their state vari-
ables (org, xmt) and collect timing samples (θi, δi, ψi) from the same volley of packets.
Per the discussion in Appendix B.2, we cannot see how to fix this while maintaining
a single volley of packets between peers. One drastic suggestion is to require two
distinct volleys, where each peer is a server in one volley, and is a client in the other
(using one of the protocols described in Section 5.6.1). However, this is not back-
wards compatible, as both peers involved in association must simultaneously make
this change. Thus, an (unsatisfying) band-aid solution could involve:
1. To prevent the persistent failure problem of Appendix B.2, allow packets failing
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TEST2 to update org. However, this enables off-path DoS attacks.
2. To prevent off-path DoS attacks, we suggest mandatory cryptographic authen-
tication in symmetric mode (for both active/active and active/passive).
3. Even so, symmetric peers that use cryptographic authentication are still vulner-
able to DoS attacks, so we also suggest monitoring to detect excessive number
of bogus packets (Appendix B.2).
4. Monitoring should also be used to detect excessive number of initialization pack-
ets, since these also lead to DoS (Appendix B.3).
5. Finally, symmetric peers should ensure that they run TEST2 against an origin
timestamp that contains 32 bits of randomness. This can be done with a receive
function as in Figure 5·6 and a sending function in Figure 5·7.1
1 Because both peers update their state variables and collect timing samples from the same
volley of packets, symmetric mode must preserve the semantics of the origin timestamp. Thus, in
symmetric mode we cannot replace the origin timestamp with a random 64-bit nonce per Figure 5·8.
Appendix C
On-path Query Replay Attack
Replays of the client’s query are a problem because they harm the accuracy of time
synchronization. We demonstrate this with an on-path query replay attack on a
target host in our lab. We were able to degrade the accuracy of the target’s time
synchronization from 4× 10−5 seconds (on average) to 2.7 seconds (on average). We
show the client’s offset (i.e., the distance between the client’s clock and the server’s
clock per equation (6.2)) under normal and attack conditions in Figure C·1; the
attacked client’s accuracy is 5 orders of magnitude worse.
Experiment. We modified the source code for ntpd v4.2.8p2 to make it vulnerable
to client query replays. Specifically, we deleted the line of code that cleared xmt
when a response passed TEST2. We then preconfigured our modified ntpd client with
one server. Every time the client sent a query to its server, our on-path attacker
captured the query, and replayed it to the server once per second, until the client
sent a new query. We repeated this for every query sent by the client. The resulting
offset in Figure C·1 was computed per equation (6.2) with T1, T2, T3 taken from the
NTP packet timestamps on server responses sent in response to real client queries
(not replayed queries) and T4 taken from the response packet’s arrival time at the
client. We repeat this experiment on the same client and server machine but without
a replay attack.
Why does accuracy degrade? This follows because the replayed queries cause the
server to respond with a stale origin timestamp T1. Suppose that t seconds elapse
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Figure C·1: Query replay attack on modified version of ntpd v4.2.8p2. Time syn-
chronization on the attacked client degrades by 105.
since the client’s most recent query. If the attacker now replays the client’s query,
the packet timestamps in the server’s response will be such that T2 − T1 ≈ t seconds
and T4 ≈ T3 seconds, resulting in a timing sample with offset θ ≈ t2 seconds per
equation (6.2). As t grows during the polling interval, the offset in the timing sample
grows as well. Thus, when the client uses these sampled offsets to set its clock, it
miscalculates the discrepancy between its local clock and that of the server, resulting
in the inaccuracies in Figure C·1. Thus, this query replay attack has similar effect to
a delay attack (Mizrahi, 2012a).
Appendix D
Reboot Bug
Our experiments show that, upon reboot, an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client updates its local
clock from the very first response packet it receives from any of its preconfigured
servers. This is CVE-2016-7433. We now explain why this is a security vulnerability.
What does the RFC say? When describing the algorithm used for clock updates,
the pseudocode in Appendix A.5.2 of RFC5905 has a comment that states “select
the best from the latest eight delay/offset samples”. Also, a client configured with
multiple servers is supposed to choose the ‘best’ server from which it will take time.
Section 5 says: “The selection algorithm uses Byzantine fault detection principles to
discard the presumably incorrect candidates called “falsetickers” from the incident
population, leaving only good candidates called “truechimers”.” We argue that this
bug disables Byzantine fault tolerance upon reboot.
Experiment. We set up an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client preconfigured with five pool servers.
Upon reboot, the client sends server Alice a mode 3 query with reference id ‘INITAL-
IZATION’ (indicating that it is unsynchronized) and reference time ‘NONE’ (ex-
pected behavior upon reboot). Another such query is made to Bob. Bob’s response
arrives first, followed by the response from Alice. Next the client sends a query to
server Carol. The reference id field in this new query is Bob’s IP, and the reference
time is set to a time before the response was received from Alice. We therefore see
that the client updates his clock upon receipt of his first response packet (from Bob),
without considering the contributions of servers Alice, Carol, Dave and Frank.
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Implications. Thus, on reboot, Byzantine fault tolerance is disabled, and the client
is at risk of taking time from bad timekeepers. This issue becomes even more serious
when the panic threshold is disabled upon reboot when a client is configured with -g
option. (This is the default on many OSes, see footnote 3.) Thus, if a bad timekeeper’s
response arrives first, a -g client will immediately accept huge, potentially bogus,
update to its clock.
Worse yet, an off-path attacker can exploit this, along with other bugs, in order
to perform a low-rate time-shifting attack. The attacker first learns the IP of one of
the target’s preconfigured servers, using the trick per footnote 6. Then, the off-path
attacker sends some ‘packet-of-death’ that crashes ntpd.1 If the OS reboots ntpd,
then the target restarts with the panic threshold disabled. The attacker now injects a
single spoofed server response with (1) zero origin timestamp (per Appendix A.1), (2)
the legitimate server as the source IP, and (3) some huge (incorrect) time offset. The
client accepts the response even before it queries its legitimate servers, and adjusts
its clock to the attacker’s bogus time. The low rate of this attack—it requires only
three packets—also means it could be sprayed across the Internet.
Recommendation. An NTP client should be compliant to the RFC specifications
even upon reboot, and adjust its clock only after multiple successful exchanges with
each of its timeservers.
Where is the bug introduced? The bug is introduced in ntpd v4.2.7p385 (re-
leased August 18, 2013) and exists in all the following versions, upto and including
ntpd v4.2.8p7 (released April 26, 2016). The definition for Root distance (λ) in the
variable dtemp in file ntp proto.c was changed between ntpd v4.2.7p384 (Figure D·2)
and ntpd v4.2.7p385 (Figure D·1). This change (Lines 2966-2967 in Figure D·1) in-
troduced the bug. However, this change violates compliance with the definition of
Root distance in RFC5905 which defines it as in Figure D·2.
1For instance, CVE-2016-7434 or CVE-2016-9311.
226
2965 dtemp = (peer->delay + peer->rootdelay) / 2
2966 + LOGTOD(peer->precision)
2967 + LOGTOD(sys_precision)
2968 + clock_phi * (current_time - peer->update)
2969 + peer->rootdisp
2970 + peer->jitter;
Figure D·1: Lines 2965-2970 in ntpd v4.2.7p385
2933 dtemp = (peer->delay + peer->rootdelay) / 2 + peer->disp
2934 + peer->rootdisp + clock_phi * (current_time - peer->update)
2935 + peer->jitter;
Figure D·2: Lines 2933-2935 in ntpd v4.2.7p384
Tested Versions.ntpd v4.2.7p384, ntpd v4.2.7p385, ntpd v4.2.8p6, ntpd v4.2.8p7,
ntpd v4.2.8p8. This part of code remains the same in all the versions beginning ntpd
v4.2.87p385.
Patch: Replacing code in Figure D·1 with that in Figure D·2 mitigates the bug.
We successfully patched ntpd v4.2.8p7 (lines 3447-3453). To confirm, we ran the
experiment with the patched version of ntpd v4.2.8p7 with the same setup as above.
The test client updates its local clock after obtaining four timing samples from its
servers.
Appendix E
Disclosure and Subsequent Developments
This research was done against ntpd v4.2.8p6, which was the latest version of ntpd
until April 25, 2016. Since that date, three new versions of ntpd have been released:
ntpd v4.2.8p7 (April 26, 2016), ntpd v4.2.8p8 (June 2, 2016), and ntpd v4.1.8p9
(November 22, 2016). We summarize our disclosure timeline and the impact of our
research results on new releases of ntpd as follows:
Report. This report was first disclosed on June 7, 2016 and Section 4.4 was revised
on July 29, 2016. The report was last edited, for clarity and style, on August 26,
2019.
Zero-0rigin timestamp vulnerability (CVE-2015-8138, CVE-2016-7431, Ap-
pendix A.1). This vulnerability was disclosed in October 2015 (prior to ntpd
v4.2.8p4) but unfortunately still existed in v4.2.8p8. (This is because Lines 10-11
of Figure A·1 were still present in ntpd v4.2.8p8, likely in order to process initializa-
tion packets in symmetric mode, see Appendix B.3.) The vulnerability has been fixed
in ntpd v4.2.8p9.
Interleaved pivot vulnerability (CVE-2016-1548, Appendix A.2). Following
disclosure of this vulnerability in November 20151, ntpd v4.2.8p7 was patched so that
clients do not automatically switch into interleaved mode by default. Now, clients do
this only if the option ‘xleave’ is set with a peer, server or broadcast configuration
command.
1Also the concurrent disclosure by Miroslav Lichvar.
227
228
Leaky control queries (CVE-2015-8139, Section 5.4). This vulnerability was
first disclosed in October 2015, but ntpd v4.2.8p9 still accepts control queries from
arbitrary IPs by default. Users must configure the noquery option to change this
default. The leaky control queries we describe are also mentioned in a new Internet
draft (Mills and Haberman, 2016). We have worked with the authors of (Mills and
Haberman, 2016) to add a security considerations to this document.
Origin timestamp randomization (Section 5.6). Cryptographic randomization
of the origin timestamp has not yet been incorporated into ntpd.
Bogus packets in symmetric mode (Appendix B.2). ntpd v4.2.8p7, ntpd
v4.2.8p8 and v4.2.8p9 allow bogus packets (that fail TEST2) to update the org state
variables.2 Thus, the ‘transient failure to persistent failure’ from Appendix B.2 is
no longer present, but the two denial of service vulnerabilities in Appendix B.2 are
present. This issue was disclosed on June 7, 2016.
DoS via initialization packets in symmetric mode (Appendix B.3). This
was first disclosed on June 7, 2016. These flaws were still present in v4.2.8p9.
Reboot bug (CVE-2016-7433, Appendix D). We first disclosed this issue in
August 2015, and provided a full analysis on June 7, 2016. This bug was still present
in v4.2.8p8 and fixed in v4.2.8p9.
2This change was probably done in response to NTP Bug2952 reported by Michael Tatarinov
and made public on April 26, 2016 (concurrently with our work). The bug report states only that
“symmetric active/passive mode is broken” (Tatarinov, ).
Appendix F
Security Analysis
In this appendix, we provide our formal security model and prove that the protocols
in Appendix 5.6.1 are secure against off-path attackers when NTP is unauthenticated
and against on-path attackers when NTP is authenticated.
F.1 Model
Our model focuses on the description of an honest party called the network N that
delivers packets and orchestrates the execution of several NTP exchanges akin to the
environment in a UC protocol (Canetti, 2001).
Parties. We suppose there are ` honest parties P1, . . . ,P`, where Pi denotes the
IP address of the ith party, who collectively perform many pairwise client/server ex-
changes. A single party Pi may act in both the client and server roles in different ex-
changes. There is also single attacker A = P0 who may also have honest client/server
exchanges, but has other goals and powers as well. Parties send packets through a
network N .
Packets. We model a packet as a tuple of the form (h,m, t), where h = (IP src, IP dst)
contains the source and destination IPs, t is a MAC tag optionally appended to the
packet, and m contains the remaining fields of the packet that are authenticated by
the MAC tag.
Packet delivery. The network N maintains a counter step to orchestrate the flow of
communication. Informally, one may think of step as the wall-clock time from N ’s
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point of view. During each step of the step counter, each honest party may receive,
process, or transmit one packet.
We require that honest parties have sufficient time to process every packet re-
ceived; put another way, attacks that flood an honest party with packets in order to
deny service are out of scope. Formally, we model this property by (1) restricting N
to deliver at most one packet per step of the counter to each party, and (2) incre-
menting the counter in integer multiples of L/R, where R denotes an upper bound
on the bandwidth (bps) of honest parties when ingesting NTP packets of length L
bits. Here, L = 720 bits for unauthenticated NTP packets and L = 720 + 2n bits for
NTP packets authenticated with a MAC of length 2n.
The network imposes a constant latency δ on packet delivery. Specifically, if N
receives a packet from an honest party when the counter is step, N holds the packet
in a queue and assigns a value deliver = step+ δ to the packet. When step == deliver,
the packet is transmitted. We stress that the attacker A does not have the power to
modify, delay, or drop packets between honest parties.
Race conditions. Unlike the honest parties, attacker A may specify the deliver value
for all packets she sends. However, as per constraint (1) above, this value must be
distinct from the deliver values of all other packets in N ’s queue destined for IP dst.
This power allowsA to win all race conditions.1 As such, our model allows attakcer
A to send an honest party up to 2δR
L
packets in the duration of an NTP exchange,
since A can request the delivery of one packet for each step of the counter, while the
two messages in an NTP exchange are each subject to a longer delay δ.
Additionally, this power also encapsulates the real-world uncertainty in packet
delivery. So far, our model assumes that all packets encounter a constant delay. In
reality, we often have at most a rough upper-bound on network latency, and we want
1We remark that this capability is unrealistically powerful for an off-path attacker, who cannot
observe honest packet transmissions.
231
for NTP’s security guarantee to hold for any distribution of packet latency times that
fit within this bound. Rather than formalizing a network latency distribution within
our model, we opt for the simpler approach of letting attacker A “speed up” packet
arrivals using its power to determine deliver for its packets.
Transcripts. A transcript is a list of NTP client/server exchanges, formally written
as a set of tuples
(start, i, tc, j, ts)
each indicating that an exchange between client Pi with local time tc and server Pj
with local time ts starts at step start of the step counter. We stress that A = P0 may
legitimately engage in NTP exchanges in the transcript specification.
Network N enforces execution of the transcript by informing parties that they
should begin a client/server exchange. When N ’s counter is step == start for tuple
(start, i, tc, j, ts) in the transcript ts, N sends a ‘go message’ (client, i, tc) to Pi, after
which an honest party Pi immediately sets her local clock to tc, runs the protocol
in Figure 5·7 or Figure 5·8 resulting in a mode 3 query packet ((Pi,Pj),m, t) to Pj
through N . After a delay of δ, N sends a ‘go message’ (server, i, ts) to the Pj and
also delivers the Pi’s query packet, and honest Pj responds assuming that her local
clock is set to time ts.
The transcript must be consistent with our “no flooding” rule that limits each
party to receiving 1 packet (plus perhaps a ‘go message’) per step. As a consequence,
two exchanges involving the same client cannot have the same start counter. Addi-
tionally, a party cannot simultaneously be a server at counter start and a client at
counter start + δ.
Interacting with the network. The networkN starts by receiving ts and then choosing
and dispersing secret keys for each pair of parties {ski,j : i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `}}. The
honest parties Pi receive these keys and initialize their xmtj state variables for every
232
other party j 6= i. The game then begins with N in control and the counter step
initialized to 0.
If N ’s counter step equals either (1) the start value of a tuple in the transcript
ts or (2) the deliver value of a packet in its queue, then N delivers the appropriate
packet or ‘go message’ and cedes control to the honest party. The honest party starts
computing when it receives the packet or ‘go message’.
Once an honest party finishes its computation and possibly transmits a new packet
((IP src, IP dst),m, t) to N , the honest party cedes control back to N . Next, the net-
work N instantly reveals [(IP src, IP dst),L(m, t)] to the attacker, where L is a leakage
function. N then cedes control to A, who may perform arbitrary computations and
optionally transmit a packet of its own. When N regains control, it increments step
and repeats the process. This model implicitly forbids A from dropping, modifying,
or further delaying packets; instead, every packet is delivered intact to IP dst after
delay δ.
Leakage. The leakage function L models the information available to an on-path or
off-path attacker. Specifically, L equals the identity function for an on-path attacker
(i.e., m and t are revealed perfectly) and the zero function for an off-path attacker
(i.e., m and t are perfectly hidden).
Spoofing. Network N never validates IP src in a transmitted packet. This allows
attacker A to send packets with a spoofed source IP IP src. Meanwhile, honest parties
always use their true IP src. Additionally, if A spoofs a query packet on behalf of a
client Pi, we observe that N lacks a timestamp t∗s to deliver to the honest server Pj
along with the query packet. We choose t∗s as follows: if A’s spoofed packet occurs
during an honest NTP transaction between parties i and j, then N sends the same
timestamp that the honest transaction uses; otherwise, A may choose t∗s arbitrarily
and inform N of its choice.
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F.1.1 Soundness guarantee.
Without an attacker, the results of honest parties’ NTP exchanges are completely
defined by the transcript. Formally, clients update their local state which includes the
set of servers they are willing to query, the state variables (i.e., xmtj and orgj) used
in exchanges with each server Pj, and the resulting set of validated timing samples
(including delay δ, offset θ, jitter ψ, dispersion  per the equations in Section 5.2).
k-statei(ts, step) is the state of party Pi during an execution of the transcript ts while
N ’s counter is step, and contains the results of the k most recent exchanges with each
server.
A’s objective is to tamper with k consecutive timing samples that some honest
client Pi stores in its state corresponding to interactions with a single server Pj.2
Hence, we let k-stateAi (ts, step) denote the state of party Pi during a game where the
attacker A is present. Of course, if Pi voluntarily chooses to query A as its server,
then A can significantly influence Pi’s state. The soundness guarantee effectively
states that A can do no more than this.
However, there is one type of modification that we cannot hope to rule out. Con-
sider the effect of A “preplaying” honest packets: that is, submitting a packet that
is identical to one in N ’s queue but with an earlier arrival time. This action is very
likely to affect the state of honest parties, albeit in a bounded manner. It may re-
duce delay measurements δ from their upper bound of 2δ, but never increase them.
Similarly, each offset θ may increase or decrease by at most δ. Finally, jitter ψ may
be altered slightly, likely by far less than the bound accepted by TEST11. Due to
their limited, unavoidable effects, we consciously opt to ignore preplay attacks in the
following soundness definition to simplify our discussion.
2Note that the definition ‘NTP exchanges should not fail’ does not hold because exchanges may
fail even without an attacker. As one example, consider a client who initiates two exchanges with the
same server in rapid succession, i.e., the client’s second query is sent before she receives a response
to the first query. Then TEST2 will fail for the server’s first response.
234
Definition F.1.1 (Soundness). NTP is (k, )-sound on transcript ts if for all resource-
bounded attackersA who never preplay packets from honest parties, and for all parties
Pi who do not query A as an NTP server,
Pr[∃ step s.t. k-stateAi (ts, step) 6= k-statei(ts, step)] < .
This inequality must hold for all k components of the state. The probability is taken
over the randomness of all parties and N ’s choice of shared secret keys.
F.2 Soundness against off-path attackers.
We now prove Theorem 1 of Appendix 5.6.3, which states that the protocols in Ap-
pendix 5.6.1 are sound against an off-path attacker offA. Theorem 1 follows largely
from the entropy E present in the origin timestamp. We do not require NTP packets
to be authenticated.
The theorem holds as long as randomness is produced from a cryptographically-
strong random number generator (RNG), and that, upon reboot, honest parties ini-
tialize their xmtj variables for each server to a 64-bit number generated by their
RNG.
Let offA be any off-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript that involves `
honest parties, a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair, and
a maximum of s trusted servers per client.
Let i∗ be any client who does not query offA as server. We say that the protocol
described in Figure 5·6, 5·7 randomizes the sub-second granularity of the expected
origin timestamp, while the protocol in Figure 5·6, 5·8 randomizes the entire expected
origin timestamp.
We use a sequence of games to prove that offA tampers the state of Pi∗ with
probability at most offA.
Game G0. This is the real interaction of offA with the honest parties P1, . . . ,Pl and
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the network N . For ease of notation, we denote the probability that offA breaks the
soundness of game G0 by Pr
0
offA.
Game G1. This game is identical to G0, except that Pi∗ ’s pseudorandom number
generator is replaced with a truly random number generator. By definition, the
probability that anybody (in particular offA) notices this change is at most A(RNG).
Hence, Pr0offA − Pr1offA ≤ A(RNG).
Game G2. This game is identical to G1, except that we abort the execution if offA
sends a spoofed packet (i.e., one for which offA claims an IP src different than her
own) involving client Pi∗ and some server Pj such that the spoofed packet’s origin
timestamp matches Pi∗ ’s state variable xmtj. Importantly, offA has no chance of
winning game G2 (that is, Pr
2
offA = 0) because its spoofed packets always fail TEST2.
In order to demonstrate that any client Pi∗ distrusting offA properly refuses all of the
attacker’s spoofed packets while also accepting all of the honest servers’ packets (i.e.,
computes the desired value k-statei(ts, step) at all steps), it only remains to prove that
the probabilities of winning G1 and G2 are close.
There are two conditions that cause Game G2’s abort condition to trigger:
• Client Pi∗ is engaged in an NTP exchange with server Pj at the moment the
spoofed packet is received, and the spoofed packet’s origin timestamp matches
that of the transmit timestamp in honest client’s query.
• Client Pi∗ is not engaged in an NTP exchange with server Pj at the moment the
spoofed packet is received, and the spoofed packet’s origin timestamp matches
the client’s randomly-chosen xmtj value.
3
In the first case, we know that the client’s choice of the origin timestamp expected
in the mode 4 response packet (i.e., pkt.T3 in Figure 5·7) ensures that xmtj has
3Recall that A may choose the server’s response time t∗s arbitrarily in this case, which would have
immense power if A could get the spoofed client to accept the response packet.
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E = 32 bits of entropy if the sub-second granularity of the timestamp comes from
Pi’s RNG or E = 64 bits of entropy if the entire origin timestamp is randomly chosen
(i.e., pkt.T3 in Figure 5·8). When targeting a particular server Pj, offA can send
Rδ
360
packets to each honest party during an NTP exchange between the target client
Pi∗ and the server Pj, each of which influences Pi∗ ’s state with probability at most
2−E where E is the number of bits of entropy in the origin timestamp. Hence, offA’s
ability to impact Pi∗ ’s state during the NTP exchange is at most Qd = 2−E Rδ360 .
In the second case, offA can send T = 2pR/720 packets to each party in the interval
between two successive exchanges (where p corresponds to the polling interval). Each
packet succeeds in altering Pi∗ ’s state with probability Qb = 2−64 because xmtj has
64 bits of entropy.
Finally, Lemma 1 below states that offA can influence the state of k consecutive
exchanges between client Pi∗ and server Pj with probability at most (k + 1) · (kQ)k,
where Q = max{Qd, TQb}. Additionally, there are τ possible locations for this run
of k successes to start, and s possible servers whose state may be attacked. In total,
we find that:
Pr1offA − Pr2offA ≤ (k + 1)sτ · (kQ)k
In practice, we claim that Qd > TQb if entropy E = 32:
2−32 · Rδ
360
> 2−64 · 2p R
720
233δ > 2p
With the maximum poll value p = 17 permitted by NTP (Mills et al., 2010), this
reduces to the claim that δ > 2−16 ≈ 10−5 seconds, which is the time required for light
to travel about 3 miles. So, our inequality is reasonable unless the client and server
are physically co-located but still using a large polling value. Conversely, we claim
TQb > Qd if entropy E = 64: this claim reduces to the statement that 2
p > 2δ, which
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holds since RFC5905 constrains poll p ≥ 4 while network delays δ do not exceed 16
seconds in practice.
All that remains is to prove the following combinatorial statement relating the
probabilities of success during and between exchanges.
Lemma 1. Let Qd denote the probability that an attacker A successfully impacts the
state of client Pi∗ during an NTP exchange, Qb denote the probability that each packet
by A in between NTP exchanges impacts Pi∗’s state, and let T = 2p · R720 denote the
number of packets that A may send to each party in between NTP exchanges. Then,
the probability that A impacts k state observations in a row, beginning with a specified
exchange, is at most (k + 1) · (kQ)k, where Q = max{Qd, TQb}.
A may compromise a total of k states either during or between exchanges. Let
c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} denote the number of consecutive NTP exchanges (with a specified
starting point) that A plans to compromise; clearly, she may do so with probability
Qcd. Additionally, A must also inject a total of k − c state measurements over the
course of c + 1 intervals between these NTP exchanges. Here, each packet is an
independent Bernoulli random variable that successfully impact’s the client’s state
with success probability Qb. The total number of between-exchange successes (i.e.,
the sum of the (c + 1)T Bernoullis) is distributed as a binomial random variable,
hence the probability of k − c total successes is at most ((c+1)T
k−c
) ·Qk−cb .
In total, A succeeds at compromising c NTP exchanges and successfully injecting
state k − c times in between these exchanges with probability at most(
(c+ 1)T
k − c
)
QcdQ
k−c
b ≤ (kQ)k,
where the inequality follows from the bound
(
x
y
) ≤ xy. The lemma then follows by
summing the probabilities of success for the k + 1 choices of c.
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F.3 Soundness against on-path attackers.
We now prove Theorem 2 of Appendix 5.6.4, which states the protocols in Section 5.6.1
are sound against an on-path attacker onA as long as NTP packets are authenticated,
randomness is produced from a cryptographically-strong RNG, and honest parties
initialize their xmtj variables for each server to a 64-bit number generated by their
RNG upon reboot. For the protocol described in Figure 5·6, 5·7, which randomizes
the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp, we also require
that the second-level granularity of the client’s local time tc isn’t replicated too often
within NTP queries.
We suppose NTP is authenticated with MAC of length 2n. Let onA be any on-
path attacker, and let ts be any transcript involving a maximum of s trusted servers
per client and a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair that
replicate any tc value (up to the second) at most γ times. Let i
∗ be a client who does
not query onA as server.
As before, we use a sequence of games to prove that onA tampers the state of Pi∗
with probability at most onA. We start by reusing games G0 and G1 from the proof of
Theorem 1 above. It is straightforward to validate that the reduction between those
games continues to hold against an on-path attacker. We now build a new sequence of
games that (1) reflects onA’s ability to view the contents of honest parties’ messages
and (2) utilizes the MAC tag to limit onA’s spoofing capacity.
Foreshadowing the end of the proof, we will use Lemma 1 to arrive at the fi-
nal bound. As such, our analysis simply describes the impact of each game on the
probability of success during an NTP exchange (Qd) and between NTP exchanges
(Qb).
Game G′2. This game is identical to G1, except that the network N is additionally
instructed to drop all the packets sent by onA that are simply ‘preplays’ of packets
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sent between honest parties; i.e., spoofed packets sent by onA that are identical to
existing packets in N ’s queue such that onA’s packet will be delivered first.
Recall that our definition of soundness is agnostic to preplay attacks. Hence,
forbidding them has no effect on the adversary’s success probability, i.e., Pr1onA =
Pr2
′
onA.
Game G′3. This game is identical to G
′
2, except that we abort the execution if
the client Pi∗ sends two different queries to the same server with identical origin
timestamps. We stress that this constraint is independent of onA’s behavior.
Consider a single NTP exchange between client Pi∗ and server Pj where the client’s
clock begins at tc. Pi∗ ’s origin timestamp replicates a previous choice with probability
at most q32 = 2
−32γ if only the sub-second granularity is randomized or q64 = 2−64τ
if the entire expected origin timestamp is randomized. If the honest client repeats an
origin timestamp, then onA may trivially attack an NTP exchange by replaying (an
already-MAC’d) responses from previous exchanges.
Hence, the transformation from game G′2 to game G
′
3 affects Qd by at most qE.
We remark that onA only requires 1 packet to perform this attack, so the resulting
probability is independent of the bandwidth R.
Game G′4. This game is identical to G
′
3, except that the network N is instructed to
drop all of onA’s ‘replayed’ packets, i.e., packets sent by onA that are identical to
prior packets sent between honest parties and (1) have already been delivered or (2)
are in N ’s queue for delivery before onA’s packet. These replayed packets will have
valid MAC tags but stale origin timestamps.
Consider what happens when a response packet from server Pj is replayed to
target Pi∗ , or when a query packet from target Pi∗ is replayed to server Pj and elicits
Pj’s legitimate response packet. If Pi∗ and Pj are currently engaged in an NTP
exchange, then Pi∗ ’s state variable xmtj is set to an origin timestamp that is distinct
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from the one in the replay packet, so the replayed packet definitely fails TEST2 by
the constraint imposed by Game G′3. On the other hand, if Pi∗ and Pj are between
exchanges, then xmtj is set to a randomized value with 64 bits of entropy. Hence, the
transformation from game G′3 to game G
′
4 affects Qb by at most 2
−64.
Game G′5. This game is identical to G
′
4, except that the network N consciously
corrupts all MAC tags in offA’s spoofed packets that aren’t replays or preplays, so
they never verify. We note that onA has no chance of winning game G′5 (that is,
Pr5
′
onA = 0, and thus Qd = Qb = 0 for game G
′
5) because all of the packets she sends
are rejected by their recipients for having invalid tags. Hence, onA cannot get any
honest party to read its spoofed packets, much less change their state as a result of
them. Additionally, we claim that the Game G′4 → G′5 transformation affects Qd by
Rδ
360+n
· A(EU-CMA) and Qb by 2−64 · A(EU-CMA).
To prove the claim, we replace the tags of all onA’s packets toward server Pj
or client Pi∗ that aren’t replays or preplays with an invalid tag ⊥. We do this one
packet at a time, starting with the final packet and working our way back up to the
first one. By a simple hybrid argument, we see that each change has an impact with
probability at most A(EU-CMA).
During an exchange, a single forged MAC permits the attacker to respond to
a query with timing data of her own choosing, and a simple union bound gives the
bound on Qd stated above. In between exchanges, a forged message must also include
the origin timestamp matching Pi∗ ’s randomly-chosen xmtj or else the packet will fail
TEST2, yielding the bound on Qb.
Putting it all together. Game G1 additively impacts onA, and Game G′2 has no effect.
Games G′3, G
′
4, and G
′
5 all depend on k, and they detail the combined vulnerability
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of NTP to an on-path attacker during and between exchanges:
Qd ≤ qE + Rδ
360 + n
· A(EU-CMA)
Qb ≤ 2−64 · [1 +A(EU-CMA)] ≈ 2−64,
where the final approximation follows from the fact that 1+A(EU-CMA) ≈ 1 for any
reasonable MAC. Lemma 1 then bounds the probability that onA affects a particular
client-server state k times in a row beginning from a specified starting point, and (as
before) multiplying this value by the sτ possible starting points yields the bound in
Theorem 2.
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